







The purpose of this work consists of the following areas: first, to expli cate the 
methods and main theories in the study of comparative civilizations; second, 
articulate the field of problems in comparative studies, with a special emphasis on 
the basic assumptions inherent in civilizations; third, to develop the problems of 
interpretation, indicating the ways that textual traditions di sappear completely, or 
appear in the folds of other historical texts; fourth, to disclose the way the „logic of 
significance“ transgresses the limits of Western interpretation of space and time, 
and comprise the possibility for inter cultural studies. The authors grounded the text 






































Copyright © 2011 Mykolas Romeris University. 
All rights reserved.
UDK  008(091)













Prof. Joseph Pilotta, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, USA – 89 p. (5,35 author’s 
sheets)
Prof. Algis Mickunas, Ohio University, Athens, Ohio, USA – 89 p. (5,35 author’s sheets)
Publishing was approved by:
Institute of Humanities of Mykolas Romeris University (28th of June 2011, 
Nr. 2HMI-18).
Department of Foreign Languages of Mykolas Romeris University (22nd of June 2011, 
Nr. 1UKK-8).
Publication review and approval commission of Mykolas Romeris University (28th of 
July 2011, Nr. 2L-16).
ISBN 978-9955-19-314-2
3
CHAPTER I.  
CIVILIZATIONS AND CULTURES.....................................................................5
CHAPTER II.  
COMPARATIVE THEORIES ...............................................................................19
CHAPTER III.  
HERMENEUTICS ..................................................................................................39
CHAPTER IV.  
CULTURAL ETHNOLOGY .................................................................................61
CHAPTER V.  
TRANSCENDENTAL CONDITIONS OF CIVILIZATIONAL STUDIES...85
CHAPTER VI.  
LIFEWORLD AND CULTURE ..........................................................................107
CHAPTER VII.  
CULTURE: LAW AND VALUE: A ....................................................................139
CHAPTER VIII.  
TECHNICAL CENTERS AND CULTURAL MARGINS..............................161




CIVILIZATIONS AND CULTURES 
Introduction
We must explicate various problematic areas in the comparative 
study of cultures and their underlying civilization morphologies. The 
problem of “translation” from one culture into another is faced by every 
researcher of texts, regardless of the type or topic the texts may contain. 
Resultantly, a resolution must be found in another, all pervasive domains, 
which contains a great variety of cultures: civilization. The essay opens a 
methodology capable of accessing cross-disciplinary and cross-cultural 
analyses of texts at the level of civilizations and their comparisons.
The term “culture” has become iconic, ranging from lyric poetry to 
nomadic. In brief, everything is culture and culture is how everything 
acquires meaning. The language about culture is equally instructive: 
there is multi-culturalism, there are rights to discursive spaces – and 
their granting, there are pop and post-pop cultures, MTV discourses, 
and even corporate techno-discourses and cultures. All in all, the-
se facets are the media of currency and legitimating and provide the 
dynamics of culture as multiple incomprehension – not because of the 
pronouncements of various deaths – death of subject, poetry, philo-
sophy, identity, text, humanism, modernity, all the divinities and their 
mothers, and even death of death. The latter, as we all know is modern. 
Despite all this, there seem to be other phenomena that, while not of-
ficially articulated, are intended by cultural texts and even practices. 
Such phenomena are, pursuant to some of the major scholars, such as 
Weber, Dumont, Sorokin, Toynbee, Lauf, Dumezil, Kavolis, Eisenstadt, 
civilization. This is to say cultures belong to civilizations and are com-
prehensible as hermeneutical readings that signify civilizational pheno-
mena. Indeed, it could be claimed that the hermeneutical readings may 
range from myths through various theoretical pronouncements. What 
is at issue is that the followers of culturalism and multi-culturalism miss 
their own positions due to the problematics of regarding everything as 
culture. In this sense, the following essay is designed to decipher civi-
lizational phenomena by reading some myths that are prevalent in the 
6
CIVILIZATIONS, CULTURES, LIFEWORLDS /Comparative studies/
West. What such a reading proposes is this: the contemporary West se-
ems to be locked in a confrontation between two civilizations which 
have been expressed by mythological stories, i.e. read through myths. 
It is known that the term myth has been articulated in indefnite ways, 
from fable through scientifc theories, to everything is a mythical story. 
Yet it is also the case that culturalism regards myths as cultural stories 
whose meaning is independent of any other concerns: it is purely and 
even arbitrarily constructed. I shall address the notion of construction 
in subsequent sections; meanwhile, the very notion of culture, as used in 
the so-called critical cultural scholarship, must be taken under serious 
consideration in order to avoid the numerous implicit moralizings and 
universalizations.
Cultural Problematics
Cultural anthropology has to contend with the following issues, 
specifically the ones that require methodological access to the cultural 
phenomena and their multiplicity, and the presumed objectivity which 
is required as a guarantee to truth claims by theorists of culture. First, 
it is claimed that any member of a given group belongs to and unders-
tands itself within and in terms of its own culture. But this would mean 
that there cannot be any privileged persons who could escape their own 
cultural understanding in order to see it from outside. How does one 
alienate oneself from one’s culture, if the very culture regards itself as 
alienating? One is already stuck in a cultural position and hence cannot 
claim to have any culturally impartial attitude. Indeed, the very compre-
hension of impartiality is an aspect of a given culture. Second, the major 
solution to this issue may be offered by some of the major comparative 
theories. The latter want to argue that it is possible to understand one’s 
own culture from the vantage point of comparison with another culture. 
This suggests that one knows another culture by being immersed in it 
and hence having obtained a similar comprehension as the natives. This 
is to say, from this position one may claim that it is possible to see ones 
own culture in terms of the limits that the other culture offers. The ot-
her culture is, afar all, radically different, and we understand ourselves 
and the other in terms of the difference. Given this complex claim, it is 
impossible to offer a methodology that would allow us understanding 
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our own culture, since, seen from the culture of the other; our culture 
is already incorporated and interpreted in terms of the other culture., 
this means that neither one picks up another culture as a limit of one’s 
own and interprets it in terms of one’s own cultural grammar and hen-
ce has not escaped a problem of seeing one’s culture at its limit, or one 
adopts the other culture and translates one’s own culture in terms of 
the grammar of the other culture. In neither case has one gained any 
methodological access to one’s own, and indeed to the other’s culture. 
To speak pedagogically, if I am going to lecture on another culture, and 
claim that it is radically different from my own, I shall do so in terms of 
my language that is comprehensible to the audience to which I am com-
municating. Both the audience and I understand the other culture by 
giving it our own cultural context and grammar of interpretation. The 
same can be said in reverse when talking in terms of the other culture 
about our culture; in this case what we would get is the other’s incorpo-
ration of our culture into their context and grammar, and hence without 
offering anything more than their cultural frame – but comprehensible 
only to those who are part of, or have been immersed in the culture of 
the other. Third, we face, what could be called, the hysteria of objectivity. 
By hysteria I mean the shock that objectively speaking other cultures 
have to be treated as equivalent to our own, leading to the efforts that 
deny other cultures their due and right to speak. This is to say, the scien-
tific modern Western pronouncement that everything has to be treated 
with objective impartiality, requires the positing of our own culture as 
one among others, having no value claim to be privileged in its various 
pronouncements.
But this is the hysterical point: the claim to scientific objectivity 
is one aspect of Western modern culture and belongs to the interpre-
tive context of this culture. Hence, the very claim to Western scientific 
superiority, as having methods to access all phenomena objectively, is 
a culture bound position that cannot be universal. After all, objectively 
speaking, other cultures, as equal, have very different understandings 
that do not include such tandems as objectivity or for that matter su-
bjectivity. Culturally objectively speaking, we cannot deny them their 
different reading of cultural, and indeed all other phenomena. To say 
that the others are wrong would be tantamount to saying that we have a 
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criterion of the right culture which belongs only to one culture. But in 
this sense, one abolishes the treatment of other cultures as given objecti-
vely and equivalently. We then would posit our culture as universal and 
require that all others interpret themselves in terms of our own requi-
rements. Yet, by the claim of treating all other cultures objectively and 
without prejudice, we have just offered a position that requires (1) the 
treatment of other cultures not as they are but as they are interpreted in 
terms of one culture’s requirements, or (2) of surrendering our cultural 
prejudice of objectivity, and allowing other cultures to have a voice that 
does not regard them as inferior. Given this setting, we revert back to 
the problematic mentioned above: how can one claim to know the ot-
her objectively when one has imposed one’s own cultural component of 
objectivity on others and hence not only did not understand the other 
culture, but failed to escape one’s own culture. In this sense, the very 
claim to be able to treat one’s own culture objectively, is to accept this 
very culture without any objectivity, since one already lives and accepts 
the terms of their own culture.
A usual approach to civilization studies (employed by most of the 
above mentioned scholars) demands the inclusion of two broad concep-
tions: first, there is a requirement to discover the broadest morpholo-
gies which determine social and cultural parameters. If problems ari-
se within social and cultural domains, the problems must be resolved 
at the level of such morphologies. Thus, according to Eisenstadt, (we 
shall expand on his thinking subsequently) the morphology of Islam 
is sensate-idea-tional. Any interpretive questions arising at any level of 
social, aesthetic, commercial, legal life must be resolved at the level of 
this morphology. Second, in order to signify civilizations and not only 
societies and cultures, one must attend to the symbolic designs of social 
systems which combine into broadest and most encompassing morpho-
logies – civilizations. This comprehension of civilization does not seem 
to be adequate, since through social structures and symbolic designs 
appear phenomena that do not play a role as if they were a “broader 
morphology,” but the very way that cultures, as interpretive devices of 
the world, also signify directly the civilization phenomena. The latter 
are signified by varieties of texts, such as social systems, theories, myths, 
even symbolic designs as interpretive, but which are not composed of 
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accumulation of interpretive texts. These phenomena are not to be con-
sidered as “deep structures,” as if they were some founding rules, but are 
phenomena precisely because they are the very sense and foreground of 
the varieties of interpretive  texts. It may be the case that the civilization 
phenomena may be resisted by a particular cultural text, but the resi-
stance shows the significance of civilization phenomena.
Methodologically speaking, civilization analyses have a task of 
tracing the characteristics of these phenomena, since the latter, as phe-
nomena, comprise, in turn, an access to cultural texts. Any comparative 
analyses of cultures also provide a way of contrasting and correlating 
civilization phenomena. Moreover, the latter must be broader than any 
specific culture, despite the fact that they are not founding phenomena. 
Indeed, they are broader because they are phenomena and not localiza-
ble or ontic reality. Some of the more interesting cultural texts – to which 
I shall attend shortly – are mythological formations and their dramatic 
enactments. It could even be said that speaking about various moralities, 
they too, in most cases, appear as mythological and dramatic depictions. 
It must be emphasized nonetheless, that mythological morphologies 
and their dramatic enactments do not comprise civilizations, but a way 
of signifying or intending the civilization phenomena. In the very proc-
ess of interpreting the world, myths, and emphatically dramatic myths 
constitute their correlative civilization phenomena. These phenomena 
usually are proposed by scholars of civilizations who propose theories 
capable of encompassing and grounding all civilizations.
It has been shown that there is no direct and demonstrable con-
nection between theoretical thought and the domain of life world experi-
ence of things, cultural objects, and even language. The experienced phe-
nomena are external to theories and the conjunction between them has 
no necessity. The conjunction requires a conjoiner whose understanding 
must be broader than the theory and its selected perceptual aspects. The 
conjoiner is a reflecting process that performs the task from a vantage 
point of interest, whether the latter is culturally prejudged, linguistically 
prescribed or part of a historical tradition. In this sense, an application 
of a theory does not yield pure objective perceptual phenomena, but one 
that is interpreted by the theoretical requirements and finally by some 
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contextual interest. The latter is usually understood in cultural, histori-
cal or linguistic terms.
The scientist, or the theorizing subject, as cultural and historical, is 
also a factor in the domain of investigation. The philosopher, if he/she is 
a part of culture or his/her own history, cannot claim to obtain the given 
phenomena without changing them. The very philosophical explanati-
on that assumes historical or cultural position will itself transform the 
subject matter of such explanation. While being shaped by historical 
and cultural contexts, the explanations offered will also change the con-
texts. In turn, if a theory is part of a culture and history and is shaped 
by them, then no theory is sufficiently broad to encompass and offer the 
position of a final interpretation. It is only one aspect of a historical tra-
dition, a culture or a language. As Apel once pointed out, if positivism 
were to offer two contesting meta-languages, each claiming to account 
for all the usages of a given language, then the debate between them 
would involve a language that is broader than either meta-language. In-
deed, this can also be said of historical-philosophical hermeneutics that 
posits a historical tradition as the unsurpassable ground of all unders-
tanding of things and being itself, it too is a historically contingent posi-
tion that may belong to a specific historical period of a specific tradition 
and hence cannot offer a universal claim. Another context, of the same 
tradition, might not have a historicizing language and hence no such 
understanding, not to speak of entirely different traditions.
Perhaps the most pronounced way of this manner of theorizing, 
i.e. proposing a universal explanation that intended to overcome the 
problems of inherence in a historical tradition or linguistic culture was 
offered by positivism and is still offered by mainstream analytic mode of 
theorizing. In the first case, there is an a priori position that posits a rea-
lity in itself that is untainted by historical traditions and can be accessed 
by appropriately constituted method. But this means that all experien-
ces in and of the world have to be discarded or reduced to the posited 
reality. Yet these positions do not escape the issue of the last interpreter 
to the extent that the method, formulated as mathematical logic, does 
not in any way imply a direct access to the posited reality. The method 
must be applied from an evaluative position which, for these trends, is 
pragmatic. What works for human benefit – at the price that humans 
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must also be reduced to the same reality? In brief, such reality does not 
offer itself in its purity but in terms of what we can make of it, and thus 
to transform it through our pragmatic intervention. Even Habermas, 
who understood well the instrumental nature of modern positivistic 
methodology, hoped to break out of the hermeneutical context by posi-
ting science, such as psychology, that can treat our traumas objectively. 
Yet as we know, these sciences are not ontological but normative: they 
are designed to make us function normally. The latter is, of course, a 
prescriptive behavior in a context of a specific society, culture, or histo-
rical tradition.
All that we have attained so far is that a given theory or a selec-
ted method cannot be by themselves the last moment of interpretation, 
since they are either one aspect of a given historical tradition, cultu-
re, or language or are interpreted by some evaluative point of interest 
which might be seen as the last point of interpretation. Moreover, the 
very objectivity that is being sought is not attainable since every effort 
to reach it leads to the understanding that it is compelled to change in 
accordance with the point of interest that may be laden with numerous 
interpretations or with the very process of application of theory to rea-
lity that is radically selective of what will count as objective among the 
various ontological options and thus posits an a priori decision what 
will be the data of a given theory. That is to say, all other data will not be 
tolerated as objective and dismissed as theoretically redundant, perhaps 
subjective. But such a position will not include a justification for the 
principle of selectivity of the required ontology or its own position. If 
an explanation is to be universal, then it must be explained by the selec-
ted ontology and the prescriptive methodology. If not, then neither the 
theory nor a methodology, posing as a theory in its formal-quantitative 
language, can be all-encompassing and provide the domain of the final 
interpreter.
From what has been said so far it can be concluded in one regard 
that the subject, or the last interpreter, who constructs theories, correla-
tes them to selected phenomena, and evaluates such correlation, cannot 
be, in principle, investigated by any of the empirical sciences. If this were 
the case, then the very subject of selectivity, correlation and interpreta-
tion would be selected as an object of another subject of selectivity and 
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interpretation leading to an infinite regress. In brief, the last interpreter, 
the selecting and correlating awareness cannot be a subject-matter of 
any specific objective science and theory, and resultantly the last inter-
preter is inaccessible by theories and methodologies of any philosophy 
or science. To avoid this conclusion, all one has to do is to proclaim that 
the last interpreter is a language of a historical tradition and hence the 
subject becomes either redundant or is determined by her language and 
in other variants by her culture, historical context and even psychologi-
cal upbringing. Even the sense of the subject depends on a cultural and/
or linguistic context in which one resides. This general hermeneutical 
position is taken for granted by culturalism, legalisms, and historicisms. 
No doubt, such a position seems plausible given the variety of meanings 
ascribed to subject or what is deemed to be a subject.
To state this issue in terms of a general hermeneutical principle, 
any theory, any method, any meaning of anything, including the sub-
ject, emerges as an aspect of its historical tradition and in turn points 
back to it, thus forming a hermeneutical circle. Any theory that offers an 
explanation of everything, converges into the historical horizon of that 
tradition; the latter is broader than the explanatory theory. But such a 
circle also intimates that all awareness is a result of a language, culture, 
customs, and even prejudgments of a historical tradition within whose 
horizons the human dwells. All is interpretation; even the most admired 
strict sciences do not offer access to the way things are; afar all, if one 
looks at scientific language, one notes that its logic and structure is not 
derived from experienced phenomena. In brief, it is different from such 
phenomena and thus when applied, it becomes an interpretation. Of 
course, we must make a note here: if one claims that a given language 
is distinct from the experienced phenomena, then one must also admit 
that she has an awareness of things that is not bound by language; ot-
herwise the distinction between language and things could not be made. 
Let us leave this issue aside for a moment and point out that the herme-
neutical circle, interpreted as language, culture, or tradition, claiming 
to be the last interpreter, cannot be cognizant of itself. If language is 
the medium in which all events, theories, methods are understood, in 
which selectivity and designation of what is real, unreal, objective and 
subjective appears, then language cannot be a subject matter of any phi-
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losophy or theory, since the latter would be one aspect within the vast 
linguistic tradition. If culture were the last vestige to be posited as the 
condition for all interpretations, then such a culture could not become 
an object of any theory, philosophy, or method. If a tradition and its 
horizons comprise the dimension in which we dwell, then such a tra-
dition could not be grasped by any theory about a tradition, since such 
a theory again would be a minor aspect of it. It could be said that even 
the very notion of a hermeneutical circle and convergence of horizons 
of a tradition and of an interpreter would have to be one claim within 
a given tradition. All these claims, by virtue of their self-destruction, 
become necessarily contingent. And yet, left to their own devices, they 
seem to be epitome of necessity.
Some claim that cultural hermeneutics comprise partial civiliza-
tional phenomena, and, as mentioned above, there are theories that 
attempt to combine such partial aspects into more unified theories in 
order to propose broader civilization morphologies. Yet what is noti-
ceable in such efforts is their partiality as hermeneutical constitution of 
civilization phenomena. This is to say, such efforts reveal that the very 
proposed theories are another interpretive way of signifying civilizati-
on phenomena. Thus, if one pays close attention to the above mentio-
ned civilization theorists, including more current ones such as Dumont 
and Eisenstadt, to be considered shortly, one notes their pre-judgments. 
First, each civilization scholar is closely tied to modern Western catego-
ries for analytical tools as cultural interpretive modes of the analysis of 
all civilizations; second, each theorist takes some specific civilization as 
“normal” and regards others as deviations; finally, there is inadequate 
attention to the problematics that various theories, be they sociological, 
psychological, economic, historical, are interpretations that signify phe-
nomena that are specific to a singular civilization. Moreover, it behooves 
us to note that even at a superficial level closer attention should be paid 
to the unnoticed relationships among theories within a given civilizati-
on. For example, Kavolis points out that if we take Freud’s division of a 
person into Id, Ego, Superego, we also note that such a division is social 
class division: low, middle, and high classes. Just as Id strives toward ego, 
and Ego is subject to Superego, so does the lower class battle to reach 
a middle class status, under the requirements of the upper class. But 
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in this sense, the various theories are translatable into hermeneutical 
understandings that signify civilization phenomena. These phenomena 
then transgress the boundaries of the various cultures and theories that 
constitute them through their very activity of interpretation. This also 
suggests that the civilization phenomena are not derived from cultural 
and theoretical hermeneutics or from their generalization. All of these 
comprise the processes, conceptions, intentionalities that constitute ci-
vilizations. It could be pointed out that such phenomena coincide with 
sense making; this is not to say that civilization phenomena are some 
sort of individualistic or intersubjective presences; it is the very sense 
that emerges with the cultural and theoretical hermeneutics. We shall 
devote an entire chapter for this topic.
It has been well established that not all traditions are historical, not 
even some that belong to the Western civilization. Hence, it is necessary 
to explicate the philosophical aspects that gave rise to the conception of 
what, in the modern West, is called history. The subject matter that is at 
issue is one of ontology. The latter is reserved for the exposition of the 
basic principles that constitute the very essence of nature. The latter has 
been a debate within and among major schools of philosophy, yet all of 
them will have to be explicated at the level wherein the necessity for his-
tory arises. Despite some variations, classical Greek thought understood 
all natural events from their limits (peras). Every being is determined 
to be a specific kind of being by the limit which cannot be transgressed. 
Whether the limit is located in topos noitos (the place of ideas), or is the 
morphe (the inherent form of a thing) in each case they are the very es-
sence of a given thing. In turn, the essence of a being is what comprises 
its very purpose, its Alpha and Omega, its intelligibility such that from 
the very inception of a given being, the form, the essence, is what deter-
mines the way the given being will unfold its dynamis, kinesis, its dyna-
mics, the shape of its movement. The dynamics, therefore, is intelligible 
at the outset because it manifests its own form as the very purpose of its 
unfolding. In this sense, every being has its own purpose, which is its 
own essence. This means that the necessity of all beings is inherent in 
them. Contingency or accidental encounters do not alter the essence of 
beings. An animal, engaged in the unfolding of its essence as its purpo-
se, such as grazing, may encounter a lightning, which too is unfolding 
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its essence, would encounter an accident. The latter may be mechanical, 
but not essential to the beings of either event. Moreover, any notion of 
evolution is excluded a priori. A being does not evolve from previous 
beings nor does it evolve from itself by addition of elements from other 
events. In the former case, a parent does not produce something essen-
tially higher than itself. It is the rule of aitia, an efficient cause, since the 
result can be equal, but never more than its cause. In the second case, a 
being, as a result of its essential cause, cannot evolve, since at the very 
outset it contains its essence that will unfold to full actuality, but it will 
not change in itself. A monkey will produce monkeys and cannot be a 
cause of something more. In turn, beings have no histories, apart from 
differences in the unfolding of their essence. A human may become a 
carpenter, a baker, a scientist, but these factors do not change the essen-
ce of what a human being is; they are accidental encounters in specific 
settings. In brief, a human is born and will die a human. That we have 
Herodotus and Thucydides as “historians” does not mean that there is 
anything necessary in “historical” accounts. Such accounts depict chan-
cy encounters, accidental intersection, which is subtended by the pursuit 
of human telos as human essence. In this sense, historical events, such 
as encounters of armies, will be essentially forever the same, regardless 
of time and place. Essentially, there is no difference between Alexander, 
Napoleon, Bush or Hitler, battle of Gorillas or charge of elephants; they 
all pursue their essential natures. It would be nonsensical to speak of the 
history of Alexander or a history of a snail.
The ontological shift in modern philosophy toward mechanistic at-
omism strips all essential structures from nature and replaces all beings 
with a sum of material parts functioning in accordance with mechanical 
laws. Therefore, no beings of nature have any purpose. This ontological 
conception of all nature leaves one entity, the human as a thinking sub-
ject, who has purposes. But such purposes have nothing to do with the 
real, material world, including human bodies that function mechanical-
ly. Moreover, such thinking and its purposes have no fixed rules or laws; 
it is basically volunturistic. Hence human actions, directed by will, make 
their way that is distinct from the world of ontologically posited reality. 
Humans make history as a purposive process, which might aim at some 
final end. The latter has been depicted by various utopian images, in-
16
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cluding some versions of Marxism. If material events are counted in this 
purposive history, they are not ontologically material, but practically, i.e. 
what can we make of the indifferent, mechanical, and purposeless stuff 
for our aims and presumed needs. We know the rest of the modern story 
as a progress of technology and human mastery of the material environ-
ment (including the material human as part of the environment). We 
also know the story of the metaphysics of the will pervading all modern 
philosophies in such guises as power, autonomy, arbitrariness, and force 
adherence to personality cults (such as Judaism, Christianity and Islam). 
We also know the story of the efforts to impute into consciously con-
structed events some sort of causal connections and thus make history 
into science. Moreover, we have been told that historical writing is based 
on research and therefore is scientific. There is also a plethora of propos-
als to ontologize history by presuming that it is explainable in terms of 
some basic biochemical components, specifically genetic and evolution-
ary biology. Finally, there are even voices proclaiming the end of history. 
Such efforts are premised on a specific confusion between theoretical, 
continuous time, and historical time, wherein the latter, as phenomenon 
of human awareness, has no necessary continuous connections.
Critique of Historical Reason
The notion that history is human and not natural phenomenon le-
ads to the way that modern Western thought had to account for time. 
All events, depicted mechanically, follow a causal sequence. What is gi-
ven now can be explained by previous causes. Yet at present the previous 
causes are no longer available; they require an introduction of awareness 
of the past, called memory. The future not being at present also requi-
res an awareness which is called projection of temporal possibilities. 
Both are, of course, phenomena of consciousness. The latter must pro-
vide temporal connections, so well recognized by Kant, Hegel, Husserl, 
Heidegger, and finally Sartre. Some, such as Hegel, realized that human 
memory and projection are inadequate to account for past events which 
are beyond human memory. Hence an introduction of an absolute cons-
ciousness, a sort of all encompassing, eternity, manifests itself in a conti-
nuous historical time. Such an eternity is incompatible with temporality 
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to the extent that eternity, as an infinite position, cannot be divided into 
historical, temporal periods, without ceasing to be infinite. Kierkegaard 
made sport of Hegel on this point. Once the infinite collapses, what re-
mains are contingent, historical events, having no necessary connecti-
ons, apart from human memory and projected future. To save the day, 
scientific reason introduces the method of quantification and the abili-
ty to measure mathematically (presumed to be objective operation) of 
events of the past and expected events of the future. All is well, but the 
problem is not  solved – only postponed. First, how can a subject, living 
in the present, extend its measures on the past if the latter is no longer 
and the future is not yet? What does one measure? Second, mathemati-
cal devices are not temporal and do not provide any clues whether what 
is being measured is in the past or in the future. Hence, one has to assu-
me awareness of the past and of the future which, as was seen, are not 
given except in the present awareness. Space is no mystery; all spatial 
events are present now, deployed one next to the other but, as material, 
they do not signify their past or their future. Hence, once again, the si-
gnifications of both are conscious phenomenon.
Historical reason encounters broader issues. Assuming that there is 
a continuous historical process, having a future aim as its final purpose 
that is posited as a necessary condition for necessary connections betwe-
en temporal events, the assumption results in a positing of historical ru-
les, be they dialectics of Hegelian or Marxian brands, or some presumed 
evolution. In brief, future final purpose is posited as a condition for the 
invention of necessary rules of historical development. It is significant 
that the final purpose is in and part of history and hence one aspect of 
history and thus defers the very notion of a final purpose. After all, one 
historical event cannot be the aim of the whole. Afar this “final event” is 
reached; history does not cease and thus abolishes such an event as final. 
This outcome forces the thinkers of historical reason to posit a transcen-
dent historical aim above or beyond history. Such transcendence cannot 
be historical and properly must be designated to be eternal. The results 
of this transcendent view are as follows: first, the best that can be ob-
tained from it is a changeless dialectical structure or system and hence 
in principle static, yielding no historical development; second, trans-
cendent, infinite being is unknowable by contingent historical actors 
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(well noted by Kierkegaard) and thus cannot be a source of claims as to 
whither of human destiny; third, infinity has no temporal orientation 
and would not be an indices of a purposive direction of history; fourth, 
historical consciousness cannot escape self-destruction in terms of its 
claim to be universal and all inclusive, because, one, if all consciousness 
is historical (expressed pedagogically as an accumulation of knowledge) 
and must be historically contextualized, then such a conscious claim is 
equally historical and must be understood within its historical context; 
and two, the very ontology, which gave rise to the conception of me-
chanical world, is equally historical. Hence, if the mechanical universe 
were to be reinterpreted as one of having open meaning, i.e. signitive, 
then historical consciousness would cease to be relevant. These aspects 
place current historical consciousness at a complete loss and a crisis. 
No doubt, the wrestling with this crisis led numerous philosophical and 
scientific efforts into all sorts of metaphysical postulates of infinity, and 
cosmic order, all attempting to find some permanent component, even 
an eternal recurrence, as a saving grace. Theories are proposed and dis-
carded like spring fashions, continuously disclosing our confusion.
The understanding of history, therefore, is premised on modern 
Western ontology which is not available to other civilizations and there-
fore cannot be used a priori as a silent assumption. Does India or China 
have histories, and if so, what kind? Tao is not a divinity which humans 
must seek as their purpose, and the coming and passing of all events 
have no specific direction and hence no aim. The time of India is ocea-
nic-rhythmic, offering no utopian future or nirvana. This suggests that 
civilizations have different modes of time awareness which need not in-
clude “historical time.” These suggestions are necessary to avoid imposi-




Sociologists, specifically those who have historical orientation, are 
prone to claims that the current upsurge of search for national or even 
ethnic identities are temporary. Nationalities that claim to be based on 
ethnicity, are a recent product of the modern West and, as all other tem-
poral entities, are doomed to vanish. Yet such claims fail to account for 
the surge of nationalisms and their insistence on reclaiming their own 
identities. The task of this section is to outline various civilization com-
parative theories in order to note their adequacy with respect to national 
cultures and in turn to point to their own prejudgments that might not 
be sufficient to explicate “the others” as civilization ally and culturally 
different. This requires the placement into civilization context even of 
Western secular civilization with its enlightenment and democracy as 
one among other civilizations. No theory based on this civilization can 
be privileged as a standard for the others. Thus one major caution: any 
attempt to “export” a civilization by any means would be a presumption 
that only “we” know how the rest of the world should live. Even the 
much lauded “modernization” and even the more famous “postmoder-
nism” should not be given any precedence, since they might be only 
one type of modernization and quite different from other types. There 
are good indications to support this position. In China, Confucian te-
achings were modernizing and Taoism was its post modernity; Islam 
was modernizing, and Sufism was its inherent postmodernism. Each 
modernization claims to have found some universal set of standards 
which include all humanity: thus modern West proposes “universal hu-
man rights”, based on universal humanism and secularism, Islam offers 
universal Sharia under one Khalifat, each having their own postmodern 
extensions. Even designations of the philosophies of other civilizations 
must be avoided; Western tradition is, in principle, philosophical, and 
thus it would be inappropriate to burden other traditions with such de-
signations. To call Hinduism, Confucianism, Buddhism, Medieval the-
ologies, shamanic pronouncements philosophical would be an imposi-
tion of external and thus unfitting terms – one could even say it would 
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be an insult. Resultantly, we shall avoid such insults and treat the others 
in their own right. In turn, we shall have to insist that the theories we 
shall survey do the same; barring that, we shall not spare our critical 
remarks.
There is no question that current debates concerning civilization 
phenomena are playing on the background of Western modern moderni-
zation; some civilizations are regarded as engaged in efforts to extricate 
themselves from and even retard modernization – this would be the 
case with Mid-Eastern civilization (composed of Judaism, Christianity, 
and Islam), while others are moving at full speed to catch up and even 
surpass the West and hence enter “world history” as equals – the cases 
of China and India. No doubt, in all cases there are admixtures of tradi-
tion and novelty, the latter being Western modernity while the former 
a search for roots in order to have a revolution that recoups the past. 
Here, the major scholars enter the scene with their hypotheses and offer 
theoretical bases for their explication of diverse civilizations. There is a 
tendency among scholars of civilizations to offer an encompassing and 
yet “clean models” of symbolic designs that compose civilization aware-
ness, even if such models range from binary to quadrennial formations. 
Sorokin’s research presents an example of the binary type that separates 
civilization awareness into two major regions: ideational and sensate, 
each assuming different variations within the parameters of a specific 
civilization. Thus we have empiricism and rationalism in Modern West 
and pure transcendence, in contrast to polluting rescendence in Hin-
duism. Nonetheless, for him Oriental awareness is basically ideational, 
even if Confucian mode of awareness allowed for mixtures. The same 
can be said of Islam, apart from a couple of periods that allowed the 
sensate awareness some space. According to him, the ideational empha-
sis is a hindrance to dynamic tension and resultantly to modernization. 
The West, in contrast, is dynamic due to the tension and constant shift 
between ideational and sensate awareness. The shifts are regarded sequ-
entially; as soon as modality of consciousness is exhausted, it switches to 
the other and re-dynamizes- the entire civilization process.
It is somewhat out of character for a student of civilizations to pro-
claim that the Western mode of awareness is standard, while other mo-
des are abnormal and are deviations from the dynamics of the West. 
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Sorokin overstates his case by accepting only the modern awareness of 
the West as a standard and interprets other periods – even in the West – 
along the modern lines. Even classical Greek thought was a constant 
mixture of the two regions, and the mixture at times had no sensate 
components, even if there were such theses as atomistic materialism. 
Moreover, Medieval West was no paradigm of dynamics, while China, 
of the same period, was an explosive society that could have “walked 
across Europe” in a month. Hence, a closer look at diverse periods of 
different civilizations would open more complex formations than the 
ones suggested by Sorokin. There is another issue that requires greater 
caution. Modern West and its obvious dynamics is not a constant shif-
ting between sensate-empirical, and rationalist-ideational formations, 
but a continuous creation-transformation of ideational factors. Modern 
West’s empiricism is not at all “sensate” since the “empirical” awareness 
is designated as “subjective” and is irrelevant for scientific pursuits. 
What is relevant is a creation of an ontology that posits homogeneous 
material parts (inaccessible to any senses) to be treated quantitatively. 
This means that the quantitative-ideational domain is created by the hu-
mans and can be transformed and recreated at will and applied on the 
homogeneous (equally ideational) material domain in order to shape 
it in terms of ever newly invented formal structures. This creativity is 
premised on the “will to master” the environment, including humans, 
technologically. This will to master, appearing in various modern guises 
as will to power, is the dynamic surge that defers the Sorokin binary 
structure. Moreover, there is no account by Sorokin what is the “me-
dium” that allows the shift from sensate to ideational awareness. After 
all, purely empirical sense awareness is inexhaustible, colorful, resona-
ting with sounds that can suggest new songs, new colorful paintings, 
just as the ideational is to be continuously formed into new “logical” 
problems and continue indefinitely. Critically speaking, Sorokin’s accept-
ance of modern West as “normal” is not even adequate for the West, not 
to speak of other civilizations.
Another theorist, who follows a binary, even if more complex struc-
ture, is Dumont. He suggests that complex civilizations are distinguis-
hed by their dominant ideologies, composed of a network of symbols 
that legitimate the relationship of individuals to a society in a hierarchi-
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cal pattern. The traditions in which the individual is subject to society 
are normal. The modern Western type, where the individual is prior 
to society, and is the legitimating source of the latter, is abnormal. His 
claim rests on pragmatic considerations: normal means a type which 
best preserves continuity and stability. Basically, an all-pervasive ideolo-
gy, subordinating all power, must be at the top of a hierarchy, while the 
lower level of practical, daily activities, must keep power and ideology 
separate. Of course the separation varies; it may appear as a distinction 
of a priest and ruler, for example, the case of India, or church and state 
in the Medieval West. In case of threats from the lower level, they can be 
integrated at the higher level by ideological images. Since modern West 
does not have such a structure, it is in a constant state of dissolution that 
leads to momentary creations of dictatorships to lend some semblance 
of structure. In this way, the modern West is radically deficient, while 
India can be a standard for a normal civilization. It is important to note 
that his comparison of Western modernity with traditional India can 
provide a means to criticize only the modern West. 
No doubt there is something about longevity of a civilization that 
might lend it an image of stability and continuity, but the case of India 
does not offer itself as such an image. Traditional India, as can be found 
not only in the Vedas, but also in Ramayana and Mahabharata, is per-
vaded by cosmic energies, erotic tensions, playful yet bloody battles be-
tween Aryan patriarchal divinities and Dravidian maternal forces; there 
is no hierarchy, since in that world any figure, no matter how “high” 
may fall and become “low”, while the latter, by virtue of its efforts at pu-
frication, may reach celestial heights. Precisely this play (lila) of cosmic 
forces (shakti) that allowed this tradition to oust the British empire. As 
Churchill complained, how is it that a naked fakir has chased us out of 
India? There being multitudes of divinities of all sorts, male and female, 
and each guru, capable of declaring himself a divinity, no “Priest” was 
and could be on top of the hierarchy of civilization. Even today, India 
has no problems of absorbing the Western modernity and its “instabil-
ity” into its own instability and thus dynamic continuity. A better candi-
date for Dumont’s stable civilization would be the Mid-Eastern civiliza-
tion, starting with the Persian absolute hierarchy of positions and one 
autocratic power, wherein the ruler and priest-divinity are one, and his 
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law is changeless. The variants of this mode of awareness extend through 
Judaic-Christian-Islamic monotheisms, reaching into autocratic Byzan 
the empire and Soviet Union with its absolute hierarchy of positions 
and power. In this mode of awareness, there is no distinction between 
the priest and the ruler, so obvious in the proclamations of the divine 
right of kings, or the identity of the head of church with the head of the 
state. Indeed, its continuity has been remarkable, although one of its 
pillars, Soviet autocracy, has lost its grip precisely due to the continuous 
instability of the West. The other pillar, Judaism-Christianity and Islam, 
is still holding firm against the great Satan, the modern Secular West, 
although in all sorts of modified ways that must inevitably accept the 
creative dynamics of secularism for its survival.
Dumont’s criticism of modern Western individualism as a source of 
instability becomes contradictory to the extent that it fails to take into 
account the built-in reflective self-correction of modern West. The lat-
ter allows an awareness of human fallibility and demands that the estab-
lished dictatorships on the basis of popular and individualistic demands 
be dismantled equally on individualistic basis because such dictators-
hips violated individual rights. This is to say, the individual comprises 
a criterion that destroys autocratic claims to infallibility. Thus modern 
West, having been accused of slavery and colonialism, was the first to 
admit that such practices are unacceptable not only in the West, but 
universally. Meanwhile, the much lauded hierarchical, autocratic civili-
zation, having engaged in the same practices, will not admit its wrong-
doings and, despite all evidence, continues to claim infallibility. After 
all, how could a civilization, being identical to divine law and will, the 
laws of dialectics and historical reason, ever be mistaken? In this sense, 
its continuity is premised on stability that can neither accept changes 
nor tolerate challenges. If we are to take Dumont’s proposed standard of 
civilizations, the hierarchical structure and other modes of awareness as 
deficient, then we would also have to accept a very stagnant and self- de-
feating civilization, since any dynamics would have to be borrowed from 
others, introducing a “virus” in its very core for survival. Subsequently 
we shall explore this intersection between civilizations that offer more 
fundamental ways of accessing their uniqueness and the possibility for 
their comparisons.
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While a member of a modern world, Weber offers a more complex 
framework for the continuity and transformation of civilizations. Accord-
ing to him, complexity does not require some ideal integration. Rather, 
the continuity depends on struggles among diverse groups, associations 
of groups, social organizations and various ideologies. Some coherence 
may be found at the level of some cultures belonging to a civilization, yet 
what holds a complex civilization together are the processes that manage 
the struggles in ways that the latter do not destroy the continuity of a civi-
lization. These processes provide benefits and are enforced against those 
with less benefits. Those with less benefits comprise a source of trans-
formations which are more complex than a mere uprising. According to 
Weber, important transformations, such as emergence of Western moder-
nity, depend on a conjunction of elements that appear very rarely. There 
is a requirement of attainable ethos addressed to dissatisfied groups and 
their unique imagination of the future and practical interests, legal system 
and community or kinship structures. Hence in the Medieval West there 
is a tension and a balancing between the spiritual or organized church and 
the monastic community, and between a unique voluntarism of the feudal 
state, with a limited covenant and an autonomous bureaucracy possessing 
a general power of coercion. But in the development toward modernity, 
this is also the source of Western abnormality. Once it reaches maturity, it 
loses the positioning of various, even if unequal parts, and becomes domi-
nated by a homogeneous logic of rationalization; it becomes an iron cage. 
If normal is less rational, then it will appear in the guises of the ant mo-
dern, postmodern and archaic. The current appearance of nationalisms 
tends toward archaisms that are ethnocentric and bear traces of sacrality 
tensed against modernizing secularism. It might be added that the in-
clusion of postmodernism among the irrational rejection of modernism’s 
rationalism is correct if we disclose another level of Western modernity: 
metaphysics of the will where everything, including the environment and 
human beings, are constructs without any rules – arbitrary. This is preci-
sely the point of numerous post-moderns: all discourses, cultures and life 
worlds are arbitrary constructs having no basis in anything.
Although it might seem that all required factors needed to un-
derstand civilizations are in place, the question arises whether Weber 
is bound by modern Western categories that might not be adequate to 
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the modes of awareness of other civilizations and their transformations. 
First, the notion of modern Western rationality must be modified by the 
fact that such rationality in no wise corresponds to classical reason that 
constitutes one major pillar of Western philosophical civilization. That 
reason was Socratic, capable of maintaining an open domain for debat-
ing any question, position, or claim in an effort to understand things as 
they are. Modern rationality is instrumental, quantitative and in princi-
ple technological “at the service of humanity’s salvation.” If it is an iron 
cage, it is so because it does not allow any other rationality to have a 
“scientific voice.” This suggests that Weber’s understanding of modern 
civilization is inadequate to encompass even Western civilization, not to 
speak of various other civilizations. As to the forces that transform civi-
lizations, we may suggest that Mid Eastern civilization and its transfor-
mations did not change its basic configuration and were not powered by 
classes with less benefits in a society. They all were premised on the edict 
to constantly re-establish that very civilization whose members have 
drifted away from its true calling: bringing the entire humanity to kneel 
before the only lord, the lord of lords, king of kings, and a complete 
autocracy. It must be recalled that the current tensions of the Mid East, 
drawing in other civilizations, is a family war within one civilization.
Meanwhile, another theorist of civilizations, Eisenstadt, argues that 
Weber’s thesis is inadequate to encompass complex designs of civiliza-
tions, because this thesis is basically sociological and fails to provide an 
all encompassing format for them all. For Eisenstadt, civilization symbol-
isms are designed to relieve the tension between the transcendent and 
the mundane regions. At this level, he operates with a binary structure. 
Civilizations exhibit various solutions to this tension: a contemplation of 
an other-worldly transcendence, characteristic of Hinduism and Budd-
hism; mundane ethical action in case of Confucianism and secularism, 
and the nexus between transcending and this worldly action. Thus in 
Islam there is a strong separation of military action and political practi-
ce from an ordered transcending orientation. Islam can accept Western 
modernization in military and other practical spheres. A different form 
of this nexus can be found in medieval Europe and early modernity, 
present in the interconnection of two salvations: the Faustian and the 
Promethean or this worldly and other-worldly salvation.
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According to Eisenstadt, symbolisms are invented with a power to 
transform a social order, but the extent to which a transformation oc-
curs depends on the direction taken by the social order. Framed by the 
tension between the transcending and the secular domain, the social 
order may tend toward the transcending and contemplative, or to this 
worldly, toward their separation or their nexus. Regarded socially, such 
moves depend on successive, symbolic separation of peripheral from 
central activities, and the vertical hierarchy of social positions. Given 
this symbolic arrangement there appear various possible alliances that 
can modify a civilization to yield a solution to this primal tension. In 
social settings, elites can ally themselves – the political and the religious; 
religious elites may ally themselves with some segments of a gullible po-
pulation, and ruling elites might join the bureaucratic class. Of course if 
we introduce the factor of Western modernization that is entering every 
civilization, how would the binary tension address such a phenomenon? 
Aftr all, modernization has both formal and ontological transcendences 
with neither being other worldly or perceptually this worldly.
A more serious issue appears with Eisenstadt’s claim that civilizations 
mediate between other worldly transcendence and this worldly affairs. If a 
particular society, at the level of its fundamental symbolic designs, is iden-
tical with its civilization, then the notions of transcendence and worldli-
ness belong to that civilization; in brief, civilization cannot be some sort of 
mediation between already given two realities. According to any scholar 
of civilizations, there are no factors that could be outside of them, and the-
refore all the founding conceptions, whether transcendence, rescendence, 
or nexus of the two are aspects of one civilization – in Eisenstadt’s case, 
Mid Eastern civilization with some Western factors mixed in. Thus it is an 
obvious Western interpretation of India when he claims that Hinduism 
and Buddhism comprise transcendent and contemplative other worldli-
ness. We should be cognizant that Buddha was not a divinity, and that he 
did not offer “salvation” in some other world.5 No one worships Buddha 
as if he could help to reach nirvana; the latter is a state of awareness that 
all is in flux, and that any effort to maintain a semblance of stability is 
Maya. The latter includes all Hindu “divinities” whose presence is avai-
lable as long as we desire such presence. Moreover, such divinities are, in 
the main, symbolic of cosmos and not some entities to which humans can 
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appeal. Shiva, after all, is a cosmic dancer and symbolizes the entire dy-
namics of cosmos conceived as rhythmic, play-full, even divinities come 
and go – despite their longevity – as cosmic symbols. This means that 
the divinities do not “transcend” but are symbolic of the cosmic levels in 
which everything is involved; the humans are a momentary conjunction 
of playful, erotic, terrifying cosmic energies which will dissolve everyone 
back into the play of such energies.
There is a tacit consensus, since the beginning of modern Western 
thought and its end in post modernity, which it makes no sense to speak 
of “essences.” All the previous categories, regarded as revealing an essence 
of something, must be surrendered as mere constructs and, if they should 
be used, then only as conveniences and not representations of some onto-
logical ground. Even such a venerable category of all modern theories as 
“matter” has dissolved into a zoological garden of particles, events, proc-
esses and even chaos. There is no such a thing as “human essence” or 
some essential difference between “organic” and “inorganic” processes. 
No arguments will be offered for or against this modern/postmodern “no 
essence” essentialist metaphysics, even if such arguments could be devas-
tating to this metaphysics. What is at issue is not a quest for some relati-
ve or even ultimate reality but the varied phenomena of rituals and their 
role in human life. We shall not even give credence to Wittgenstein’s pro-
nouncement that “humans are ritualistic beings.” After all, birds perform 
“ritual” dances in total solitude and hence without any purpose. Indeed, if 
rituals are to be understood in their “essence” without any presumption of 
all sorts of essences, including “human essence,” and its variant “human 
society,” then all the numerous metaphysics explaining ritual will have to 
become redundant or, to speak with some postmodern writers, just dif-
ferent forms of rhetorical rituals. In this sense everything is ritual and, 
resultantly, there are no rituals if they cannot be distinguished from anot-
her sphere of awareness. Yet it is equally undeniable that peoples of most 
diverse cultures engage in rituals without regarding everything as ritual. 
Just as most peoples, apart from Western postmodern metaphysics, see 
the difference between myths and fables, so do most peoples understand 
the mentioned difference between rituals and daily life. While it is impos-
sible to explicate all the theories concerned with rituals, some of the basic 
prejudgments that pervade most theories will be offered.
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Social Ethnology
With the dawn of modern Western metaphysics, social sciences 
promised to explain all forms of human life across continents and civili-
zations. The latter is taken to be the broadest social unit even if most of 
social researchers from the West of other peoples were concerned with 
small ethnic groups – the exotic – who would offer an “innocent” and 
primary structure of society and the “purity” of their rituals. In brief, 
we wished to understand the spiritual world of the primitives. Such a 
wish rests on the notion that all the modern complexities cover over the 
direct ritualistic awareness that is common to all societies practicing 
rituals. Of course, it is also methodologically admitted that there might 
be an unbridgeable gap between cultures, and between those that are 
contemporary and the primordial human societies. This is specifical-
ly obvious with respect to the mentioned “wish.” When an ethnologist 
wants to describe such an alien society, he engages in mystification. Yet 
it is also the case that such mystification is of the same status as an in-
sight into an alien culture. During the process of acquiring an unders-
tanding, the experienced will be equally overwhelmed by the “origina-
lity” of its own and the other’s mode of being. This “originality” opens 
another “primal” awareness of being in a domain belonging neither to 
the “primitive” nor to the ethnographer, and yet being a condition for 
ethnographer’s research. Such a “primal awareness” dominates all the-
oretical imagination and can be deciphered in the texts of sociologists 
and ethnographers, such as the well known theoretician Durkheim and 
a field researcher Malinowski. They present a classic case both of theo-
rizing and research and, in a final analysis, the limits that have not been 
transgressed either by social theory or ethnographic research. This is 
not to say that their efforts are irrelevant or to be discarded; rather, they 
become methodologically viable as ways of tracing cosmic awareness 
pervading rituals.
It is interesting to note that the other, as alien and difficult to under-
stand need not be “the primitive” but can belong to the same society that 
splits into two irreconcilable groups, as happened in the French revolu-
tion. Without going into detail, for Durkheim all efforts at reconciliation 
failed, including the most famous promises by scientific sociology of 
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Comte who maintained that the progress of reason has moved beyond 
the primitive and the metaphysical and can offer “scientifically impar-
tial” solutions to any social problem. 6 After all, neutrality can address 
any issue and find “rational harmony” in the consensus building among 
radically opposed parties. The obvious problem is with science: both si-
des, the revolutionaries of July 1830 till Paris Commune of 1871, and the 
bourgeoisie claimed scientific foundations for their positions and hence 
having neutrality as the ground for their divergent demands. In princi-
ple, no science can overcome social divisions, all the way to individual 
interests, and thus cannot yield collective solidarity. Thus, it might be 
necessary to reverse the premise of science that starts with divisions and 
begin with a community as the basic component of scientific research. 
After all, even if individuals are the concrete functions in a society, the 
latter transgresses individuals by its continuity and maintenance of self-
identification for succession of generations. Any theoretical positing of 
collective consciousness is to be regarded epistemologically, since the 
reason for this postulation is recognition of the limitations of individual 
awareness which, as a matter of course, comprises a hindrance for social 
research. This move by Durkheim seems to offer a basis for his search 
for solidarity. This first move toward solidarity is possible because of 
modern division of social labor which, by its increased differentiation, 
also reveals increased interdependence and hence comprises automatic 
solidarity. Yet it is also well known that modern division of labor se-
parates persons into classes and increasing differentiation, forcing each 
individual to look out for his well being – forcing the creation of selfish 
individualism and fragmentation. In brief, modern production does not 
offer solidarity.
Given this situation, social theorists and ethnographers have to 
seek for another ground of solidarity. While numerous researches were 
focused on mythologies, they did not seem to offer a solution, since they 
were at the level of imagination and stories and hence did not provide a 
more pure form of communal participation. While myths were equated 
with religion, for Durkheim one must discover “primal religion” given 
in rituals wherein mythological stories would provide support but not 
a basis for such a “religion.” Fortunately for social theorists, seeking to 
understand the means to maintain social solidarity, were offered ethno-
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graphic evidence of “primary” religious rituals which, in their “purity” 
would provide a standard for all variants of solidarity. Here one has to 
rely on the researches of aborigines by ethnographers such as Spencer, 
Gillen, Strehlow, and especially Frazer who named the primal “religi-
on:” totemism. Totemic cults belong to clans and are characterized by a 
specific name that is not individual but accrues to the clan and is drawn 
from some natural being whose name also designates an entire type of 
beings and not an individual entity. The totem can be embodied in an 
emblem, whether it is some sketch in sand, a piece of uniquely shaped 
wood, a polished stone. During a ritual the members of a clan attempt 
to transform themselves into a semblance of the totem which, of course, 
has a “higher” standing and requires of the clan members to reach for its 
likeness: thus the need in rituals for costumes, paints, hair styles, adorn-
ments, all the way to body transformations. The chosen object that is 
inhabited by the totem is “holy.” Here holiness is not some unique cha-
racteristic of the object, but what is “engraved” in it as a symbol thath 
elevates it to an entirely different dimension.
But totem alone, with its magical name, is not the sole source of ri-
tual; in background there appears the ruling “ancient” who has “called” 
the clan or tribe into being; he gets invested with materially recognizable 
shape and guarantees identity to his “descendents.” The most significant 
attention of the tribe focuses on its “holy” possessions whose loss would 
spell total disorientation and destitution of all life from which the tribe 
could never recover. The reason for such a shocking state is this: there 
would be a loss of a tension and correlation between the “sacred” and the 
profane. This tension/correlation is present in all rituals and comprises 
the division of life into the holy and mundane. Religions take the experi-
enced world and divide it in two dimensions to which all things belong. 
The sacred things are those that are protected by edicts and separation. 
Mundane things must not mix with the sacred and must be strictly sepa-
rated from them. It is, of course, obvious that the mundane things are 
invested with the rules of the sacred region through which they find a 
place in the group’s life. While the sacred things may look as any other, 
their special place as sacred gives them a special status. Rituals belong 
to the rules of action in face of the sacred things and also in important 
social relationships, such as marriage, social position, and even procre-
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ation. While the separation between these domains is deemed absolute, 
power comes from the totemic side.
It is significant that the basic aspect of “religion” is neither the belief 
in gods, spirits, or natural things; to have a religious experience is more 
than some passing thing, image or uncommon appearance; it is rather 
bound on a constant, even if experienced as alien energy, force, that can 
flow in and pervade all awareness, including feelings, and power that can 
set a member of a clan or the clan itself above all things. It is totally im-
personal force that enters into play and propagates itself through things. 
Holy things are those that have been touched and pervaded by this anon-
ymous force. Among the prototypes of this awareness are Melanesian 
Mana or the Wakan and Orenda of North American native tribes. the 
encounter with this alien force is given solely in a trans-individual sphere. 
According to theorists of social organization and to ethnographers, this 
special sphere is that of social life which is forever present and inescap-
able among the clans and tribes of Australian aborigines. The awakened 
energies appear far superior to the singular and compel the individual 
to accept them as of extra-human origin. Such an experience is possible 
when the singular is transformed; the normal, daily routine, that seems 
to be inescapable, becomes overturned and the singular is moved by for-
ces which no longer allow the individual to recognize himself. When this 
transformation propagates itself through all members, there appears a 
collective transformation as a birth of religion. It could be said that at this 
moment social life swings between ritualistic movement and daily habits. 
In the latter, all surroundings have specific expressive characteristics that 
are habitually recognizable: some are attractive, some disgusting, others 
imposing, distant, loveable, boring, exciting, and so on. Yet with ritual 
arise entirely different characteristics wherein the surroundings and the 
humans transform themselves; humans and things are no longer “them-
selves.” The adornments, the masks, movements, nonsensical shouts, re-
veal this radical transformation and entrance into a different sphere. Here 
everything is intense, vibrant, uncanny, pervaded by forces invisible in 
daily life. To enter this sphere he must engage in ritual and thus become 
totally other with extraordinary powers, modes of being and feeling.
How is it that these forces must assume a totemic form? It is said 
that an animal or a plant lends its name to a tribe and acts as a protective 
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presence. In the presence of its name, the members of a tribe are awed 
and transpose their feelings of awe, force, and extraordinary sense of 
unity with the animal in a way that the animal becomes a symbol pos-
sessing this force. Totem is a creature that shifts toward a symbolic pres-
ence through ritual transformation of the members of the tribe. They all 
become one with the totem animal and thus belong one to the others as 
the children of the same founding elder. Yet the totem elicits much more 
than just cohesion of the tribe. All things become members of the tribe, 
from grasses to stars, such that each has a place and destiny in the tribal 
rituals. In ritual humans become one with the totemic animal, with the 
creatures of the waters, with trees of the forests, with shapes of hills and 
desert dunes. There appears, then a genealogical relationship between 
completely diverse things which comprise a bond of solidarity across 
the universe and reveal trans-human characteristics – compacted into 
some symbol. In the ritual presence of the totem one does not have a part 
of the surrounding nature as a property or possession of the tribe. The 
tribe itself is brought into a cosmic totality; in the presence of the totem 
nature, society and cosmos close into a symbolic oneness. This means 
that the things that are outside of daily needs become involved in all 
human affairs and comprise a system of signs where each thing points to 
all other things and thus mutually assign their rank and order. All of the 
cosmos is designed, according to social theories, to master nature, either 
through magic or science, in favor of human social continuity, solidari-
ty, and well being. Speaking for all social theorists, Luhmann points out 
that under this interpretation the cosmic sense of ritual is, as a matter 
of course, premised on “purposive rationality.” 8 Contemporary biology 
does not even notice its methodological embodiment of modern metap-
hysics of the will into “laws” of genetic substance. The genetic “drives” 
use everything as means – including rituals – to proliferate a continuity 
of a given species. Hence ritual and its promotion of “social solidarity” 
guarantee the continuation of the species and not the individual. Here 
even biological events follow “purposive rationality.”
Is it possible to extricate the understanding of rituals from such an 
interpretation? Another researcher who has pushed his investigations of 
the “others” to the limit is Malinowski. He notes that every ritual, begin-
ning with primal magic to funeral rites, from initiation and baptism to 
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holy mass, comprise primordial wonder. The general understanding 
that all rituals must contain a basic wonder, cannot be regarded as some 
phenomenon of human infancy or primitive ignorance as an effort to 
explain the world in a pseudo-scientific manner. Humans require won-
der due to their concrete experience of their physical and psychologi-
cal limitations and the efforts to break out of such limits that is their 
experience of death. And myths, enacted in rituals, are the way that 
one experiences reality. 9 Thus they are not fictions but lived awareness 
which arose out of its own accord “in immemorial times” and continue 
to be lived as the most basic formations of social life. All the social rules 
and roles, the edicts and sanctioning are mythological. Myth appears in 
ritual anytime rules of life require legitimating. Thus mythical stories 
present a primordial, grander and more relevant reality by which the 
contemporary life, destiny and activities of humans are determined. In-
deed, myths provide the very motives for living and dying. While in the 
West there is a notion that such legitimating and rules are historical, for 
primal mythical life they are “mythical chart” and are present in all ritu-
als and indeed daily life. After all, the telling of the stories of the “ancient 
ones” is cotemporaneous with the modes of life of a tribe or a “commu-
nity” of believers. It is more so if the rituals and their mythical stories 
are to be regarded cosmically where the paths of the planets, the stars, 
sun, the seasons, are also intertwined in the rituals and stories. These 
are the primal backgrounds of today’s astrology and astronomy, wherein 
both weave in the cosmic paths in their own discourses. Indeed, eve-
ry piece of landscape, every rock or bush, every murmur of the brook 
is inhabited by spirits, persons, heroes, dangerous or benevolent forces 
such that the landscape is pervaded with meaning. Here the meaning is 
not projected by individuals but is found, rediscovered as obvious and 
“natural.” From this follows that human activities, such as gardening, 
raising of animals and children, growing old and healing, must belong 
and adhere to the entire mythical chart in order to be meaningful, ap-
propriate and successful.
Be that as it may, neither myths nor rituals are identical with the 
world of mundane things that fulfill human direct survival needs. Even 
if ritual is interpreted purposively, it still traces a domain that has no pur-
posive features. This is the case can be surmised from the way that even 
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“higher beings” that inhabit this “sacred domain” have a place in the 
cosmos, but are not sources of it. We should also recall that the methodo-
logical issue opened a question of a primal awareness that appears at the 
moment of encounter with the culturally other. There opens up a back-
ground that allows for the identity of each and their difference in such a 
way that the latter is broader than either culture. Another concern that 
shows up is the way the best efforts of social theorists and ethnographers 
introduce into other cultural worlds, without any critical evaluation, 
specific concepts: survival of the tribe, practical needs, death experience 
and the symbolic efforts to transcend it, and even a two world hypot-
hesis. In this context, the methodological questions cannot be avoided, 
specifically those that touch interpretation of others. Since the others, 
including their rituals and myths, comprise a “text,” then the latter must 
be understood in its own “context.” For Western understanding this also 
means that each text is located in its own historical context. If the re-
searcher lives in his own historical and cultural context, and uses the 
latter to interpret all others, then he commits the mistake of reading the 
others out of his and not their own contexts and, resultantly, does not 
recognize the other. Moreover, the horizon of the researcher absorbs the 
other without residua and therefore does not open a required difference 
between his and the other’s culture and fails to disclose a more funda-
mental awareness that does not belong to either, although is a condition 
for the recognition of both in their differences. Across all methodologi-
cal requirements, whether positivistic, hermeneutical, semiotic or even 
phenomenological, there appears a “background” awareness that has no 
specific location or cultural determination.
First manner in which this background appears is a researcher’s awa-
reness of his/her own limitations, individual, cultural and theoretical; 
such a limitation is a reflective moment from the other, even if the ways 
of living of the other are initially proclaimed to be incomprehensible, 
totally alien and dramatically objectionable. Second point appears if 
and when the researcher attempts to “explain” the other and discovers 
that the ways of the other resist and are resilient to any explanation. For 
example, the head hunters of Iran Jaya cannot be explained by the most 
revered theories of the West, from modern through postmodern, even 
when the rituals of the head hunters would seem to have a “purpose.” All 
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the modern libidinal, economic, all the postmodern desire laden procla-
mations of the French, shattered on the spears and holism of these hunt-
ers. In brief, the latter set an absolute limit to purposive and even causal 
explanations. Third aspect shows up when the other and the researcher 
recognize their differences from each other and, through the differen-
ces, their own identity; the latter is not a clear or sharp awareness, but 
simply an amorphous presence that indicates a sense of things as be-
longing to a different cosmos. It is not the things present to perception 
that are different, not the divinities/demons shining through masks or 
deploying the dancing limbs, but their sense, their origin and destiny 
that appear framed in and on a background that does not coincide with 
the researcher’s understanding. And we suspect what this vague bac-
kground is a cosmos that cannot be signified or subsumed under any 
purposes, since all purposes are only a minor aspect within this cosmic 
background. Thus, a fourth way to understand the cosmos deployed in 
rituals is to note an essential presence of purposeless phenomena. This 
may be evidenced in a spontaneous deviation of gestures-movements 
from those prescribed by ritualistic purposes or movements that simply 
articulate the bodily possibilities without any of them pointing to any 
specific end. Most importantly, the rituals in most cases do not achieve 
their supposed purpose and turn out to be a mere habitual performan-
ce. As someone suggested, the “shouting of words” in face of a volcano 
never stopped the volcano, and any intelligent cat would spit at such a 
nonsensical human preoccupation. And yet the preoccupation continu-
es as if it made sense and achieved its purpose. Thus we are left with a 
question of the “essence” of ritual beyond any purposes.
My venerable teacher, E. Fink, wrote a text entitled “Spiel als Welt-
symbol” wherein “symbol” here does not represent anything, does not 
signify a place, a time or a being in a world, but is the world wherein 
the purposes, directions, times and places can make sense. I shall not 
articulate his thesis, but take of from where he left of. What is central 
for understanding of ritual is that it is a symbolic activity which is a 
direct presence of the world in its self-articulation. To make this clear, a 
distinction has to be made between all sorts of metaphysics/ontologies 
and world. It has been maintained through most varied and numerous 
disciplines, from philosophy, theology, sciences, that all understanding 
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must have “reasons” which account for human activity. In most cases 
such reasons are ascribed to “purposes.” Why do we have rituals? Be-
cause they serve a purpose to hold a society together, or to defect our 
fear of death, or to defeat the enemies, and to maintain our health. It is 
equally the case that the achievement of purposes requires means, such 
that the latter comprise appropriate sequence of causal powers. Such a 
sequence is semiotic, where one thing is a sign pointing to other things 
and thus has a meaning. This metaphysical account is coextensive with 
the most primitive magic wherein activity disappears, since any causal 
sequence abolishes the very awareness of activity and replaces it with 
simple movement in space and time. Only when the activity becomes 
symbolic that it extricates itself from purposive causal series and ap-
pears in its own right as self-deployment without a purpose. To speak 
philosophically, it is possible to show that there is a radical difference 
between purposive-causal interrelationships present through signs and 
an activity of founding whose aim is itself and as an activity it cannot 
be subjected to any purposes for “the sake of ” which our “movements” 
are performed. Movements of a body belong to an “organized body” 
while action comprises articulated body which is a deviation from and 
redundant to organized body. The latter is symbolic as a presence of ac-
tivity over movement and of world over the sum of things and purposes. 
Ritualistic body is an active-articulated body that directly presents the 
world; it could be regarded as playful without “play intention.”
In the previously discussed totemism, the first intimation is the abo-
lition of the singular in its identity with the powers of some animal – a 
bear – but in its very identity the singular becomes “all things” and every-
where-every time such that the primacy is placed on non-positional re-
lationships whose presence as a cosmos is without direction or purpose. 
Hence every magical ritual is a symbolic transparent with the whole. All 
sorcery, enchantment, bewitchment work in this way. This means that 
all culturally comprised activities, as articulated-ritualistic body, obtain 
cosmic transparency. While numerous metaphors are used, wherein the 
activity is interpreted as a Mask of some other being, another world, 
more basically ritual activity is a direct trace of a cosmos. How are we to 
understand the latter is a protracted problematic in myth, science, and 
philosophy. Without entering into protracted arguments with an entire 
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tradition of great figures, human and divine, one thing can be claimed 
without a contradiction: under whatever interpretation, cosmos is an a 
priori condition of every human thinking and action, of every divine, 
demonic, and mythological presence; all of them depend on a cosmos 
wherein they assume their places, destinies, purposes and deaths.
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The term “hermeneutics” was coined in the Seventeenth Century. The 
philosophical lexicon by Rudolph Gocklenius, Lexicon Philosophi- cum, 
(1613) contains an article on hermeneutics under the Greek term “herme-
neia”. It shows the function of this term in medieval theology and jurispru-
dence, and shows its technical uses. Its earlier forms appeared in Greek 
thought, inclusive of Plato and Aristotle. In Plato’s Laws there is a discus-
sion of arts, one of which is interpretation; it attempts to illuminate the 
cryptic sayings of divinities without making any claim to truth. In Aristotle 
one mode of speaking is interpretive. Subsequently hermeneutics was de-
veloped into an auxiliary discipline of philosophy, theology, and jurispru-
dence, devising specific rules for the explication of texts. This development 
also included major crises of Western thought, specifically during various 
confrontations of distinct texts and traditions. There was a confrontation 
between Hellenic allegorical thought with the Judeo-Christian historical-
prophetic orientation. It appeared in the efforts to transmit Greek education 
to the Latin world in order to overcome linguistic barriers. Hermeneutics 
appeared in the efforts to pass on to subsequent century’s Roman jurispru-
dence, Greek philosophy, and Biblical texts. Finally, the efforts were made 
by Schlegel and Schleiermacher to free hermeneutics from its auxiliary role 
and present it as a universal theory of understanding.
The general view that hermeneutics presents is that all explicit human 
thought, including philosophy, is founded on an implicit understanding. 
Such an understanding includes all divisions of human thought and ac-
tivity, from philosophy, through psychology, arts, sociology, religion, 
economy, to physical sciences to the extent that the latter assume human 
understanding and also the divisions of the world into specific domains 
implicit in this understanding. This means that the understanding con-
tains implicit prejudgments as divisions of various domains that sciences 
and humanities take for granted. Such an understanding is much broader 
than any area of sciences and humanities. Moreover, it must deal with 
other domains, such as architecture, since they too are aspects of human 
world and have an architectural and social meaning. Indeed, it has been 
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suggested that architecture is a concrete embodiment of a given social 
“spacial” system. The arrangements of human life into socially assigned 
roles is evident in the places and hierarchies that humans occupy in their 
architectural places. Hence, the understanding of architecture requires 
the prejudgments of social divisions of a given population. The exposition 
of the various prejudgments is the task of hermeneutics.
At the level of prejudgments, various writers divide hermeneutics into 
specific philosophical domains. Thomas Seebohm, for example, claims that 
hermeneutics can be divided into four basic concerns: first is the methodo-
logical concern for interpreting texts. As we shall see, this concern is very 
important because the understanding of a given text is a complex process 
of deciphering of layers of meaning. Second is the conception of a gene-
ral theory of understanding. Can understanding be universal and include 
all traditions, or is it bound to a specific tradition and its prejudgments? 
Is the meaning of “understanding” as interpretation limited to theoretical 
concerns of the Western philosophy and its various divisions into scien-
ces, humanities, and their subdivisions, or can it cover prejudgments of 
other traditions? The reason for these concerns appears in the studies of 
other traditions. For example, Indian tradition might have prejudgments 
wherein the division into sciences and humanities is not a given; that tra-
dition might divide the world into cosmic eroticism and practical action in 
terms of powers and the search for ultimate dissolution of the individual. 
Hence, the term “understanding” might be “particular universal” stemming 
from the Western tradition. Third is the sense philosophical hermeneutics 
of fundamental ontology wherein a question is raised of the meaning of 
Being in distinction to the varieties of beings that are in the world. It is 
claimed that the entire Western thought is premised on this distinction. 
Subsequently we shall suggest arguments why and how such a distinction 
arose and why it is significant. Fourth addresses the question of interpre-
tation of symbols that attempt to “read” the domains of the latent and the 
unconscious. Here one could have psychoanalysis, both Freudian and Jun-
gian, and various types of mythological and mystical pronouncements. As 
a fifth, we could include historical hermeneutics. This type is concerned 
with temporal development of some text that contains problems and their 
continuous resolutions. The resolutions may open entirely different con-
ceptions that were not available in the original text. An example of this type 
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would be the development of a particular science, such as geometry from 
Euclidean to Non-Euclidean. The latter opens up the conception of space 
that is very different from the Euclidean. It is claimed, nonetheless, that a 
full understanding of Non-Euclidean geometry requires a historical study 
of Euclidean type and the non-necessity of some of its postulates. We shall 
discuss these hermeneutical types and issues in greater detail.
First, let us learn some essential aspects of the methodical type of her-
meneutics. This type was already known in classical Greek philosophy as 
the “art of grammar.” It included grammar in the narrow sense of the word, 
but also other aspects for the professional interpretation of texts, such as 
philology and under it rhetoric. The development of modern methodic 
hermeneutics led to the construction of specific rules (in professional 
terms they are called “canons”) that were regarded as essential for objective 
understanding of texts. The first rule states that a text must be understood 
in the context of the contemporary public and not in the context of the 
interpreter. The argument is this: while the meaning of terminology of a 
text might be clear for the contemporary audience, an intervening histori-
cal distance would surely add other meanings and hence create distortions. 
This is important not only for the interpretation of texts from different his-
torical periods, but also for translations of one language into another.
The second rule (canon) states that the understanding of the whole 
of the text presupposes the understanding of the parts and conversely. At 
times this is called the “hermeneutical circle.” This rule also implies that 
the parts and wholes relationship is larger than the parts and the whole of 
a text. The text is also a part of a whole language and its social and cultu-
ral context of a given historical period. Now we can be more precise and 
say that this rule consists of four divisions: first, the whole to which a text 
belongs is a language in which the text is written. Second is the historical 
context in which the language and the text belong. We have to understand 
the events of the times to which the text and the language refer. The third 
whole is the totality of the works written by an author in its temporal and 
historical unfolding. This whole is represented by a style of an author or a 
school of authors (the specific use of language characteristic of an author 
or a school, and the changes in the style of such texts that are still reco-
gnizable to be of the same author or school). Fourth is the whole as a text 
and the parts that belong to it. These divisions are arranged in a hierarchy 
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of relationships. The first is called “grammatical” level, the second is the 
“historical” level, the third is called the “individual” level, and the fourth is 
called the “generic” level. At this level one investigates the genre and the in-
tentions of the authors. The first and second are subsumed under the con-
cept of “lower hermeneutics,” while third and fourth belong to the “higher 
hermeneutics.” This conceptualization, as we shall see presently, has a very 
serious purpose regarding the truth and the falsity of texts or their parts.
What writers on methodical hermeneutics propose to demonstrate 
is not whether a text or its parts are true or false in some epistemological 
or ontological sense concerning “reality,” but to what extent we can trust 
our reading of texts in a surer way with respect to their historical contexts. 
This means that we cannot guarantee a true interpretation of a text, but 
we can show that a given text is interpreted in a false way. What does this 
mean? If we read an author’s or a particular writing school’s text (higher 
hermeneutics), we cannot say whether our interpretation of the text is 
true with respect to its historical and linguistic context. Yet we can say 
with certainty that the text is false since it does not belong in the context 
of the given language or other texts (lower hermeneutics). It must be not-
ed that the terms “true” and “false” are not used in an ordinary sense of a 
proposition that refers to a state of affairs, events, facts, and even “reality.” 
For methodical hermeneutics these terms play a role in the interpretation 
of texts. Hence, if you were to say that you are reading a text of Homer, 
with all sorts of heroes and divinities, we would not ask you to prove the 
existence of such heroes or divinities; we would ask you to check whether 
the text is Homeric. Does it fit in the ancient Greek context, ancient Gre-
ek language, and other Greek texts that might depict similar heroic and 
mythological events. If the text does not ft, then your interpretation of it 
as Homeric is false. While this text might have an author and belong to a 
genre (higher hermeneutics), it is falsified by the context, language, and 
other texts of a historical period (lower hermeneutics). This procedure 
can be applied even to singular terms as parts of a text.
It is also important to point out that methodic hermeneutics must 
be separated from a critical engagement with a text. If you wish to review 
the text analytically and critique it for logical inconsistencies, or argue 
that various claims seem outlandish, unbelievable, and even nonsensical; 
such an effort has left the parameters of methodical hermeneutics. Before 
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this type of engagement you must fgure out what this text says in its own 
language, its relationship to other texts of its time. But here we must point 
to an exception. Critical approach can apply to a very specific type of te-
xts: methodical hermeneutics calls such texts eminent or works of ge-
niuses. Writers such as Plato, Kant, Jung, Newton, Peirce, set a novel tone 
to human thinking. It would be very difficult to place them in their own 
linguistic contexts and in relation to other texts of their historical period. 
Eminent texts are ones to which we refer as if they comprised a new be-
ginning, a set of options previously unavailable and even incomprehensi-
ble. We can notice how such great figures struggled to invent vocabularies, 
styles of expression, and arguments to make their cases. This is not to say 
that they do not bear traces of previous thinkers and their writings; rather, 
they took such writings and gave them a different context and meaning. 
Who could think, after Newton, about the rotations of the moon and fal-
ling apples without interpreting them in terms of the laws of gravity?
We should refine the issue of what comprises an eminent text. Whi-
le major civilization traditions agree in general about the great texts (for 
example the set of fifty plus selected writings called The Great Books of the 
Western World), various cultural groups within this civilization may hold 
one of their texts to be eminent. Thus, one cultural group of this civilizati-
on holds The New Testament to be an eminent text, while some other cultu-
ral group may regard Hitler’s Mein Kampf as an eminent text. Usually these 
types of texts are a basis for a faithful followers and are formed around 
a personality who comprises a focus for personality cults. Methodical 
hermeneutics must treat all such cultural eminent texts as equivalent. No 
doubt, one group will claim that the eminent text of the other group is false, 
immoral, mystical, and even evil. All that we can say methodologically is 
whether such texts are understandable for the audiences to which they are 
addressed and the temporal context wherein such texts are articulated.
The next type of hermeneutics is concerned with the question of Being. 
The reason that this type of hermeneutics becomes significant rests on the 
awareness of the differences between things, events, states of affairs, all sorts 
of objectivities and subjectivities, in short beings and Being. Being must be 
explicated in its own right apart from explanations of the totality of things, 
events, etc. While the difference has been noted since the ancient Greek 
thought, beginning most likely with Parmenides, its current hermeneutical 
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interest was influenced by Martin Heidegger. Let us look at the way that 
this difference has arisen and what sorts of problems it presents. In Western 
tradition, it is common to inquire about things, objects and events in order 
to discover “what” they are, their essential nature or structure. It is taken for 
granted that when we ask “What is a human,” or “What is matter” or “What 
is a mind” we can give definitions that capture some essential characteristics 
of these beings. The Greek philosophers, nevertheless, noticed a specific and 
significant problem: language indicates that whenever we attempt to define 
any being, we not only attempt to discover its basic characteristics, but we 
also say that such a being IS. Apart from having some essential features, 
every being somehow participates in Being. In turn, the latter is different 
from any particular being and its characteristics.
Given this state of affairs, the ancient Greeks took on the task of 
devising the ways to understand this being that is different from all ot-
her beings. They were certain that there is a radical difference between 
beings and BEING, but then, according to Heidegger, they made a fatal 
mistake: they asked the same question that they used to interpret all 
beings: What is Being. The point is this: if Being is different from all 
beings, then it is inappropriate to ask the same question of Being that 
we ask of beings. And yet since the same question was asked, then Being 
was interpreted in terms of “What” and hence the essential differences 
between beings and Being was lost. Being became one of the beings, 
even if it was designated as the “highest” being. Because of the interpre-
tation of everything, including Being in terms of “what something is”, 
the difference was forgotten and the question of Being was neglected.
What are the options to ask the question of Being without in-
terpreting it in terms of the “what” of beings? First, we can notice one 
specific option in human knowledge: either we know the essence of be-
ings eternally, or we know such beings temporally. If we accept the first 
option, then our search for knowledge would end as soon as we have 
propositions purporting to give “and essential truth” of any being once 
and for all. But no one, so far, has given us such a truth. This is evident 
from history: many truths were offered and none of them survived cri-
tical debates. Hence, the second option can be taken as more plausible: 
the essence of any being is temporal and hence our knowledge is open 
to a range of possibilities. This means that if we speak about a specific 
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being and want to know what it is, we are also in a position to open the 
future possibilities of what else can this being be. In this sense, we can 
speak of Being as an open horizon of future possibilities of the Being 
of beings. Any final propositions are open to possible future challenges.
What is significant in this conception of the relationship of beings and 
Being is the inclusion of us as beings that are not definable essentially, but 
are open to the possibilities of our future being. We too are temporal and 
temporary. The implications of this interpretation are important. First, all 
our future possibilities are temporal, and we cannot escape our own tem-
poral being. This means that the closest possibility that we must accept is 
our own non-being – death. Second, the possibility of death also implies 
that our knowledge of “all the future possibilities of being”, is also limited. In 
this sense, we cannot claim to have understood all the options of our future, 
and the possibilities of all beings. Third, in face of this situation, we cannot 
postpone our current commitments, since tomorrow might not come. The 
possibility of our non-being demands that we live fully at the present.
The next hermeneutical conception is that of the latent. Various 
aspects of human understanding belong here. The psychological domain 
of interpreting dreams is preeminent in this area. The efforts to unders-
tand mythological symbols, and symbolic understanding in general are 
part of this area. Also, the efforts to articulate hidden meaning in scien-
tific work, such as parallel universe theories, suggesting that what we 
are attempting to understand can only be expressed by mathematical 
models that can never be verified. We know that something is there, 
but we shall never see it, apart from our mathematical formulations. In 
general terms, what is not present in some empirical fashion but is given 
by inference can claim symbolic status.
Civilizational Hermeneutics
The task of explicating hermeneutics, appropriate to the study of civili-
zations and their relationships, can be aided by some well known termino-
logical markers, such as “historically effective consciousness,” or “efficient 
history,” in which every interpreter stands and into which the interpreter 
converges. Moreover, such efficient history, in most general terms, com-
prises a tradition, and in still more general terms, a tradition is a theory, 
regardless of how many theories are within it. This claim is not made ligh-
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tly: it rests on the arguments that there is no such fortune as to allow us to 
access “the reality” and that all claims to such an access are interpretations; 
there are no phenomena that are not interpreted. In this sense to be imbed-
ded in a tradition is to be immersed in a theory. Given this state of affairs, 
the first question that hermeneutics asks is this: when does a tradition end 
or, shall we say, when the tradition of a particular text ends. The following 
numerous answers ft as an answer offered by hermeneutics.
1.  A tradition ends, in the simplest sense, with the last person who re-
fers to the text, or in the present in which the question is raised. Any 
other position, which in any way refers to the text, such as reading 
someone else’s work about it stands, at the present, in the efficient 
history. If this is the case, then there will never be a “true” or final 
interpretation, unless all references to the text cease. Methodological 
hermeneutics could only point out some errors, but cannot say that 
the interpretation is a correct one. This is to say, methodical herme-
neutics can only “falsify” by showing that the lower cases of this her-
meneutics, such as the grammatical and the historical levels, resist 
the addition of readings to the text that these levels do not permit. 
Thus a mistake in grammar, or a meaning of a term in its context, is a 
wrong reading; but there is no final say about the right reading. Most 
hermeneutics, at this level, usually regard a tradition that contains 
“eminent” texts to which other texts refer. It is to be emphasized that 
the term “true” or correct has no trans-textual meaning. It is simply 
stated that a text about another text can be falsified, but never veri-
fied once and for all. What is significant is that other peoples of the 
same tradition might claim that there are other eminent texts that 
the first, eminent texts and their interpretation would regard as un-
fit, evil, unwarranted, and completely false: De Sade, Hitler, etc. Yet 
no doubt, some literary traditions will consider such texts as emi-
nent and true. Two such traditions can coexist, and they may coexist 
by mutual references to each other as false. In this case, there might 
not be a convergence of a horizon, unless another interpretation at-
tempts to unify them: historical-philological method might attempt 
such a feat by claiming neutrality.
Speaking more concretely, some of the traditional texts tend to fade 
out, cease to function as “significant” in a given context, and thus the only 
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preservation that is accorded to them is done by philological method. The 
latter can be a catalyst for various renaissances of texts – a sort of archaic 
movements that proclaim the genuine truths that have been forgotten and 
neglected. New ageism have this tendency, yet such tendencies are always 
destructive – as one modification of the thirteenth hermeneutic – to the 
extent that the “dead languages,” although preserved by philological met-
hod in archival depositories, are framed in the current living languages 
and hence are taken out of their own contexts. They are a species that 
have vanished, and reappear only in a dramatically reconstructed genetic 
pool. For example, after the Renaissance, Scientific and Political Enligh-
tenments, and Reformation, medieval literature virtually vanished. What 
sealed its fate in the past and the libraries of the monasteries was that the 
art of printing became the means of communication. The literature of the 
Renaissance was correlated to and had a direct access to this new tech-
nology. The rest was consigned to manuscripts which, apart from being 
written in a peculiar Latin, also contained numerous abbreviations and 
other peculiarities, and was nigh impossible to decipher. What we have as 
“Neo-Scholasticism” is a concoction of parts into a whole that belongs to 
our reading, to our modern age.
This might become clearer if we compare another tradition simi-
lar to the one above. The cultic reformist and mystical dervish move-
ment entered a region and dominated cultural life. The literary tradition 
which belonged to that region was suppressed as false, godless, and evil; 
it was the tradition of Fall- safa, the philosophers. Algazzalis eminent 
text, The Destruction of the Philosophers, marks the beginning of the 
end. The literature of the philosophers survived and was influential only 
in Latin translation in Europe. The texts in Arabic are still there, packed 
away, but until very recently only western scholars had a philological in-
terest in them. There were in the 19th. and first half of the 20th. century, 
no Arabic arabists interested in some kind of systematic edition of the 
FALSAFA. In this sense, the basis for a revival of Falsafa is still missing, 
and even if it occurs, the intersection of modern philosophical literature 
will frame the questions of that tradition in different wholes.
Here, we can formulate the first cannon of civilizational hermeneu-
tic: a suppressed tradition fades out and its revival spells the death of 
its unity, since it will be framed by a context alien to it. In brief, the 
power for its survival will be borrowed.
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1.  There is a death of a tradition by violence: one culture conquers 
another and suppresses it completely, specifically if the conquering 
culture has a monopoly of text production. One example is what 
happened to Mediterranean culture after Doric invasion. Worl-
dviews, values, truths here belong to the sphere of myths. What 
we know about the old culture comes from archeology, such as the 
palaces of CRETE, or the ruins of TROY. But the contents of their 
way of life are given us in Greek mythology. We have to guess, sur-
mise, infer by indirection to get some diffused notion of the chtho­
nic goddesses and gods. It is of note that the very term chthonic is 
already a demeaning word: goddesses and gods of the dead, of the 
world of shades, of the underworld. It is a world that we can imagi-
ne, dream about, but not access. The maternal, as the underworld, 
is regarded here, as conquered. It lives in shapes of monsters and 
Minotaurs. This life nonetheless exercises a power that the conqu-
ering tradition cannot help but borrow in order to preserve its own 
vitality. This borrowing appears in numerous revitalizing rituals, 
wherein the conquering tradition must increase and invest its 
energies in maintaining the vigilance against those powerful foes, 
the demons to be suppressed, expiated, and yet demons inhabit the 
very image and dominate the recesses of the psyche.
2.  Another, and perhaps more dramatic example of the conquering 
culture appear in the confrontation of Rome with the Celtic and 
Druid traditions. Rome tolerated the myths of others, as long as 
the others obeyed the secular goddess – Rome itself. Yet this to-
lerance had a limit. Britain was conquered by Claudius, well edu-
cated and most tolerante emperor – at least in comparison to ot-
hers, such as Nero or Caligula. Thus what happened is not a result 
of excesses of a power hungry and deranged personality, but one 
that expressed the best in the character of roman cul true. Clau-
dius’ edicts were simple: myths, which promoted the practice of 
human sacrifice, and promoted head hunting, have to be eradi-
cated,  because they are inhuman, false to the nature of persons, 
and to the laws of peoples (jus gentium). Thus the eradication 
of the druids began, ending with their destruction. After Rome 
accepted the cult of Christianity, the latter completed the task; it 
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was better equipped than the Romans at extermination. Except 
for few archeological traces and few medieval SA-GAS, which are 
less than what is lef of pre-Doric world, we know nothing apart 
from the Mists of Avalon. These examples allow us to formulate 
the second rule of comparative civilization hermeneutic:
  The principle issue of this type of hermeneutic is: in case of the 
confrontation of the Doric with the early Mediterranean, the Do-
ric culture had only a rudimentary literary culture. Thus a partial 
merger of motifs was possible in the medium of more tolerant and 
less controllable oral tradition. But in the case of the clash betwe-
en Rome and the Celts, the latter had no literary tradition, while 
Rome had a highly developed one which had a grammatical and 
syntactical permanence that allowed what is possible and what is 
not. Second rule: A complete and irrevocable suppression, lea-
ving almost no traces, presupposes that the new tradition has 
a total control of the production and preservation of texts. The 
same happens if the suppression is done by conquest, specifically 
in conquered places. Nothing was left after the conquest of Byzan-
tium by Turks, i.e. by Islam, although the literatures survived out-
side the region, some in Russia, and some in the West. Similar 
case could be made for the reconquista in Spain, whose literatures 
survived in Islam outside of Spain. Yet the suppression of the cul-
ture locally was as radical as it could be. The suppressed tradition 
denied the power to the other – the death of self identity.
3.  A more complex case, where the other retains power in very 
fascinating ways, is present in the confrontation of cultures that 
possess literary traditions. One main example, in the Western 
world, is the case of Christianity: first by the breakdown and a 
conquest of Rome by a mid-eastern cultures, and then the re-
jection in Rome of its own literary tradition, and that means of 
the Hellenic tradition, Christianity rejects and suppresses pa-
ganism, and more precisely the literary traditions of Hellenism 
which were more than pagan. This literary tradition was sub-
sumed under the title “paganism” shows the virulence of this 
suppression. We surmise that large amount of texts, of which we 
know only the titles, are lost forever.
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The suppression was well defend by the apologists, the early church 
fathers and the early councils before Christianity became secular power. 
The acts of destruction followed, most significant among which was the 
burning of the library of Alexandria. This is to say, in order to root out Hel-
lenism, it was not enough to destroy the temples. A literary tradition had to 
be destroyed. Therefore, the burning of libraries, books, and the producers 
of books became an enduring tradition. The end of this destruction is mar-
ked by the forced expulsion of philosophers and Hellenistic scholars from 
Athens and other capitals by Justinian. They went to Persia, and via this 
exodus the cultural heritage of Hellas could have its renaissance in medie-
val scholasticism and later in European renaissance. Plato was back on the 
scene. The suppression of other literary traditions – at times called hereti-
cal – is a characteristic Christian attitude toward other literary traditions. 
This attitude, having become a tradition, can be adopted and extended by 
cultural influences. Thus in the twentieth century the Russian Revolution 
engaged in the destruction of texts as well as the writers of them; Nazis did 
the same, and Chinese cultural revolution repeated this Christian traditi-
on. In this sense, 20th. century has seen some of the most archaic methods 
to deal with literary traditions that are regarded as condemnable.
Let us return to the other modification, i.e. a confrontation of two 
traditions that are literary, yet incapable of complete destruction. This is 
the case at another level when Christian efforts to destroy completely the 
Greco-Roman tradition had to “internalize” some of the latter. How does 
the supervening tradition “store” suppressed texts, or what is suppressed 
in texts, for further use This is possible due to the fact that in a given litera-
ry tradition there is a split up into rivals among texts. Thus in the West, the 
initial rivalry is between cultic texts and philosophy/science. Here, Plato 
called the poet the hermeneus of the gods and the rhapsodies the herme-
neus of the poet. In Epinomis Plato speaks of the hermeneutical art as ne-
cessary to interpret signs as portents of the future, and also to interpret the 
laws of the first law givers. Since the poet, as a producer of myths among 
Greeks is also a prophet, there is a claim that hermeneus combines a lite-
rary and legal traditions. This articulation is given by a philosopher and 
is immediately followed by partial, yet basic suppression. The hermeneus 
does not know the word and the truth which is revealed to him; the law 
givers might be deceitful or hermeneus might be inadequate to the task of 
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revealing the true meaning of law or divine edicts. But then who knows 
the truth, the philosopher? The critique of mythology assumed its radical 
finality by Stoics and Epicureans. Not only that myth does not have a place 
in philosophy, but that they are false and immoral.
This was the Hellenistic civilization which also dominated the Roman 
Empire. Here, (1) political and legal tradition and power separated itself 
from other literary traditions. Thus in the Roman Empire one could fol-
low any literary tradition as long as one recognized that the political and 
juridical tradition existed separately and needed no justification from any 
other tradition. (2) The literary tradition of philosophy internalized mu-
tual rejection, although not suppression of other truths. We love Plato and 
Aristotle, but we love wisdom more, and hence can argue against either or 
both. (3) A new morphology emerged: uncommitted reports of all kinds 
of facts, events, and opinions. The Hellenistic tradition, and through it the 
Roman empire, internalized diverse literary traditions which became a 
topic of “histories.” What these histories required is a new “art” to manage 
them, and thus to have a unified literary tradition; the latter became phi-
lology. The modern renaissance, as universal wisdom, originates with the 
ancient art of grammar – the philological hermeneutics. Here, the ideal of 
humanity and empire became identical and Claudius, who went after the 
Celts, was its exemplary expression.
Having become mid-eastern, Rome’s church fathers rejected the Hel-
lenistic tradition, although they were educated in it. By winning, they had 
to use the techniques of the conquered, and the technique was the art of 
grammar to be applied to the scriptures. The second move was determi-
ned by the principle of hairesis. But to identify a heresy one needs logic 
to show the differences between true and false. Technology for this was 
offered by classical philosophy – such as modified Aristotelian categories. 
The result: rigid system of dogmas. In this context, most of the philosop-
hical heritage, that found its way in Christian heritage, appears in disgui-
se. What happens to this heritage is well exemplified in Slavic literature; 
there no sources were available to make comparisons, and hence all the 
traces of Hellenistic tradition were regarded as authentic ideas of church 
fathers. Yet these very ideas had the power to initiate Renaissance.
Here, a new system was developed that became a tradition. A set of 
texts in writing was developed by highly educated persons. These texts 
52
CIVILIZATIONS, CULTURES, LIFEWORLDS /Comparative studies/
were also designed to eliminate heresies and thus to determine rigid 
standards for all aspects of life. Compared to Hellas, this was archaic, 
since its center had one eminent text, purportedly reporting an eminent 
event: the New Testament. Eminent text is constantly appealed to as the 
final arbiter of all other claims. This means that the text becomes do-
minating and exclusive. Yet, as just pointed out, it already incorporated 
the logics of the philosophers both as rigorous means of thinking and as 
heresy. And this arrangement lends power to the suppressed tradition, 
leading the oppressive tradition into a crisis.
We can now formulate the third rule of the civilization hermeneutic: 
If a conquering literary tradition suppresses another strong literary 
tradition, then it is forced to incorporate the conquered tradition and 
attempt to use it against the conquered tradition. Yet the very use can 
turn against the conquering tradition and thus create a crisis.
The first crisis in this new tradition appeared in medieval times. 
One began to sense the temporal distance between various accumula-
ting interpretations of the eminent text. As noted, the clergy and the 
councils developed their dogmas by using the philosophical techniques. 
In turn, the efforts to get back to the “original text” involved the same 
philosophical techniques which supposedly were capable of showing 
which interpretations are true and which are not. Hence, Abelard’s sic 
et non (this and not that) to show that some of the church fathers in-
terpretations contained contradictions either within their own texts, or 
in contrast to other churchly texts. This is a fascinating power of the 
suppressed. The philosophical texts were false, evil, to be burned, they 
are in excess of the truths of the father and the son, yet these very “exces-
sive” truths were used by the church fathers to establish their position, 
and thus were built into their texts. Lo and behold, medieval are using 
the same philosophical truths to realign their own texts and find them 
in excess in terms of what they suppose to possess: concordance. Yet in 
either case, it is the philosophical residuum that reveals the excess of 
itself and any text that will be involved in using it. No concordia was 
possible when faced with a double access; hence, following their own 
interests, the Averroists developed a theory of a double truth: there are 
truths of reason and science, and there are divine truths that are based 
on will and should be accepted on faith by will. The two do not coincide, 
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indeed they contradict. The double truth is a recognition that either side 
is too much for the other and their intermixing will continuously lead to 
crises. Barring that, one could solve the confrontation if one divided the 
world into two domains: philosophy and-science to deal with the world 
as it is, while the state, the law, ethics, will be the province of the divine 
will. This stretches into modernity through Descartes and Hobbes.
This could be stated as follows: the Hellenic tradition could tolerate 
contradictions, and was under no obligation to avoid them; indeed, to 
produce contradictions belongs to the structure of this literature. Thus, 
any authority could be abandoned in favor of open debate concerning 
any subject matter, and it was abandoned. On the other side, the side of 
the will, reformation had no choice but to proclaim that divine will is a 
matter of individual will and its faith. Hence, there are no supervening 
rules that would determine the encounter between two wills. Seen on 
this ground, the tradition that attempted to mix philosophical literature 
with the eminent Christian text was false and evil – one more time. What 
Luther did not realize is that this move would itself create a tradition; 
thus reformation soon had its fathers, but the act that created this tradi-
tion could be repeated and turned against itself, revealing its own excess 
and superfluity in two ways: first, any effort to limit the interpretation 
of will encountering another will by some “authority” would be imme-
diately discarded: Protestantism split and split... Thus each individual’s 
will is a final arbiter, and therefore the eminent text can be in excess over 
itself: there are as many eminent texts as there are readers – creating, 
what Diltheys called, a “universal falsehood.” It is to be recalled that this 
tradition of the WILL was once supposed to be the basis of juridical 
state and morality, but with the endless schisms, each person is her own 
moral criterion and a criterion of the reading of the eminent text.
The Circle
It has been said that hermeneutical thinking in general constitutes a 
circle. Each text in a context implies the context and the latter implies the 
text. Regardless how far we stretch the hermeneutical understanding, we 
shall have to admit this rule. Parts imply the whole and the whole is given 
through the parts. Yet what we noticed in our suggestions so far is the fea-
ture of the thirteenth hermeneutic: efforts to suppress a text, a culture, a tra-
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dition by another. This suppression can be absolute – the destruction of the 
tradition and the people and hence all the readings about the tradition will 
be presented by the victorious literatures. In short, such a reading includes 
the other in its own circle without residua. We also noticed that in another 
modification, the residua remains and are relegated to a site which is des-
ignated to be lower, yet having an overwhelming vitality to challenge and 
threaten the suppressing tradition. This agonal component lends strength 
to the victor by being within the rules, but not quite controllable by them. 
Trojan women, Clytemnestra, the Sirens, and the Nymphs, constantly are 
included in the circle of literary texts written by the suppressing patriarchs, 
but the inclusion is never complete. The women are more cunning and 
form secret and unpredictable conspiracies that lurk through entire texts of 
the patriarchs. With all the power at their disposal to control events by tex-
tual inscriptions, such events are reproduced consistently as not complete-
ly controllable. Then we found still another modification wherein the sup-
pressed tradition and its developed literatures become necessary aspects 
of the suppressing tradition. The latter must use the former in order to 
demonstrate its truths and in this sense borrows the power of the litera-
tures that are being condemned. In this sense the condemning literature, 
in its presumed supremacy, proves the presence of the other and its supe-
riority, and indeed to such an extent, that the suppressing tradition begins 
to write its texts in terms of the suppressed. This is the encounter between 
Greco-Roman and one version of Mid-Eastern traditions: the episteme of 
Hellenic Athena and the word of the Father. As was noted, she constant-
ly resumed her power by being incorporated as a necessity for the very 
survival and, at the same time, constant self-abolition of the suppressing 
tradition. Here the circle of the suppressing tradition gets transformed into 
the circle of the suppressed till finally, as we saw, the suppressed tradition 
acquires complete emancipation and forces the other to fragment itself and 
to become excessive to itself. The father can no longer maintain its power 
and the mothers show up as priests.
Yet there is another tradition, that of India, which adds another level 
to the thirteenth hermeneutic. No doubt, this tradition includes the mo-
difcations we have noted, but apart from such modifcations, it contains 
its own uniqueness. It has two fully developed hermeneutical circles in 
its literatures, and hence two theories. We recall that tradition is basical-
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ly a theory. What is radical about this tradition is its demonstration that 
the presumably oppressed literature is found to be an inextricable and 
integral part of the oppressing tradition. Indeed, I hope to show that it is 
the “transcendental” condition for the possibility of that tradition. This 
is to say, while the oppressive aspect constantly maintained itself as the 
“transcendental” ground, what is the actual case is the reverse. Another 
aspect of this tradition is this: it includes the previously mentioned ma-
jor hermeneutic – the interrogative. The eminent text, the Mahabharata, 
comprises an answer to a silent question.
One central claim referring to this eminent text is that of Vedanta: the 
eternal presence of the absolute (Purusha), which lies behind and beyond 
all phenomena. Here one regards Mahabharata as a tracing of liberation 
(mukti) from Maya. This liberation forms its own hermeneutical circle that 
attempts to subsume everything under itself. At the first level, it is a theory 
of transcendence, of going beyond the merely phenomenal to reach the ul-
timate one. At this transcendent level there is formed a circle of texts each 
mutually supporting the others, and each becoming a part of the who-
le. The latter is centered in one text of MAHABHARATA, the BHAGA-
VADG-ITA, as the eminent text. It purportedly unifies the entire story and 
has no contradictions (Radhakrishnan – different views in Hinduism are 
complementary and not contradictory). This text is regarded as the jewel 
and center of the entire Indian tradition and it teaches the way that all parts 
are connected to form a transcendent hermeneutical circle. One can readi-
ly see this in the titles such as BHAGAVAD-GITA AS IT IS, by His Divine 
Grace, A.C. Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada. Regardless of the impos-
sibility to use terms such AS IT IS, what is relevant for our investigation are 
the terms that form this circle. Lord Krishna is the supreme personality 
of godhead, supreme cause of all causes, and a supreme object of worship. 
Arjuna who glimpses the supreme, transcendent unlimited cosmic form 
of Krishna, the Virataroopa, is made to realize the inconsequentiality of 
his actions. Bhakti, is a pure devotional servant Purushotaman, the su-
preme soul/being, Sat, that is equally Brahmann. They are also coextensive 
with Dharma, law, that is permanent and transcends the phenomenal vi-
cissitudes. Jnana, pure knowledge that is liberated from the mosaic, lilaic, 
pracritic (maternal) immersion in the polluted world. Other aspects could 
be added, including yogic practices of purification to reach and merge into 
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the transcendent. All that had to be pointed out is the Vedantic hermeneu-
tical circle as the mutually affirming texts of transcendence.
A note aside should be added for understanding of one of the her-
meneutics: reading texts in their contexts. What one notices in reading 
the Gita is the emphasis on law and duty, on purity and devotion, on 
submission and obedience, and on pure “objectivity” of the transcen-
dent terms. This hermeneutical circle seems to be coextensive with the 
British imperial context and hence the proclaimed Pedantic tradition 
may well be read from the context of colonialism. The question that 
could be raised is this: is the reading of Gita even by his Divine Grace 
Swami Prabhupada a hermeneutic of suppression of the Hindu Gita? 
This would call for a special and protracted investigation.
Meanwhile, let us turn to another matter; from our brief delimitation 
of the Vedantic hermeneutical circle as transcendent and beyond any ma-
teriality, there appeared hints of multiplicity that breaks up the one, and 
pollution of the pure terms, such as Krishna. After all, his Virataroop, the 
cosmic form, is Maya, a magic designed to get Arjuna to commit himself 
to war, and thus to engage in karma, activity and Maya attachment. Given 
that this transcendent hermeneutic circle cannot escape the attachments, 
the move is made to reach beyond the transcendent, to the ultimate ground 
that is neither this nor that, neither one nor many, and thus is purely tran-
scendental condition for all else. All the characterizations of the one and 
the many must be detracted from the transcendental; it has nothing that 
one could recognize, and hence it would be impossible to say that IT is hid-
den by the world of Maya-shakti, or Kama-lila, or even maga-kala. To use 
common parlance, the transcendental ground is ineffable. Indeed, it is not 
only not this nor that, but neti-neti. It is an absolute transcendental epo-
che that abolishes the epoche. What does this move accomplish and what 
claims does it want to make? It wants to say that the transcendental source 
is bereft of any aspects, even those of the transcendent hermeneutical circle, 
and that it is the ground of all – it creates the highest figures and the cosmic 
aspects of Maya, shakti, lila, Kama, kali. And this is the moment of truth: 
the transcendental, as the condition of all, borrows the conditions from 
another source in order to claim to be the very transcendental condition.
The moment of truth, the torpedo fish effect, reveals the effort by one 
aspect of a tradition to form an all encompassing universality by complete 
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suppression of the other, i.e. by proclaiming that the other is completely 
outside, cannot touch or reach the Vedantic transcendental, and yet by a 
reversed move, it also claims that the multiplicity and the cosmic dimen-
sions are its own powers. This reversal shows that the conditions of the 
very possibility of the transcendental are the cosmic, such that the cosmic 
domains of Maya, Shakti, etc., are the transcendental conditions for the 
possibility of all events, entities, and encounters. But what is obvious, is 
that these conditions are pracritic, maternal. The unavoidable reversal 
of the Vedantic transcendental move grants also the unavoidability of the 
maternal as the transcendental. What does this mean: the efforts to sup-
press the maternal tradition had to use constantly the means and powers 
of the maternal as the very conditions for the suppression. This is to say, 
such efforts were and are within the maternal hermeneutical circle as the 
all pervasive, inescapable, transcendental. While striving to encompass 
the cosmos by positing total transcendence of the cosmic, the Vedanta-
tic transcendental posture becomes completely absorbed in the excessive 
cosmic powers on which it is premised. Hence the maternal dimensi-
ons of Maya, Lila, Shakti, Kama, kala, form a hermeneutical circle that 
has always been the transcendental and founded both the Vedantic tran-
scending and transcendental moves. In brief, the maternal excess is what 
allows the transcendental Vedanta to struggle as a power against other 
powers. The liberation from the cosmic makes sense only because the 
simplicity of the absolute is constantly over determined by the maternal, 
the plus-ultra. The latter is not a denial of an absence that can be made 
present once Maya is unveiled, but what is stubbornly co-present, even 
in the active play of Brahman itself. It is also the Shakti of Siva without 
which Siva is sava, a dead corpse; s/he exists only through her. The very 
effort to escape it would require its force.
Self-initiation
Perhaps now it is possible to flow one more time with the eminent text 
MAHABHARATA and, on the grounds of the maternal transcendental, to 
note more precisely the inextricable inherence of this maternal in all events, 
such that it needs no extrinsic legitimacy. This also refocuses the eminent 
text on another aspect apart from BHAGHAVAD GITA: it is the disrobing 
of the main figure Draupadi – that concentrates all events and reveals the 
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maternal as borrowed power and yet as the genuine transcendental condi-
tion for the Hindu tradition. The poet Veda Vyasa sets a tone for the inter-
rogative hermeneutics, suggesting that the entire texts can be understood 
if it is to be regarded as an answer to a question: not what or why, but how 
did it all come about? Here we encounter text: while the king is expecting 
a birth of a son, Draupadi is born in full blossom from her own fire (agni), 
and thus is self-birthing, and gives no deference to any of the patriarchal 
figures. She is the irresistible Kama for whose hand numerous warriors 
strife; she mocks them and plays with their passions, and thus she is Lila; 
she has power over their desires and thus she is Shakti; she promises and 
withholds, and thus she is Maya. What is to be noted is that the Satrya – the 
warrior cast, as the very essence of patriarchy – are not effects of her as a 
cause of their actions. They too are swayed by these maternal dimensions 
in ways that they do not recognize. She marries five brothers. Thus the qu-
estion WHY will not do; these all pervasive dimensions are how all things 
are and happen, whether human or transcendent. They are not external 
causes but the maternal given in and through everything.
The patriarchal side is, nonetheless, the upholder of the transcendent 
domain, including dharma, the law. Yet for her Kamic, Lilaic, etc. pres-
ence, and because they too are immersed in passions, the warriors break 
their laws, ending in a dice game where finally Arjuna, one of her five 
husbands, having lost everything, wages Draupadi. Instead of being her 
protectors as demanded by law, they degrade her in a passionate strife for 
pride and power. In brief, while dharma is transcendence and belongs to 
the Vedantic hermeneutical circle, it is absorbed into the maternal powers 
and hence demonstrates the all presence of this transcendental condition. 
She is to be disrobed, her sari unwound. Yet no matter how much the sari 
is unwound, it continues to be inexhaustible by virtue of the presence of 
Krishna who upholds the Dharma. At this moment it would seem that 
Krishna, as the transcending presence is on the side of other transcending 
terms, including Dharma, yet the same Krishna, during the battle, advises 
the breaking of laws in order to win the battle as a way of enhancing the 
maternal power. Krishna’s actions thus are subject to her pervasive pres-
ence. He too is engaged in the activities that are lilaic, mayaic, and kamic. 
It would make no sense within the Vedantic context to convince Arjuna 
to go into battle if the destiny of life were to transcend all worldly engage-
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ments. And he convinces Arjuna not by revealing his total purity, absolute 
distance without power, attraction, or passion, but as Virataroopa, as ter-
rifying and awe-inspiring cosmic presence. This is what compels Arjuna 
to join the blood feud to fertilize the maternal.
Meanwhile, back in the royal hall where the disrobing is taking pla-
ce Draupadi’s sole voice silences the patriarchal assembly. She speaks of 
law, dharma and its breaking, a dharma. She is, thus in charge of both, 
the ground of both, and her voice is the power over the Vedantic her-
meneutic-cal circle – indeed to such an extent that she demonstrates the 
pervasiveness of the cosmic dimensions that cannot be set aside. The pa-
triarchal assembly knows well that it too is caught and cannot escape the 
maternal transcendental. In brief, the disrobing scene is the central reve-
lation of the entire MAHABHARATA of the maternal as the transcenden-
tal. And thus this is how things came about. The epic is the tracing of the 
maternal all the way to the Vedantic transcendental and its self-abolition 
as the ultimate Maya, i.e. an effort to hide emptiness by the denial of the 
very power that does the revealing and the hiding. Here the thirteenth 
hermeneutic reveals the failure of suppression while pushing it to the ul-
timate limit – the suppression without qualifications of the maternal. The 
more one wanted to extricate from this cosmic transcendental domain, 
the more one got entangled in it. Thus the Great War was not for the ne-
gation of the maternal, but in fact submersion in it completely.
We can now formulate the fourth rule of the civilizational herme-
neutic: a tradition may be founded on an eminent text that reveals 
a tension between two hermeneutical circles: one comprises a tran-
scendent, trans-cosmic movement, the other a rescendent, cosmic 
submersion. While the former aims to be the transcendental, it must 
submerge into the latter as cosmic-transcendental.
Draupadi is the narrative of the maternal transcendental as cosmic and 
not as ontological or metaphysical circle of transcendence. Draupadi, as a 
pervasive narrative of Mahabharata reverses the Vedanta circle yet in anot-
her way. She demonstrates that the transcendent domain into which the 
singular dissolves and vanishes makes no sense, to the extent that the Ve-
danta transcendental is regarded as neither one nor the many, and hence the 
singular, as one among the many cannot dissolve into the ONE. In turn, if 
one sheds all the material parts and hence dissolves into the cosmic dimen-
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sions, then indeed there was never a given permanent self to be achieved 
by purification. Purifcation means, then, that if every living aspect of one’s 
being is discarded all the way to the “pure,” then there is nothing left and 
all that one was has dissolved into the maternal domain. This seems to be a 
reading of the Vedanta text wherein all the transcending terms and images 
are constantly interested to dissolve themselves, including those of whom 
they are in charge, back into the maternal. Indeed, the Vedanta ultimate, the 
transcendental, beyond the beyond, is posited as one more Mayaic aspect 
to attract and to inspire devotion and commitment. And it is Draupadi, in 
all of her dimensionality, that attracts, enlivens, and dissolves in her kala, 
Maya, Shakti, Lila, Kama sway in which she too is immersed and dissol-
ved. In this sense we cannot take her as a representation of a female, but as a 
multi-faceted trace of the maternal. After all, toward the end of the epic she 
too is told, that “it is not for you that these events are happening.”
This rule of civilization hermeneutic shows that the suppressed circle 
has inevitably possessed the requisite functions without which the sup-
pressing could not act even within its own circle. the latter is constantly 
overdetermined by an excess which it cannot contain, and indeed from 
which it cannot extricate. Given sufficient interest and acumen, it would 
be important to note whether this Hindu maternal transcendental condi-
tion is all encompassing, i.e. can subsume all other modifications of the 
thirteenth hermeneutic dealt with above. Moreover, is it sufficiently broad 
also to include Zen and Tao. Such a task is still outstanding.
Remarks
No doubt, civilization hermeneutic, comprising an access to textual-
cultural morphologies, can help articulate one major domain of interpre-
tive encounters. The latter provide a serious background for the unders-
tanding of current debates concerning discursive power and its shifting 
vicissitudes. But it must be clear that such discursive battles already pre-
sume literary traditions with well developed means to both subject and 
resist, destroy, incorporate, and to be absorbed by alternative discourses. 
Yet I suspect that some of the modifications of the civilization hermeneu-
tic have also shown that most textual encounters do not destroy the other 
without residua, superfluity, and hence may acquire a power within or 








While civilization theories yield the broadest efforts at analyzing the 
basic formations and symbolic designs of sense making structures and 
processes, more currently there is a trend that claims preeminence over 
all others – post modernity. Hence, it is necessary to include one of the 
major proponents of this trend and to disclose the problems inherent 
in this trend‘s claims to universality. We have selected Foucault as a pri-
me example of this trend; despite variations on the postmodern theme, 
Foucault is a prime example of claims that have to do with cultures.
Foucault seems to follow Durkheim, at least to the extent of giving 
ethnology a special place in the human sciences, not for reasons of an-
thropological research but as a methodological ploy. Its task is not to deci-
pher the historically established cultural experiences, but to extricate the 
unconscious compositions and norms which enable the cognitive experi-
ence of cultural beings. In Foucault’s sense, ethnology is distinguished 
from the older humanities, and from the current social sciences, insofar 
as it investigates the human not as something given, but as something that 
is produced by the cognitive and normative codifications of a culture. Eth-
nography may be regarded as more fundamental, since it brings to aware-
ness the cultural conditions of science, the “cultural unconscious.” The lat-
ter must not to confused with any of the psycho-analytic schools, simply 
because such schools, as scientific, presuppose the codes of the cultural 
unconscious. Indeed, even psychiatry as a science depends on cultural co-
des. Given this foundation, the task for us is to extricate Foucault’s theory 
of society and its value for the critique of power.
The difficulties of such an undertaking are not directly accessible to 
a literal reading of Foucault’s work. One immediate problem is methodo-
logical. As is well known, in the sixties his writings, basically his MAD-
NESS AND CIVILIZATION, THE BIRTH OF A CLINIC, and THE 
ORDER OF THINGS, sketch the basic development of modernity and 
epistemic structures. But how can these works be united under ethnol-
ogy with his later works, such as ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE, 
62
CIVILIZATIONS, CULTURES, LIFEWORLDS /Comparative studies/
and THE ORDER OF DISCOURSE, which are fundamentally metathe-
oretic investigations? Moreover, ethnography as a method is a structural 
component of Western modernity to which Foucault belongs, and yet a 
method that emerged in the analyses of alien cultures. If ethnography is 
a science, does it not code foreign phenomena in terms of modernity? 
It seems that a resolution to these paradoxes must be found at another 
level, the social. First of all, Foucault proposes that the task is to take 
an “external” position to all culturally produced phenomena in order 
to note the process of their emergence. Second, ethnology as a method 
must also be investigated with respect to its emergence in another cons-
tellation, in modern society. What Foucault attempts to accomplish is to 
treat his civilization phenomena equally from an external vantage point 
from which ethnology treats all foreign cultures. Yet a full cognizance is 
given to the fact thath ethnology as a method applied to itself and other 
cultures is concurrently a social phenomenon The theoretical advantage 
which Foucault promises by this move is an effort to treat one’s own cul-
ture as any other culture. Obviously he must demonstrate the possibility 
of taking such an external view, specifically in light of the claim that one’s 
own comprehension and categorical framework is intimately connected 
with one’s own culture which one attempts to investigate. The problem 
can be avoided only when one can show that sociology in a given society 
can repeat in principle the same scientific achievement which must be 
generated by ethnography in its confrontation with alien society. Such 
a premise leads to those social theories which contend that within one 
society there can be social groups with such disparate conceptions of 
reality and daily affairs, that they would face one another as alien cultu-
res. Given this theoretical postulate, which Foucault does not share, it 
makes sense to follow research initiated by American cultural sociology 
proposing ethnography of layered culture. Here, the problem of socio-
logy can be located as an exact analogue of the problem of ethnography, 
since it is assumed that a social research encounters the “second” culture 
as equally foreign, as ethnography would encounter some archaic cul-
ture. ( S. Hall. D. Hobson, A. Lowe, CULTURE, MEDIA, LANGUAGE. 
WORKING PAPERS IN CULTURAL STUDIES, 1972-79).
Foucault does not take into consideration the theoretical hypothesis 
of an existence of diverse cultural worlds within a society, and hence has 
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to contend with the issue of a possibility for taking an external view to 
his own social milieu. As will be seen subsequently, Foucault’s implicit 
linguistic theory, termed “discourse” and “episteme,” is designed to deci-
pher the leading modes of thought assumed by a society during a given 
historical period. Yet this move is not yet sufficient to “alienate” oneself 
from one’s own modes of thought in which one finds oneself. This is one 
of the theoretical difficulties: in order to estrange oneself from a culture 
so that the latter appears as any alien culture, one must propose methodi-
cal functions which would be in a position to purify one’s own theory 
from the culturally given modes of thought and to yield a character of 
neutrality. He could justify such a claim by showing that his method has 
the ability to assume such neutrality, i.e. an ability to exclude his own 
cultural epistemic and discursive categorizations, frameworks, and co-
difications. Whether he succeeds is partially our question.
The Point of Departure
The impetus to take up an ethnology of his own culture stems for 
Foucault from literary texts of Blanchot and the convergence of French 
literary avant-gardism which were seen by Foucault as “external think-
ing.” Such thinking maintains itself apart from any subjectivity and, by 
revealing its limits, shows dispersion and finally an absence of subjec-
tivity. The avant-gardism of that time is bent on showing the vanishing 
of the subject. The world is depicted in an alien way where the human 
is submitted to the libidinal anatomy, the silent rules of a language, or a 
nameless sequence of daily events. Once events become detached from 
the subject, the latter appears to dissolve under the weight of alien forces 
in whose context the subject follows predetermined vectors. Such litera-
ture constitutes aesthetic alienation wherein the events are detached 
from the horizon of human meaning and are made into a meaningless 
succession of objectivities. Every cross section of social activity appears 
to resist any interpretation.
For Foucault this literature reveals a possibility of a speech which 
excludes the subject. Here the events no longer allow a privileged posi-
tion to the individual subject, a center of experience. No longer survey 
able, the active events make of the subject a contingency of processes 
which he cannot master. This would be the case with a given language. 
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This is the result, for Foucault, of the avant-garde literature. His aim, 
then, is to make such events sociologically more precise and fruitful for 
the ethnologically conceived social theory. The concept that the indi-
vidual is subordinated to discursive rules which surpass the capacities 
of individuals, is for Foucault a key permitting a distanced view toward 
Western cultural system. Although in an indirect way, Foucault assumes 
a literary model on which to base his social theory. For him the literary 
efforts demonstrate that not only in literature, but in the entire modern 
Western culture, the active subject was the predominant nerve center 
of such a culture. Distance from the subject shown by literature offers 
a theoretical possibility for assuming a viewpoint outside culture. This 
argument signifies the point of departure and solution of the methodo-
logical operations by which Foucault presumes to be able to extricate his 
social theory and to offer a position apart from the horizon of thought 
of the modern culture. The point of inception is, thus, the critique of 
modern tradition’s concept of subjectivity, with its attendant notions of 
objectivities and the insistence on relating the objectifications back to 
subjectivity. This “philosophy of reflection” was traced by Foucault in 
THE ORDER OF THINGS and ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE. 
The theoretical uniqueness of reflective philosophy is explicated initially 
at the scientific level. He points to a historical transition between the sign 
system comprising the reality of classical times that begins to fall apart 
due to scientific incursions in organic nature and in social phenomena 
which are not reducible to the sign systems of the classical world. The 
subject appears in the center because the transformation of the entire 
epistemic system allows the subject to be treated not only from its side 
but also as an object of knowledge, i.e. the subject is the transcendental 
condition for the possibility of empirical knowledge of the world and 
the subject. The subject is at once the active factor of knowledge and a 
substantial component of the world. It is a cross section of both orders, 
a self-knowing center of the world. In contrast, the classical thought re-
garded the human as a sign user, but not as a function of the world. Thus 
the classical view could not offer such an imperial position where the 
subject is the enslaved sovereign, an observed observer. (Lawson, 1985)
In the modern episteme the human has a dual role of being both 
the subject and object of knowledge. In this sense the domains of reality,  
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such as economic riches or cultural forms of language, seen previously 
only as sign systems, can now appear as historical modes of being of the 
human. The world now becomes divisible into as many spheres as are 
required for human self fulfllment. All these are regularities announcing 
human existence. What interests Foucault in the break between the clas-
sical and the modern traditions is the dispersal of the fundamental con-
cept of the subject through the appearance of the numerous scientific 
branches in modernity. Here he discovers the principal difficulties that 
result from the new researches. The progressive self reflection of the sub-
ject not only encounters conditions of existence which are independent 
of consciousness, but also domains in the individual activity which are 
beyond consciousness. Significantly, Foucault neither attempts to explain 
the dissolution of an established world view, nor does he interrogate the 
force of validity found immanent in the theoretical model of refecti-
on. His historical model is descriptive. Another world view that would 
be immanent to the problems of scientific development discontinuous 
phases are described wherein epoch making modes of thought yield re-
volutionary new modes that cannot be explained from the immanent 
problematics in the previous mode. Each mode of thought encompasses 
a specific number of categorical determinants entire reality. This is an 
index of diverse styles of rationality and constitutes an inevitable skepsis 
concerning scientific progress.
An inevitable question arises from this “relativism” and “histori-
cism.” What is the rationality on the basis of which one can classify and 
analyze the different types of rationalities? This forces Foucault to aban-
don the descriptive theory of his ORDER OF THINGS, and moves him 
to the ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE. Here the argumentation is 
directly related to methodological justification of the process employed 
in the historical research of Western knowledge. Indirectly, the work 
presents an attempt to apply the discovered categories for the purifi-
cation of the social level from all philosophical subjectivity. Indeed, he 
begins with a brief critique of the concept of reflective subject. Foucault 
surmises the main error of reflective subject from its consequences 
exemplified by Hegel. From the strategy of reflective philosophy one 
is led to a compulsion to grasp the entire history as a product, in the 
same way as the world of objects which the human surveys reflectively 
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as a result of his objectifcations. The totality of historical events are then 
submitted to the same activity of the subject as is the world of experien-
ce. The singularity of the subject assumes the activity of producing the 
objects of possible experience, leading to the hidden notion of historical 
continuity. All events in the historical process become transparent to 
the subject as steps which had to be assumed in the process of self reali-
zation. Here even Marxian materialism makes the same mistake. While 
Hegel serves as a model of this view, he also claims that this view is com-
patible when it is identified with a social class and its interests to which 
historical events are tied. Obviously, Foucault overlooks the factual his-
torical differentiations that arise between ontological claims, methodo-
logical suppositions, and normative projections of the historical subject. 
He takes for granted that all such differences can be subsumed under the 
“discourse of continuity.” Be that as it may, the discourse in the theories 
of history is transpositions of the results of the epistemic self-reflections 
of the ego’s constitutive activities. Thus the previous cultures become re-
garded as forms of expression of human experience, as objectivities of a 
spirit, or as hidden product of labor of a social class. Thus the historical-
ly alien becomes an accessible component of one’s own subjectivity. But 
the tendency of the thesis of discursive continuity is to impose itself on 
all areas, including the social area. Thus the social world appears as an 
achievement of self objectivation of subjects through practical activities, 
leading to the postulation of all sorts of mythical figures such as class. 
At any rate, there is an ontological underpinning of an interconnected 
sense which is not borne out by the various dispersions of events across 
what we call the historical time. In order to dispense both with social 
and historical continuities and interconnections, Foucault must keep 
clear in his new conceptions of the traditional reflective philosophy. 
Instead of lending credence to the singular subject, as the constitutive 
ground of discrete historical events, he now eliminates any trace of the 
subject per se, in order to abolish this model of thought. What comes to 
the fore are two contesting models: DOCUMENT and MONUMENT. 
Documents are written signs of the past and must be interrogated with 
regard to their meaning. In order to grasp their meaning, it is assumed 
that documents are records of intentional objectifications of a subject. 
From this Foucault concludes that this kind of history can be understo-
67
CHAPTER IV. CULTURAL ETHNOLOGY
od as a creation of a singular subject. This conclusion is plausible under 
the condition that each symbolic expression is self evident as a product 
of a homological project of sense. Only in this way can a document ap-
pear as an objectivation of a singular subject, or a univocal collectivity, 
leading to the notion of history as a diachronical arrangement of in-
tentional acts of signifcation. The result would be quite different if the 
interconnection of meanings found in a historical document were to 
be regarded poli-centrically as an interaction of various subjects. Here 
history would have to be regarded hermeneutically, and would have to 
contend with a plurality of diverse subjects. (Mickunas) This possibility 
is disregarded by Foucault. The concept of MONUMENT is posited as a 
counter to DOCUMENT. The former stems from the history of archeol-
ogy and is only indirectly of symbolic value. Primarily, its original form 
can be reconstructed only archaeologically, only through the technical 
labor of collecting the dispersed material elements. The success of this 
type of archeological labor must be tested by criteria of functional ar-
rangement of the reconstructed monument. The reconstruction of the 
monument has one aim: to decipher the MONUMENTAL TEXT objec-
tively, without recourse to its sense interconnections. To the extent that 
a written document becomes a monument, it loses its symbolically medi-
ated expression and turns into a written work composed of text elements 
empty of any significance. Tradition is then encountered not as meaning 
laden symbolic interconnection, but as an array of empirical signs. As he 
points out, the document is no longer an inactive matter through which 
one attempts to reconstruct what the humans have said or thought; rat-
her, one seeks to determine units, series, manifolds, relationships in the 
network of the text. Thus as a monument, the document no longer con-
tains an intentional content. It represents empirically found construc-
tion of textual elements. The elements are to be organized and classified 
under functional viewpoint.
Obviously this turn did not arise in a vacuum, but is a result of se-
miotic arguments against the French representatives of phenomenolo-
gy. The efforts were made to generalize the concept of sign systems, and 
to demonstrate the validity of this turn in various disciplines, against 
the sense constitution of a subject. What is assumed is a pre-signitive 
system of linguistic signs to which the signifying acts of the subject are 
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subordinated. Thus Foucault’s ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE is 
to be read on the basis of the concept of MONUMENT. Here, the inter-
pretation of documents is subsumed under various levels of sign relati-
onships which are external to any meaning. The order of language is not 
a result of meaning giving acts of subjects, but a product of arbitrarily 
arranged signs. (Hollenstein) The composition of a system, in which si-
gns are determined by mutual diferentiations, decides what the subject 
can understand and experience as significant, leading to the assumption 
of an all pervasive subject. Only the transformation of documents into 
monuments abolishes such an illusion. These arguments permit the ar-
ticulation of Foucault’s methodological “plan.” First of all, he does not 
attempt to discover the weak points of the philosophy of reflection in 
order to correct them, but attempts to replace it by an entirely different 
model. With this, the sign system becomes the transcendental condition 
for the constitution of sense and for any experience of the world.
The cognitive order of the social world must be conceived as a sub-
jectless sign system. Resultantly, the intellectual history cannot be re-
garded as a process of learning and addition by the subjects. Since the 
slightest elements of individual thought are caught in the ontological 
schema of pregiven order of signs, the rules that order the arbitrary signs 
become the “subject” of history. Yet history does not change due to the 
discovery of epistemic problems in science, since such problems cannot 
arise due to the prefguration of all epistemic functions by the sign sys-
tem. Thus the illusion of continuity is abolished by the discontinuity of 
arbitrary signs under which the humans obtain a particular experience 
of the world. Here, Foucault’s concept of MONUMENT corresponds to 
his ARCHEOLOGICAL METHOD. The latter precludes the discovery 
of any homogeneous traces among factual phenomena. Each historical 
monument is a text that needs not be submitted to an overarching homo-
geneity which would provide some semblance of continuity. The “new” 
history makes this continuity problematic by pointing to the specificities 
of the given textual forms, the segments which are initiated and drop-
ped, the various hierarchical deployments of functions and temporal 
shifts of texts, and the incongruities between texts of a given historical 
period. Yet this does not mean that Foucault wants to end with a mere 
plurality of textual differences. Indeed, there is economy, institutions, 
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sciences, religions, literatures, etc., yet the task is to discover what rela-
tionships can be deciphered between them, what vertical systems they 
compose, and what correlations and dominances they reveal.
At this juncture it is possible to suggest that the above discussed 
problem of extricating the researcher from his/her tradition seems to be 
resolved. Ethnology is now transferred to the investigations of the entire 
history within the context of archeology as monumental. The researcher 
is deemed to be in a position of an external observer of texts which need 
not have any meaning. The text is an alien composition of pre-signitive 
functions, requiring neither understanding nor interpretation of sense. 
The claim is that this methodological ploy precludes any requirement of 
symbolic access. Even one’s own language can be purified of meaning 
and accessed purely as an arbitrary structure of functional components. 
All that is required is a replacement of the categories of interpretation 
which are laden with the conceptions of an active subject. In brief, the 
method is in a position to achieve its aims as soon as it is detached from 
anthropologisms. It is deemed that the very process of such an underta-
king will yield the categories which are anthropologically free, which do 
not involve any meaning of any historical society or text.
Given this direction, it is possible to decipher Foucault’s concrete pro-
cedure which stems from Barthes’ work. First, the research material is arti-
culated into smallest elements, and second, the divided material is investi-
gated in terms of the rules which relate the elements. The newly discovered 
groupings yield the possibility of reconstructing the structure of the analy-
zed domain of objectivity, i.e. of the monument. Foucault, of course, does 
not follow Barthes suggestions uncritically. He sees two interrelated tasks: 
the text must be seen without any presuppositions of scientific typologies, 
and only then can it be articulated into elements. The first task is achieved 
through categorical bracketing which excludes all concepts which attach to 
symbolic meanings and their implications of subjectivity. Any term, regar-
dless how innocent, is to be excluded if it implicates a basis in the subject’s 
activity. Thus even such all inclusive terms as TRADITION, EVOLUTION, 
WORK, BOOK, are subject laden. After all, books and works are “products 
of man.” All are seen as manifestations, changes of mind, and re-evaluations 
of a unitary subject. Once this veil is removed, then the pure signs and their 
arrangements will come to evidence as discursive events. 
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Once the exclusion of these categories is performed, then it is possi-
ble to articulate the material into elements. Foucault, of course, presu-
mes that the process of exclusion is coextensive with the appearance of 
the elements in their raw evidence. This evidence consists of a chaotic 
mass of linguistic expressions, as an unsurveyable multitude of discursi-
ve events. They are the raw stuff from which a cultural episteme can be 
composed from the archeological viewpoint.
The difficulty that must be faced inheres in his meaning of “expres-
sion” (ENONCE). In order to get to the difficulty, it is necessary to recall 
the key role that this concept plays in the ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOW-
LEDGE. The task of this “work” is to develop a categorical framework 
for a theory of cultural knowledge which would be in a position to grasp 
a text prior to any hermeneutical understanding, including the unders-
tanding offered by his own language. What Foucault promises is not 
only an explanation of elementary units such as words of a linguistic 
system, but also of complex epistemic systems whose elemental units 
are verbal groups, such as pronouncements concerning states of affairs. 
While semiological structuralism is concerned with single words, or 
even phonemes, Foucault is forced by his argument to deal with state-
ments, since only at this level the elemental components of conceptual 
complexes are accessible. In brief, expression must be regarded at the 
propositional level. On his own principles, he cannot treat an expression 
as a meaningful combination of words. Expression is a component of lin-
guistic use or speech, and not simply an element of language. In expres-
sion, the signs are ordered with a view of making a claim, and thus one 
must allot a function to the subject, since the latter alone can array the 
signs in view of making a claim. In addition, the meaning of signs in 
expression assumes an intention of a validity claim which is no longer 
determined by its linguistic position, but also by the signified states of 
affairs. But this violates the view point from which semiotic structura-
lism draws its force. After all, an expression can no longer be regarded as 
an autonomous entity of internal relationships, if it is regarded as pos-
sessing a referential relationship. As soon as an expression is regarded 
as a linguistic element which is structured by signifying view, we cannot 
analyze it solely as a function within a complex of meaningless signs, 
but only with respect to the meant states of affairs. Foucault seems to be 
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aware of this danger by attempting to defne the expression by abolishing 
meaningful characteristics. 
It is difficult to follow his efforts at a definition of an expression, gui-
ded by the view of expression as a meaningless element. He attempts to 
extricate it from the grammatical unit of a sentence, from the logical unit 
of a proposition, and from the pragmatic unity of a linguistic act. Alt-
hough he attempts to define “expression” as “graphics,” as “accumulation 
curve” as a “pyramid,” he does this to show the inadequacies of such ef-
forts. He finally settles on the term “existence” which he sees to be com-
mon to all expressions. Expression is an existential function from which 
one can decipher by analysis or by intuition whether or not it yields a 
sense, and what rules it follows in order to be a sign. Indeed, the notion 
whether an expression yields a sense excludes in its defnition any indivi-
dual signifcation and any states of affairs; rather, a simple combination of 
two signs can be regarded as an expression. But this too is inadequate, as 
he himself shows with an example of alphabetical series. Yet this already 
claims that the letters are ordered grammatically on the basis of a given 
language. Thus Foucault can claim that an expression is a basic element of 
a text if he already assumes that it has intentional signifcation. The iden-
tification of an expression as an element of a text is tied to hermeneutical 
presuppositions. In this sense, the efforts to treat expressions as semiotic 
units, is doomed to failure. Expression is either free of any significative 
direction, and thus it is not different from any arbitrary combination of 
signs, or it is distinguished in a symbolic interconnection by meant states 
of affairs. Of course Foucault wants to escape this dilemma and continues 
to claim that an expression is an existential function which marks a deter-
minate and empty place that can be filled by individuals, i.e. it prescribes 
a position which the individual must assume in order to constitute a me-
aning. In the final analysis Foucault seems to assume that expressions are 
meaningful, then purifies them from meaning, and consequently reintro-
duces meaning by positing an individual capable of using the expression 
meaningfully. These two moves are, obviously, always taken for granted in 
order to make sense of the “purified” expression, and indeed the latter is 
never extricated in its purity, but only continuously framed in a constantly 
reintroduced intentionality of Foucault, such that he uses expressions to 
signify the pure expressions as states of affairs of his own propositions.
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Apart from expression, Foucault introduces a broader term, called 
DISCOURSE. The term, as it is borrowed from semiotics, means a system 
of interrelated expressions. The relationship between expressions is regu-
lated temporally and in accordance with rules. The emphasis of analysis 
must be placed on the rules which combine expressions into a system. 
Such anonymously given rules are to be uncovered, and the success of 
the uncovering can be regarded as a criterion of Foucault’s success. The 
uncovering of the rules seems to be coextensive with Foucault’s concept 
of MONUMENT in that both promise a subject free domain of research, 
and presumably a culturally free vantage point. But this would mean that 
the rules connecting the expressions should not belong to a specifc cul-
ture, because this would immediately reintroduce the connecting subject 
as a valid rule of modernity. Obviously, it would be most instructive to 
analyze the problematics of the rules of discourse, i.e. rules of connection 
among expressions. Partially, the problematics originate with the defniti-
on of expression. Since expressions, in their pure externality, are regard-
ed as presignitive facts, the rules that govern them cannot be accounted 
for by either the considerations of expressions, or by some subject, or by 
the states of affairs. What are then the rules of formation capable of con-
necting expressions into a discourse? They cannot be a consensus among 
subjects, since such a consensus is intersubjective, and no mode of subjec-
tivity, not even a collective one, is admissible. The rules cannot be habits 
of human activity that connect expressions, since habits are also excluded 
from providing a continuity of history and society.
This is the issue on which ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 
centers. What turns out to be a more interesting issue that prevents even 
a discursive solution to the above articulated questions, is the impossi-
bility of naming a series of unified expressions which would offer them-
selves as an issue to be resolved theoretically. There are no issues of phe-
nomena to be resolved, apart from the expressions and their discursive 
rules; but the expressions themselves do not require, and indeed cannot 
require, continuity and unification, and hence cannot be deemed as 
problematic. In this sense, for example, madness cannot be regarded as 
experience but as a discursive allocation. Failing this, Foucault attempts 
other ploys, including “style, concept, and theme,” as means to explicate 
the unity of discourse. Yet such tandems seem to reduce the discursive 
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wealth to a two dimensional surface. How does then Foucault bring the 
disparate expressions into some order?
Foucault has no doubt that one is faced with almost unsurmoun-
table difficulties. Even such a tandem as a “theme” can hardly be ex-
tricated from its immersion in various discourses. He seems to resort to 
the notion that it is possible to describe a specifc number of expressions 
having a similar system of distribution, in cases such that objects, types 
of expression, concepts, the thematic decisions, can define a regularity, 
thus allowing us to agree that we are encountering a discursive formati-
on. The rules of formation will be called the conditions which subtend 
the elements of this division. Yet precisely at this juncture that we are 
not told what are these conditions that integrate a specifc number of 
expressions into a similar system of distribution, that relate objects, sty-
les, concepts, and themes into a discourse. All that one can decipher 
is that there are various levels of discourse. Yet these levels, as parts of 
a discourse, do not exhibit any “motivation” toward one another and 
toward any relationship with one another. Indeed, the discourse itself 
does not seem to be “motivated” to relate various parts of speech. And 
Foucault is quite aware of this quandary; he says so: indeed, these dis-
courses consist of signs, but they use these signs for more than a MERE 
signifcation of affairs. This MORE makes them irreducible to speech and 
language. This is what must be discovered. Finally Foucault announces 
what he thinks is most basic: THE RULES OF DISCOURSE DEFINE 
THE MASTERY OF OBJECTS. The power function of discourse yields 
the secret of the rules. Yet at the same time it is the theoretical element 
which violates the original framework of semiological episteme.
At this juncture it could be said that the power function of dis-
course is a means by which Foucault attempts to extricate the discursive 
practice from representational and communicative functions. Indeed, 
discourse does not depend on some immanent rules of linguistic usa-
ges, but on objective social relations where language fulflls a function of 
grasping and controlling the environmental and social processes. Thus 
singular expressions are ordered in discursive clusters on the basis of a 
common activity initiated for mastery of some object. The discursive 
order is enforced by social rules which are found in a functional domain 
of power strategies.
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It is of note that Foucault gives two hardly reconcilable meanings 
to discourse: on the one hand, there is an attempt to argue that the 
functional rules inhere in the discursive formation, allowing then the 
appearance of a self-regulating and dynamic system of expressions, a 
“discursive praxis.” The latter does not name an activity of a speaking 
subject, but an operation of purposive rationality of a self-maintaining 
system following its own functional imperatives. Obviously, the ele-
ments among which the discursive praxis establishes relationships are 
not only linguistic expressions; the term “expressive style” includes the 
social domains from which the discursive expressions emerge. Thus the 
style includes institutional morphologies, and social positions. This is 
obvious from his discussions of medicine. The discourse here constitu-
tes a related combination of institutional strategies, cognitive procedu-
res, and functional differentials.
These reflections lead to the view of discursive praxis as a regu-
lated combination of institutionalized techniques and even cognitive 
procedures which are unintended result of anonymous processes. The 
latter are inherent in institutional strategies of activities and cognitive 
potentials, combining in an epistemic order capable of controlling social 
and natural environments. All this is counter to the initial thesis that 
discourse is purely systemic combination of linguistic expressions. Be 
that as it may, the more fundamental issue is the connection between 
the various institutional strategies, the cognitive structures, and concre-
te praxis. This is specifically crucial in light of the claim that discourse 
is extremely flexible and accommodating to the establishment of domi-
nation as well as an expression of desires. It is capable of handling ru-
ling interests and emotional drives. Both these factors, “power” and “de-
mand,” seem to be outside of discourse, although the latter lends itself 
to the establishment of both. This is to say, the institutional strategies 
allow the production, control and selection of discourse, such that po-
wer is exercised by the processes of cultural control of possible themes 
of discourse, the scientific structureration of discursive content, and the 
social regulation of discursive participants. It is to be noted that despi-
te the power and desire factors which seem to dominate discourse, the 
latter is more preeminent, since it structures the ways in which power 
and desire can be said. Power and desire are strategic media which or-
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ganize the discursive praxis, although the latter has already prescribed 
the parameters wherein such organization occurs. Obviously one can 
decipher a tension between these two trends. The discourse rules over a 
system of expressions which comes into existence with the need to unify 
expressions under a common function of domination of reality: system 
of expressions is dominated by power interests. In turn, the discourse 
must be an already pregiven symbolic system before power interests and 
desires can begin to use it. In the latter case, discourse is always pregiven 
for any efforts to employ it in the play of power and desire. In the former 
case, discourse is a product of operations dominated by power interests. 
Foucault seems to accept both without any attempt to show their mutual 
functioning. This is precisely the issue which the ARCHEOLOGY OF 
KNOWLEDGE has not mastered.
Foucault seems to accept the modern efforts to deal with the world 
without a subject, and a model for such an approach in this century is 
semiotics. At the same time, he has to transgress his semiotic assump-
tions by introducing the discursive connections through power and de-
sire, and by an effort to “alienate” the very system of discourse in order 
to survey it with detachment. What is the position of this “detachment” 
is left outside of his analyses. But any theory, claiming an all encompas-
sing scope, should be able to account for all factors, activities, functions, 
and systemic requirements.
Having gone through the discursive analyses, Foucault moves to the 
concept of power as a paradigm of society. This shift is in part motivated 
by the problematics of the “rise of individual” in the context of moder-
nity. The ontologizing problematics of analyzing discursive signification 
without the signifying subject and signified object, leaves the only av-
enue: fortuitous recourse to institutional demands. All this changes once 
Foucault shifts to social analyses. The discourse was initially regarded as 
a prop for social integration, offering a cognitive continuity. Yet with the 
constant failure to explain adequately the changes in discursive practice, 
Foucault is slowly forced to recognize the background forces of society. 
The change of perspective results also from Foucault’s understanding of 
Nietzsche in terms of deciphering the social effects which subtend the 
institutional processes that maintain the continuity of a social system. 
One common object of the constitutive impulses which flow undistur-
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bed into society, is discourse. Society is, thus, interpreted as a system 
nourished by two affects: POWER and DESIRE, with discourse being 
an ever-present stream of linguistic events and constituting an object of 
strategic controversies. In turn, the institutional division of a society is 
to be understood as a social maintenance of strategies and techniques 
through which social groupings attempt to embody in the medium of 
discourse the striving effects of power and desire. This dualistic concep-
tion is somewhat vague; it mixes life philosophies and theories of domi-
nation. This mixture forced Foucault to present a monistic concept of 
POWER. This conjunction did not arise solely from theoretical reflec-
tions, but in the main was precipitated by the failed revolution of 1968. 
He noted that no critique of the system has made any impact; the system 
survived the onslaught of the population and retained its power. This 
moved Foucault to claim that social systems are intersection of powers 
wherein epistemologies take over the task of enhancing power. Thus 
discourses are social systems which owe their source to the strategic 
demands of an established power and in turn work reflectively back in 
support of such power. But this move, of course, goes beyond Foucault’s 
semiotic analysis of society and, in place of investigation of epistemic 
systems of a culture in terms of its sign relationships; there appears an 
undertaking to decipher the relationship between the empirical compo-
nents of a social system, and the epistemic structures and relationships 
of power. This shift is acknowledged by Foucault in his interview with 
Fontana and Pasquin.
The theoretical shift, even if not explicitly admitted, is quite radical: 
the epistemic order is transformed into an order of domination, of po-
wer. What is Foucault’s concept of power? Of note is his explicit rejection 
of the “model of language and sign.” He now argues that the “historicity 
that determines as it sweeps us along is one of war; it does not belong to 
the order of language: power relations and not sense-relations. History 
does not have sense, although this does not mean that it is incoherent or 
absurd; to the contrary, it is intelligible and must be analyzed in smallest 
detail. Its intelligibility corresponds to the battles, strategies and tactics.” 
He develops his concept of power against two other theories, the social 
theory of Marxism and the classical political theory of power. Their fail-
ure rests on their conception of power which is premodern; the latter 
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assumes that power is either structured in acceptable ways or imposed 
violently by a sovereign or centralized institutions. In both cases one 
must contend with a power possessing actor capable of using appropri-
ate means to impose strictures that allow the actor to realize his po-
wer purposes. The classical political science thinks of the possession of 
power in accordance with a juridical contract model as a transmission 
of rights, while the Marxian theory of domination assumes the appro-
priation of state machinery by a social class, Foucault offers a strategic 
power model, resulting from the naturalistically conceived theory of po-
wer of Nietzsche and its translation into social theory.
Foucault argues against the conception of a social subject who is in 
possession of power means. For him power is not a fixed ability or an 
enduring property of an individual or a group, but as an open product 
of strategic controversies between subjects. The acquisition of and claim 
to social power does not reside in a form of one-sided appropriation 
and exercise of a given group’s rights and the use of the instruments of 
violence, but in the continuous struggle among the social actors. This 
is borrowed from Nietzschean concept of the multitude of power rela-
tionships. In SEXUALITY AND TRUTH Foucault defines power as a 
relationship of a multitude of forces which occupy and organize a given 
area. At times the powers align themselves into a system; at times they 
become contradictory and isolate themselves one against another. The 
strategic activities of the social participants are regarded as a continuous 
process wherein the constitution and exercise of power is rooted. Any 
one-sided striving for purposive fulfillment immediately solicits conf-
rontations among the groups and subjects.
Power comes from below, i.e. it does not rest on a universal matrix 
of global division into the rulers and the ruled. Rather, one must seek 
power in the relationships of means of production, family, groups, and 
institutions, all constituting criss-crossing splits and divergences that 
are tensed one against another. Of course, the confrontations can de-
velop into momentary and yet repeatable confrontations among indivi-
duals and groups. Social power appears in elementary situations of in-
teraction wherein the subjects confront one another in terms of diverse 
purposes, each attempting to persist in the achievement of his purpose. 
Power, then, is not the strategic confrontation itself, but results from the 
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success of one of the subjects to decide the confrontation in his favor. In 
this sense, each collectivity is in an unavoidable war. “Between man and 
woman, between teacher and student, between the knower and the igno-
rant, function power relationships that do not stem from some sovere-
ign or grand power with respect to individuals. The individuals are the 
mobile and concrete ground wherein power is anchored; they constitute 
the condition for the possibility of functioning power.” (DISPOSITIONS 
OF POWER) The social is the incessant process of strategic conflicts of 
action; society is a strategic intersubjectivity of war.
Foucault is not interested in the elemental situations of the social bat-
tle, but mainly in the complex power intersections. His analysis is focused 
on the ways in which the process of the strategic confrontations among 
the actors yield a social system of interrelated power positions comprising 
orders of domination. This rejects the Marxian notion of an economic 
class ruling through the controls of the political state. For Foucault, a so-
cial order of domination, irrespective of its character, is incapable of being 
directed from a centralized activity of political apparatus of power, since it 
has emerged from a series of strategic successes of activities and exists on 
the basis of successful exercise of situational conflicts of actions. In order 
to have a better appreciation of Foucault’s opposition to Marx, we must 
analyze the model of activity of the struggle.
Foucault attempts to grasp the construction and reproduction of 
complex power intersections on the basis of a strategic model of acti-
on. He begins with a global conception which regards the emergence 
of social power relationships as a process such that the power positi-
ons acquired in situations and different places, comprise an intercon-
nected network without a center. A dominant system constitutes itself 
horizontally, i.e. under a fictional view of a synchronic cross-section of 
continuous struggles where every moment the acquired successes in the 
social battles extend themselves into a singular aim. A power system is 
in a certain sense a momentary conjunction of similar successful acts, 
occurring at different places in a social world. To the extent that such 
intersecting successes in the same situation are made to repeat them-
selves, one can speak of a substituent continuity of a power system. In 
general, it becomes a temporally permanent system of locally acquired 
and acclaimed power positions.
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Given this model, it is clear that a theory that lends the state appara-
tus any power in society is false at the outset. Thus no social conjunction 
of powers can be maintained through central activity of a state func-
tions; rather the decentered engagements of different actors in nume-
rous situations of struggle is what supports and maintains the system. 
Although the traditional view of power assumed an application of cen-
trally directed imposition of means of suppression and manipulation of 
consciousness, it had to presume that such a centralized power attains 
stability only when it is successful in exercising power in various locati-
ons and situations, i.e. when it finds already preexisting social struggles 
and thus complicity with another power. Power systems must be already 
established on the basis of social conflicts at a pre-state level, and must 
have already structured hierarchies of successes, before a state system of 
domination can find an area for exercising its power functions.
The critical arguments, stemming from the model of strategic ac-
tivity, were seen by Foucault as a contribution to the French debates on 
Marxism. Principally he objects to Althusser and his “ideological state 
machinery,” although from these considerations one could also find ways 
of evaluating Adorno. After all, Adorno restricts social domination to the 
purposive rationality as an activity of a centralized machinery of ruler-
ship. In contrast, Foucault offers a MICROPHYSICS OF POWER that 
is capable of tracing power in strategic confrontations of ordinary life. 
There are no univocal relationships but numerous confrontations and 
disturbances, conflicts, transitory and evanescent that threatens to trans-
form power. The transformations of micro-powers do not face ALL OR 
NOTHING, where controls are assumed over all events, with either a to-
tal rejuvenation or disruption of institutions. Power consists of episodes 
completely enmeshed in a historical net. Foucault is consistent in draw-
ing his descriptive analysis. The model of strategic activity requires that 
the confluence of powers constitute only a momentary system. The lat-
ter must shift in order to maintain its presumed stability and hence must 
change. There are no stable and global systems, but only a battle without 
cessation. This is not to say that state is unimportant. Yet obviously the 
state cannot enter all power relationships, and it can operate only on the 
basis of already established social powers. The state is a superstructure in 
relationship to a series of power nets that pervade the body, sexuality, fa-
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mily, modes of relationship, knowledge, technologies, etc. Yet this power 
and its functions of prohibition can operate by being rooted in all kinds of 
domains of diffused and non-defned power relations.
These arguments enter the French Marxian controversy and is one 
of the principle counters to Althuser’s theory of ideological state machi-
nery. This can be understood if we disregard for a moment his obscure 
model and suggest that his argument is focused upon a “microphysics 
of power.” This requires the tracing of the strategic controversies in the 
practical arena; they cannot be reduced to univocal relationships and 
are numerous, multilayered points of confrontation, constantly thre-
atening power relations. In this sense, each point of power is in a net 
and is constantly exposed to dissolution and transformation, requiring 
incessant use of self-enhancing means at various levels and from nume-
rous domains. These domains conjoin themselves into semi-permanent 
aggregates and become institutionalized. But this does not mean that 
the strategically composed activities are adequate for the social fabric. 
This could not lead to normative understanding and to the institutiona-
lization of a momentary winner’s power. This is to say, the explanation 
must rest with at least two other options: first, the mutual acceptance of 
some normative rules, and second, a constant elevation of power in face 
of strategic confrontations. If the latter is to be affirmed, then the former 
becomes an illusion used as strategic means for the struggles.
This leads us to the second point in Foucault’s understanding of 
power: strategic means. In this context, he sees the two major traditional 
conceptions to be inadequate, i.e. force and ideology. Thus one either 
uses force or deception. Against ideology he offers not only historical 
evidence, but also argues theoretically. His view is that force and ideolo-
gy fail to account for the integration of complex modern societies. Even 
the Parsonian notion of “common values” must be rejected. Foucault 
argues that social fabric must remain unstable, since the social confron-
tations over power positions cannot be brought to stability by values. 
An order of power which is regarded as some kind of unity of stable can 
minimize its instability by introducing technical means for the enhan-
cement of power. For Foucault the Parsonian question must be reversed: 
what kind of means are used by modernity for power maintenance, spe-
cifcally when it shows a lesser degree of instability then would be possi-
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ble by means of ideology or force. Physical force and ideology, as means 
of power, reveal a common characteristic: they compel the opponent to 
give up his goal. Yet such means are clumsy, difficult to implement in all 
places and constantly. Foucault rejects even the argument that ideology 
can be effective in compelling an acceptance of alien goals as one’s own. 
In contrast to such external and internal repressive means, Foucault in-
troduces the category of “productivity.” This is to say, power consists of 
productive efficiency and strategic wealth.
This category is borrowed from Nietzsche’s conception of creati-
ve activities of all kinds either as direct or sublimated expressions of a 
striving for power. Yet Foucault restricts this concept to modernity by 
showing that now the technicians of social power possess the capacity to 
release social energies. Specific techniques of social power can enhance 
and not suppress practical energies. This is not completely clear unless 
we show a close relationship between “norm, body and knowledge.” 
Norm is an expression for the purpose of those power means which no 
longer use repressive, but take over productive functions. Technicians of 
power do not aim at a direct or indirect means of oppressing the aims of 
the strategic opponent; rather their aim is to route the social opponent 
through disciplining toward depletion. This procedure is called by Fou-
cault “normative activity.” Thus seen, norms of activity are rigidly repro-
duced schemata of activity, or an effort to produce such norms. Since 
19th century there arose a series of mechanisms designed to establish 
disciplines, habits, and compulsions. Nonetheless these remain unclear 
without the second category – body. It contains the region of life toward 
which the modern technicians focus their means.
While at one level the subject is submitted to linguistic rules and 
norms, used by all as natural, at another level such norms are bodily. 
By forming the bodily movements, expressions, and gestures, the social 
system minimizes instability. This view becomes obvious with the un-
derstanding that modernity feeds on productivity as a bodily activity. 
Although one can speak of motor activities, the latter are also submit-
ted to productive rules. This leads then to the regulation even of the 
organic processes: body shape, diet, health, exhaustion, recuperation, 
all designed to accommodate the rules of productivity. The social power 
can be measured by the extent to which it is capable of submitting the 
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body to the requisite rules of behavior and being. In this sense modern 
power techniques are no longer designed to oppress or to restrict the 
body, but to structure it by designs appropriate for modern social sys-
tems – improved bodies. Yet such improved bodies have to assume a 
uniformity and homogeneity: all designed for appropriate tasks, built to 
standards and requisite gestures. It is not a psychological conditioning 
of behavior that counts but a psychological conditioning that is elated 
by the submission of body for productivity. Here, psychic and bodily 
meanings are collapsed into one signification: one is “happy” because 
one’s body is capable of “performing” the structured and “productive” 
tasks; if one begins to lag, one is discarded. Thus youth and pliability 
must be worshiped. Body is a productive design, tooled and retooled, 
till its final break down.
The dynamics of drives, moods, spontaneities, are rejected in favor of 
organizing them along bodily “intelligences,” i.e. modes of operating. This 
is counter to any psychological region, since the latter is to be “corrected” 
for appropriate bodily activity and not for appropriate psychological fe-
elings. The latter are equally submitted to psycho-chemistry, leading to 
an acceptance of “behavioral modifications.” This means that psyche is 
reduced to biology and the latter can be reshaped by chemistry and even 
“atomic” processes, making, in this sense, the entire bodily process acces-
sible to the power needs of a system. Here birth, life, and death are at the 
disposal of the controlling interests. Indeed, such interests are beginning 
to extend into the very genetic and DNA compositions in order to pluck 
out the “deviant” formations prior to birth. One, in brief, is entering the 
age of bio-politics. Structuration, obedience, efficiency, speed, homoge-
neity, serialization, and fragmentation rule the times.
What once passed for “knowledge” can be seen now under the ru-
brics of political and biological technocracies. Research is designed to 
yield control mechanisms capable of pervading all facets, shapes, abili-
ties, and forms of concrete activities. The linguistic and discursive prac-
tices have become coextensive with bodily praxis. Here scientifc know-
ledge and its empirical data are mutually warranting; every hypothesis 
is made to work, and the funded sciences are continuations of discour-
ses by empirical means, capable of securing and continuing the power 
forms over the individual. Indeed, the social actors are enabled to em-
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ploy the strategic means provided by science for increasing reworking of 
the activities of the individual in conformity with systemic interests. In 
this sense one can no longer speak of instrumental rationality as somet-
hing that is applied on external nature, but as a strategic requirement for 
social power confrontations. The sciences themselves are in the same 
social context; they too are in an incessant “competition” for supremacy 
and must submit their operations to the material codes of progress, rele-
vance, economy, and progress. And this too requires fragmentation.
It is possible, now, to extend this concept of power toward institu-
tions, whether they are pedagogical, political, economic, or aesthetic. 
They are an extended body following the same rules imposed and per-
vading the socialized – techno-biologized – body of the social members. 
Institutions must too be progressive and efficient, economic and behav-
ioral, restrictive and homogeneous, i.e. normal and normalizing. In this 
sense, the distinctions of modernity between democratic and totalita-
rian systems vanish, and reach a conception of simply being “different 
systems” with the same techno-biological politic. Such a politic ceases 
to raise questions of “rights” and proposes functional requirements 
that call for the structuration of body politic in concreto. It has become 
obvious that once the choice has been made to design and introduce a 
particular bio-technique, the choice not to use it has been lost. The I.Q. 
pill must be taken if one is to maintain or enhance one’s position. And 
the latter too is an inscription of corporeal process all the way to the cell. 
This is neither internal nor external power, but the power imbedded in 
the ways one walks, acts, smiles, eats, makes “choices” among diets, and 
even thinks. Is this power shaped by mass opinion, or is mass opinion 
shaped by such a power? Perhaps the two are inextricably tied together, 
each enhancing and promoting the other. But here we have reached pre-
cisely the modern scientific enlightenment in its fragmented discour-
ses, their productive magic and political technocracies. Foucault is very 




TRANSCENDENTAL CONDITIONS  
OF CIVILIZATIONAL STUDIES
Introduction
The numerous civilization theories tend to seek to accomplish a 
common task concerning human life world: explanation. While such 
a task is worthy of effort, there are other tasks that suggest other ways 
of regarding civilization: its ground in awareness, regardless of cultural 
and social origins. The latter two factors are premised on various and 
usually unarticulated eidetic modes of awareness: historical transmis-
sion of sense and meaning; pedagogical continuity of a tradition; some 
inherent natural and/or supernatural rules; and finally, the legalistic 
theses, i.e. language is not only the primary means, but is the essence of 
culture and, in turn, of civilization frameworks.
Our arguments are designed to show that awareness and basically its 
intentional structure has a greater explanatory capacity than its avoidance 
and replacement by the primacy of cultural life worlds and their languag-
es. It is claimed that in principle, if one learns proper linguistic behavior, 
one need not be conscious, i.e. one need not introduce the hypothesis 
of awareness. In a certain sense, there may be a misunderstanding of in-
tentionality by the advocates of various types of lingualisms. If one looks 
at the intentionality and corrects the inappropriate ways in which it is 
interpreted, one will find that the arguments on the side of cultural world 
priority may not hold. Indeed, intentionality might turn out to be corre-
lated to a given cultural world as its linguistic, even if limited, expression. 
This will require a rejection of intentionalism interpreted as some sort of 
mental characteristic or a voluntarism. At the same time it will be argued 
that any terms designating some presumed internal states, such as psy-
chological or biological desires, needs, or instincts, that are descriptive 
of intentional states and related to sundry “external” affairs, are equally 
redundant, comprising the residua of seventeenth century metaphysics. 
Moreover, concepts of cause and representation become redundant for 
any description of intentionality and its cultural means of communicat-
ing. This is to say, the latter has been, at times, associated with some of 
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the evolutionary ontologies as the presumed bases for linguistic concepts 
and semantics. These ontologies are residua of modernist mythologies 
of progress, with all of the tacit teleologies and eschatologies. One could 
even argue against the assumption that culture is a given and is sufficient 
to account for sense making. There is no a priori necessity for presuming 
that there IS culture and that it is concerned with meaning. Both maybe 
unjustified ontological speculations and are at best conveniences. More-
over, there is no a priori necessity to regard one cultural linguistic form, 
such as logical, propositional, given in one culture as superior over anot-
her without a tacit valuation or a point of not articulated interest.
Intentionality
It has been a part of a long history of Husserl scholarship maintai-
ning a common claim that intentionality is a fundamental signifying 
function of awareness; it means something or other. The qualification of 
intentionality, in the context of cross cultural communication, is sense 
making. A close survey of this phrase offers an added picture. The term 
intentionality does not designate a pregiven state of affairs, but rather 
stakes out a problematic field. Thus, it is necessary to point out that the 
common definition of intentionality as “consciousness of...” is more 
than the notion of “intentional action,” or “deliberate engagement.” Such 
designations are still burdened by traditions of metaphysical clashes be-
tween proponents of determinisms and freedoms. Even if it were possi-
ble to regard intentionality as a function of wanting or willing, analyses 
would show that these tandems presume a more “neutral” delimitation.
Such delimitation is in line with Husserl’s suggestion that his life’s 
work was shaped by the discovery and analyses of a correlation between 
universal requirements on anyone’s part and the structure of a given ob-
ject irrespective of its ontological status. The use of the term correlation 
instead of relationship suggests a difference between an one-to-one, i.e. 
act to object structure and a one-to-process composition. In this sense 
the object must be regarded as a constant, while the correlation to it may 
be variable. In turn, the correlation may be constant while the “object” 
may be variable. To see is to see something, to judge the same thing, to 
use it as a support for a hypothesis, to employ it for practical purposes, 
or even as a basis of theoretical interrogation. The object need not be a 
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“natural” entity. It can be a numerical system, an emotion, a complex 
state of affairs, or a problem to be resolved. All such “objects” can be 
maintained as identical, while our correlations to them can vary. The 
numerical system can be judged concerning its value for some task, or it 
can lead to speculative metaphysics with respect to the “whereabouts” of 
the existence of numbers. Such correlation variations can be subsumed 
under the term “intentionality.”
Our arguments are designed to defect any opposition from cultur-
ally committed lingualists with claims that awareness is either shaped 
by a cultural sign system or by some psychological states inherent in the 
human natural constitution. Thus in this sense some would argue that 
“intentional analyses” belong to the mind or internal states which, while 
not regarded causally, are at the base of human understanding. We want 
to show that such reductionisms miss the point of their own positions 
to the extent that they assume a diversity of types of intentionalities and 
their correlation to distinct kinds of objects, including the object called 
mind and it’s meant internal composition. This is to say, we can show 
that transcendental phenomenology is more objective than the posi-
tions offered by its cultural opponents. The sense of a specific type of 
objectivity sets the parameters to the structure of the intentionalities, 
and both can be regarded purely objectively. In short, the structure of 
the object is decisive concerning the objectivity of the intentional func-
tions correlating to the object. No doubt, this correlation can be highly 
complex, requiring careful analyses, yet in principle such correlation is 
objective. Husserl, as a matter of fact, demonstrated that this mode of 
analysis of intentionality is a no speculative positivism.
An objective analysis extricates initially two levels of intentional cor-
relation: the empirical, and the essential. The latter can not be construed 
ontologically as if there were some essential reality, but as a structural 
feature of a sense making process focused on the empirical comprising 
given means of expressing the essential. The structural features must not 
be confused with generalized concepts derived from empirical charac-
teristics, since such features disregard the boundaries of typological des-
ignations. One can say “I see a group of objects” with total disregard to 
the metaphysics of family resemblance, since the group can consist of 
generically diverse objects. Yet it is not an a priori concept in another 
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metaphysically posited entity called mind. Not to speak of the irresolva-
ble dilemmas concerning the “application” of the a priori concepts – or 
for that matter the presumably generalized concepts – to the singular 
cases, there is equally a sticky problem of reintroducing the unneces-
sary question of “meaning” as an explanatory tandem. How could one 
presume that a variety of individual objects could, in a flash, assume a 
“meaning?” These difficulties could be avoided with a turn to intentio-
nality not as meaning, but as sense making. For example, a particular 
arrangement of objects, without regard to their generic characteristics, 
may be called a group. The latter is not a generalized category but an 
“essential” mode of making sense. It is neither a particular nor universal, 
and yet it has its own generality requiring no meaning for its sense ma-
king function. This avoids other difficulties, inclusive of inductive mys-
ticism wherein after surveying singular objects one emerges with some 
other singular object, a linguistic term, and claims that the term obtains 
at a stroke some mysterious general feature. Indeed, sense making need 
not be regarded as a function of some entity or consciousness, but as a 
correlation in whose context even the so-called subject makes sense.
No doubt, objections might arise to the effect that if there is no 
one to intend, the term intentionality would cease to be meaningful. 
This objection is premised on a language possessing substantive terms 
and verbs, leading to a metaphysical assumption favoring “things” that 
act. Such a presumption is a convenience which has no necessary im-
plications concerning the world. If this assumption is disregarded, it is 
possible to offer a delimitation of intentionality that simply makes sense 
to anyone. Intentional activities are not individualistic or private enga-
gements that should lead to a generalization of them. They are either 
proper, make sense at the outset, or do not make sense. The activity is 
general and may be repeated and experienced by anyone.
It should be obvious that intentionality regarded in this manner 
is not representational, imagistic, or conceptual. This is to say, it does 
not “copy” the object, does not look like the object, and is no particular 
state of substantively conceived consciousness. This avoids a type of psy-
chological assumption – modern representational as a part of modern 
Western cultural language, is a block to understanding cross cultural 
studies. Such a thesis requires that you and I guarantee that both of us 
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have the same internal states expressed in different languages and cau-
sally related to the “same thing.” In brief, my image in me and your ima-
ge in you must be accessed as alike before we can claim mutual access 
to one another. Hence, there are inventions to fill this cultural and even 
personal gap: one speaks of empathy, of similar physiological, biologi-
cal, etc. constructions. The point is that the activities correlated to the 
given objects are neither inner nor outer, neither similar to the objects 
under consideration nor their inner counterparts or images. They are 
correlational. Such a correlation extends all the way to theories as mo-
des of anyone’s awareness accessible to all. One can say “let us regard 
the world as a sum of material parts” or as “projection of ideas” without 
raising the question which of these regards is true. Both can be deemed 
to be ways of making sense.
Tis kind of understanding of correlation excludes presumed dis-
tinctions between mentalist, such as a conscious activity in contrast 
to motor and even unconscious activities, and received materialism. 
Intentionalities understood in this way can be seen metaphorically as 
vertical: they are directed, in complex shifts, toward the objects. Verti-
cality has neither temporal nor spatial topoi; we can look toward future 
events, predicted by science, expected in daily engagements, or attend to 
galaxies “above” us. Whether such intentionalities were enacted by an-
cient Chinese astronomers, or contemporary scientists, the enactments 
can be reiterated by anyone and anytime. Thus vertical intentionalities 
are not correlations to something from a position of above toward the 
below, from left to right, and from forward to backward, but toward a 
given objectivity. Vertical intentionalities are, in principle, appositional 
and thus accessible to anyone.
There are, of course, powerful arguments, pointing out that inten-
tionalities are both intersubjective and belong to a cultural life world. 
Indeed, too many have pointed out that Husserl’s turn to the analyses of 
life world may be an admission of the inadequacy of the transcendental 
delimitation of awareness that I have sketched. I am well aware of this 
issue. As a matter of fact it could be argued that despite Husserl’s con-
tention that modern sciences have constituted an artificial layer over the 
doxa of the life world, all the efforts to perform an epoche on what the 
sciences have constituted, did not reveal the, but simply another cultural 
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life world, perhaps the medieval before the scientific, and prior to both, 
perhaps a mixture of Greco-Roman and Mid-Eastern. In brief, what was 
discovered are a variety of life worlds each having its own cultural mo-
des of living, speaking, dancing, worshiping, socializing and dying. To 
speak bluntly and, perhaps, within some cultural life world, life worlds 
are relative. This is a common thesis of social and cultural anthropolo-
gists, with an added notion thaTheach of us is subject to our own culture 
which far surpasses our own intentionalities. In a way this thesis lends 
priority to the we over the I. As we are aware, the hermeneutical turn is 
also premised on this conception of the more of the historically effective 
consciousness over the singular consciousness. One could even go so far 
as to argue that this singular consciousness recognizes itself only in face 
of, and in contrast to the other.
Having said this much, it is also important to note another aspect, 
usually buried in the foreground, in the rush to reveal the primacy of 
cultural life worlds: that in the process of delimiting such cultural life-
worlds, we are not constituting our inherence in them, but our aware-
ness of them. This is the point concerning both the inadequacy of the 
Ego, and the notion that the Ur-ego is a requisite awareness that consti-
tutes itself in the correlation to cultural lifeworlds. This suggests that the 
consciousness we are tracing is not cultural – even if we use terms such 
as consciousness that are borrowed from a specifc culture. If we say that 
a cultural life-world is premised on the priority of the we over the singu-
lar, we are also saying that there is an awareness of the way both options 
may engage in articulating a given lifeworld. But the awareness of either 
must be traced from the given life worlds in order to note the “how” 
of this awareness, its self-constituting intentionality. The point is quite 
simple: it may be the case that some cultural life worlds have expressive 
means to claim the transcendental region as geological – I see, I think, 
I perceive, while other such worlds may regard the we to be the consti-
tutive background. Yet in each case, there is the given awareness of the 
world that is accessible to either cultural life world, despite the cultural 
limitations of expression. We shall return to this issue subsequently.
The rule of such intentionality is “the living present” consisting of 
permanence and change. While the object remains permanent, the func-
tions correlated to it may change. In turn, we can repeat the same acts, 
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holding them as permanent (not necessarily viewed as timeless), while 
offering a variation of objects. The vertical intentionalities are prelin-
guistic in the sense that no question of meaning is raised. If one were 
to say that a meaning of an object depends on the meaning of linguistic 
concepts, one would still assume the sense making process. The argu-
ment, based on linguistic signifcation, at times takes a turn toward cul-
tural relativism. Hence the object “cow” might mean “holy” in some 
of the Hindu cultural traditions, or it might mean “product” in capita-
list marke economy. Regardless of these meanings, it makes sense for 
anyone, Hindu or otherwise, to see this object as identical, given from 
various perspectives and exhibiting different sides, requiring our mo-
vements around the object. One cannot transgress this sense making 
process by a mere linguistic definition and walk through this object, i.e. 
one may not be arbitrary. The given structure of the object dictates the 
requisite access to it if the performance of this access is to make sense. 
Indeed, one can change linguistic expressions, use distinct cultural se-
mantics to exemplify this object, yet such linguistic usages will have to 
correlate to the requirements of a given object.
Cultural Expressions
Cultural expressions can be regarded as means of articulating the 
vertically maintained objectivities. As is well known in phenomenology, 
the term “objectivity” includes anything to which we orient ourselves, 
inclusive of cultural objectivities such as works of arts, mythical figures, 
scientific theories, and spring rituals. These expressivities are to a great 
extent linguistic, and articulate the sense of the vertical intentionality. In 
order to accommodate the vertical intentionalities, language must be re-
garded as signifcative and dialogical, i.e. to speak is to speak to someone 
about something. Language, taken concretely, makes sense as dialogi-
cal, and despite the variety of its cultural types and rules, it follows the 
triadic structure of dialogue. No doubt, dialogical structure can be ex-
panded to include more than two persons and more than one linguistic 
level. This extension of dialogue can be called polycentric. We perceive 
with the intentional orientations of others as they do with ours. One can 
address a crowd about some issue; one can even argue with members 
of one’s own or of other traditions who lived in a remote past. Thus one 
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can say “I disagree with Plato’s argument about justice” without being 
regarded as making no sense due to the empirical absence of Plato. We 
know what Plato said in his works about the given subject matter. Even 
if we claim that Plato was mistaken, we still claim that he was mistaken 
about the subject matter such as justice. In turn, we are able to recognize 
not only the subject matter of discourse, but also the various levels of 
speaking and can make appropriate judgments concerning the fitness of 
a given terminology.
This suggests that discourses can be addressed in their own right 
and investigated in their own structures and rules. This is to say that 
our intentional activity is shifting to expressive compositions compri-
sing the horizontal articulation of a given objectivity or a subject matter. 
This, for me, is an argument concerning the priority of intentionality 
over culturally available means of expression. Only the granting of this 
priority opens the possibility of articulating these means. Without the 
intentional correlation to a specific structure of objectivity, there would 
be neither criterion by which to judge the appropriateness of a given 
structure of expression, nor a particular communication with persons 
of other cultures. Questions, such as “what do you mean by this gesture 
or this word” would not even arise.
All language is about something, and is equally capable of articu-
lating that something in various ways and at different levels of human 
engagement with the objects of the environment and culture. This arti-
culation is horizontal, in the sense of serial succession of signs, terms, 
conventional marks or sounds. Such an articulation does not embody 
any meaning, but is designed to extend and to complicate the sense 
maintained in the vertical intentionalities. At one level language could 
be structured as a predicative judgment, at another it might be an expli-
cation of some pragmatic function of the object, at yet another, it would 
place the object in a system of exchange values, or aesthetic and cultural 
appreciation. Obviously, all such articulations would have to make sense 
with respect to a given object and context. The linguistic combination 
of marks or sounds, even if patterned by “rules” of verbal games or by 
linguistic forms, do not reveal any sense. This is to say, the “solution” 
to the problem of sense making cannot be had at the level of the presu-
med linguistic rules. The latter are metaphysical postulates without any 
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warrant or demonstration. No doubt, various philosophical directions 
of “lingualism” attempt to answer the question of sense making by sho-
wing the difference between marks, sounds, gestures, and the rules of 
their composition. Yet in the final analysis such ventures fail precisely at 
the juncture at which the rules are postulated as another set of objects 
for analysis to which some sense must be added. Such ventures lead to 
a fruitless regress.
The point is that the question of sense, even at the linguistic level, 
has always been a redundancy whose exclusion avoids the spilling of 
innocent ink. In brief, such questions make no sense. What make sense 
are questions concerned with the possible modes of cultural or horizon-
tal articulation of the vertical intentionalities. In order to come to terms 
with the composition of horizontal expressivities, some of the salient 
western traditional metaphysical assumptions must be surrendered. 
One of those assumptions culminated with Kant and his question as to 
the nature of conceptual understanding. Since a concept does not seem 
to be an aspect of the empirical, then it must be a structure of some non-
empirical type that can provide a form, a unity for the “blind” pheno-
mena. It seems then that such concepts are either “in us” or in language. 
Resultantly, one engages in conceptual analyses under the presumption 
that there are “concepts” offering some “universal” calling card. It could 
be that the so called concepts are residua of Platonic metaphysics im-
ported through the back door of unsuspecting philosophical discourse. 
This takes place even under the guise of generalization or universaliza-
tion, leading to the claim of obtaining a universal proposition. Yet if one 
observes the so called universal proposition empirically (and how else 
could one observe such propositions in the context of intensionalism 
that rejects intentionality as some type of mental state in the interiority 
of an empirical subject, without, at the same time, introducing some 
metaphysical epiphenomenon), then one will discover a set of marks 
or noises, each in its own right a singular, empirical datum. A singu-
lar datum, or a succession of singular data, will not lead to anything 
more than the singular data. As Husserl has shown in his Logical Investi­
gations, given empirical prejudgments, neither universality nor genera-
lity are exhibited among such data. Indeed, even the assumed meaning 
is not available among these data without intentionality.
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Given these concerns, the usual ploy is to reintroduce in some 
way the traditional metaphysics of concepts, forms, and even linguistic 
rules. This presumed necessitation originates with the traditional and 
indeed uncritical assumption that the “empirical” is a singular datum, 
containing no generality, and the latter must have its source elsewhere. 
This elsewhere have been the bone of contention and the source of ex-
tremely clever constructions of metaphysics. Where are the universals, 
the concepts, the forms, the rules and the laws that can be instantiated 
by most diverse empirical impressions, or empirical inner states. The 
presumption of factual singularity and conceptual generality is com-
pletely unwarranted. Our discussion of intentionality has shown cle-
arly that the objects of the world are available neither as singular nor 
as universal – conceptual or formal, even if such objects are parts of 
language, but bear a generality of their own and thus are accessible to 
anyone even interculturally. Language is a complex articulation of such 
generality and bears general characteristics of its own. In brief, generali-
ty does not require metaphysical postulation of something “beyond” the 
factual, but is the very composition of an object that calls for activities 
and language that are general; the latter comprise a sensible and syste-
matic access to an object without empirically conceived epistemic enti-
ties and blocks. In this sense, even linguistic functions need not be seen 
as either individual marks or sounds, or as somehow formed by or even 
comprising instantiations of rules. The marks and the sounds have their 
own generalities as bearers of intentional orientation that transgress the 
traditional views of particularity and universality.
The cultural domain may be regarded as a generality that subtends 
the metaphysics of single objects and universal propositions. A state-
ment such as “People are funny that way” does not say “All people” and 
hence provide a pure extensional definition, and yet it does not desi-
gnate some intentional concept and an individual. Phenomenology, 
thus, locates language, and by extension cultural worlds, between the 
universal and the singular and investigates them as articulations of in-
tentionally constituted sense of given objectivities and their extension 
toward various modes of human engagement with such objectivities. 
Yet the connection between intentional and cultural remains unjusti-
fied without indicating that the former is not simply an obvious object, 
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but a system of intentional activities and hence requiring some sort of 
explication. In this sense the cultural explication traces the intentional 
implications and possible variations. It can be said that the explication 
is between the experienced and the object that is being experienced as a 
systematic process of sense making and exploration. Thus the claims of 
phenomenologist’s of language assume some credence. To enhance this 
credence it ought to be shown that language is neither a system of terms 
and rules that refer purely to a pregiven set of objects nor is it merely a 
tool for expressing thought, but occupies a position between the inten-
tional activities and their correlative object.
The Nexus
One issue leading to this intermediary position is concerned with 
the last interpreter. Is it the individual who is the final and ultimate ar-
biter of sense? Some would maintain this position by pointing out that 
language, specifically if it is deemed to be theoretically laden, does not 
suggest any connection between itself and the so called factual domain. 
There must be another factor that connects language and fact, and does 
so from a vantage point of interest. Thus, the application of language to 
facts does not yield objectivity, but objectivity that becomes explicated 
from a vantage point of interest. This leads directly to a second issue. 
The user of language, while relating language to objects, not only inf-
luences language, but is at the same time part of the linguistic tradition 
and hence is subjected to it. This is to say; given this state of affairs it 
is impossible to make language an object of investigation without inf-
luencing this object and hence transforming it. When one insists on 
claiming that all language must have a “factual” base, one has assumed a 
metaphysical standpoint of interest and thus selects linguistic tandems 
from a much broader linguistic field and makes a claim that the selected 
tandems are “objective.” The residua must then be “explained” on the 
basis of the selected “factual” language and thus transformed. Here the 
interest is metaphysical and thus is assumed a priori. Yet in such a case 
the metaphysical vantage point of interest is regarded as the final “inter-
preter” of all other modes of speaking, making other cultural languages 
either inaccessible or non-factual. But such an interpretation is equally 
a falsification of what it interprets in the sense that the subject matter of 
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investigation is not only preformed a priori, but is regarded from a van-
tage point of a specific intentionality – in this case a deliberately enacted 
position of a specific type of metaphysical interest and reductionism. 
Thus, while dealing with language, one assumes one of its aspects and 
then changes other aspects to suit the selected ones. The latter are, no-
netheless, some aspect of one language of one culture and cannot claim 
universality in the sense of speaking for all cultures.
The process of selection is in fact posited in the background, but not 
accounted for, although it functions as the last interpreter. In principle, 
the latter is the intentional process accessible to all. It is taken for gran-
ted that the selection assumes an awareness of the choice of metaphysi-
cal base, e.g. empirical-factual, it assumes equally an awareness of other 
possible objectivities in order to reject them as either “not there,” or as 
merely subjective, or residua of unenlightened and even primitive cul-
tures, and thus assumes an objective awareness of this subjectivity. What 
such an engagement leaves out is the intentional activities of selecting, 
differentiating, judging, reducing, and explaining objectivity in terms of 
another. These intentional activities are none other than transcendental. 
They are the processes of mediation that are not mediated.
Next issue consists of the “superfluity” of the traditional langua-
ge over the selected aspects of it for constructing either an explanati-
on or a structure under which all culturally and indeed cross-culturally 
transmitted linguistic expressions could be subsumed. Yet, as numerous 
current textual investigations indicate, the superfluity can neither be 
subsumed under, nor remain without some influence on the selected 
terminology. In this sense, the last interpreter cannot be designated as 
the “objective theorist” but a fund of cultural modes of speaking and 
social interactions providing connections between statements formed 
for “factual” designation. If one takes the rules of language, the terms or-
dered by such rules, and the factual designation, one will not be able to 
show connections among a variety of statements without a background 
of cultural and contextual customs. For example, a string of sentences 
“How are you?”, “It is a fine day,” “Will you be playing tennis today?” has 
no indicated rule in the sentences concerning their connection. Indeed, 
one sentence does not imply the others. This suggests that there is much 
more to concrete linguistic process than the “well formed” sentences, 
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supposedly derived from, and designating empirical facts. In brief, the 
cultural life world, inhabited by transcendentally constituted sense con-
nections, provides the immediate foreground of understanding this is-
sue also implies that the speaker, even the theorist of language, cannot 
achieve a total extrication from the varieties of linguistic interactions 
and survey such interactions from outside, without the assumption of 
an intentional analyses that yield the constitutive activities of the sense 
of the connections among sentences.
From what has been said so far, it follows that the dialogical and 
polycentric intending and theorizing process, as a last interpreter who 
selects linguistic usages and thus designates facts and evaluates such 
designations, cannot be investigated by such selected and theoretically 
interpreted terms. Were this the case, then the very subject of inten-
tion, selectivity and valuation would be selected as a factual datum of 
another subject of selectivity and intended as a fact. Such a move is not 
a solution, but simply a shift to another last interpreter that escapes, me-
anwhile, any interpretation. As noted above, the answer would be that 
since the subject of intention and selectivity cannot be an object of this 
selectivity, then it can be disregarded as irrelevant. The claim, then, can 
be made that cultural a world with all its linguistic structures ought to 
be regarded as the process of selectivity and designation of what would 
be deemed as factual. Ye t in this case a cultural world can never become 
an object of any discipline, since it surpasses any selected restriction 
to fit one discipline. This is to say, if such a world is assumed to be the 
process of selectivity, then it cannot be explicated by any, not even a phi-
losophical discipline. After all, if culture is the most primal intentional 
process of selectivity, correlation of theories to facts and interpretations, 
then all such theories and interpretations are parts of culture, but no 
one theory can make the entire process into its own object, since such a 
theory would be but one facet of cultural structures and rules. In other 
words, if the cultural process is the very social and historical process 
and if all theories of awareness are internal to this process, then none 
of them can rise above and be an external surveyor of this process. If 
the latter assumption would be, nonetheless, affirmed then one would 
revert back to the last interpreter, the cultural process as the unmediated 
medium. But precisely the positing by the proponents of the primacy 
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of this process over poly-centric intentionality assumes cultural worlds 
to be objects of their own intentional concerns. Here culture becomes 
a correlate, or an object, of intentionality. The latter, then, becomes the 
immediate, or the unmediated nexus. The latter, nonetheless, can beco-
me equally problematic due to the available cultural modes of articula-
tion. For example, the modern designation of subject, even when it is 
regarded as transcendental subjectivity, may be restricted to the limi-
tations of the senses of the term and hence result in controversies and 
misunderstandings. After all, the very articulation of phenomenology is 
constantly pitted against, and is compelled to use, the various available 
senses of the term “subject.” This is precisely the point of argumentati-
ve access to various hermeneutics and their claims that the meaning of 
terms, such as subject, belong within the horizons of a given tradition, 
a given cultural world. Such claims posit the tradition as the unmedia-
ted mediation, the all encompassing nexus that is always more than any 
subject could encompass. Essentially speaking, all forms of culturalism 
would have to maintain this type of claim.
The discussed issues suggest a constant fluctuation between two no-
ematic contents: first is the intentional, transcendental and polycentric 
event as the last interpreter, the unmediated mediation that can never 
be designated either as a subject in any traditional sense or an object; 
and second, the cultural process, leading to the notion that all means of 
communication comprise an in-between domain as a mediation of both 
the intending and interpreting subject and the objects. In phenomeno-
logycal terms, we have a tension between the phenomena of vertical 
intentionality and its articulation in horizontal process of cultural life 
world. In cultural terms, phenomena, including vertical intentionalities, 
have a meaning within the context of horizontal articulations.
Yet we have suggested that the vertical intentionality is correlated 
to its own specific object as a systematic core for exploration requiring 
specific activities on the side of the polycentric subject who engages in 
various explorations; such a subject equally selects from the fund of cul-
tural process the domain that would be appropriate for a systematic des-
ignation of the system of exploration. This way of understanding avoids 
historicizing of culture and the assumption that all knowledge is purely 
a cultural interpretation. We would suggest added ways in which in-
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tentionality may assume precedence over culture. As noted above, the 
essential claim of the latter is that no subject is capable of encompassing 
the horizons of a cultural tradition. The subject is always in the medium 
of the MORE of the cultural world over the intentional.
Transcendental phenomenology would accept the de facto state 
of the preeminence of cultural media. Yet the methodological position 
of this phenomenology points out that the proponents of culturalism 
perform a tacit phenomenological epoche when they focus on certain 
cultural structures in order to suggest their appropriateness for a particu-
lar region of objectivity. The simple distinction between propositional 
sentences and other forms of discourse suggest that the former relate to 
intentional noemata as tandems of empirical verifiability, while the lat-
ter may designate subjective-psychological states. The latter also assume 
a noematic status of being given vertically and expressed in horizontal, 
non-objective sentences. In this sense, both forms of language assume an 
intentional ground toward a specific region of objectivity that provides a 
criterion for the differentiations among linguistic usages. After all, Wes-
tern proponents of cultural priority would not accept the view that the 
propositional mode of speaking is equivalent to the poetic speaking, 
without abolishing their prejudgment that the former is appropriate to 
all natural sciences, and the latter being more akin to human sciences. If 
this were not the case, then, in the final analysis, communicative claims 
would be reduced to rhetorical differences, and culturalism would be-
come strife among numerous rhetorical efforts to evoke acceptance or 
rejection, without any focal criterion concerning the appropriateness of 
a given linguistic structure to a given subject matter. Scientific discour-
ses could as well be designated as bad poetry, while poetics could beco-
me the ultimate explanatory theory. Indeed, if culturalism is credited 
with the ultimate power of designating objectivities at will, then it would 
follow that culture creates, within itself, its criteria for noematic content. 
But this reverts language to one of its archaic forms: magic. In its archaic 
form the latter becomes identical with the events that the speaking “ma-
kes.” While this form of speaking may still function among the faithful 
adherents of technocracy and religious transubstantiation, it need not 
make adequate sense in other regions.
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We may advance other phenomenologically relevant arguments that 
show the assumption of the primacy of intentionality. In the general thesis 
of culturalism it is pointed out that language is prior to any noematic-
objective content, because the structure of cultural world is different from 
the structure of any empirical and/or natural objectivity. Language is not 
derived from, but, as a matter of fact, determines the meaning of empirical 
and natural factors. This contention can be enhanced by pointing out that 
even the proponents of empiricism and naturalism do not agree on the 
meaning of these terms and their counterpart objectivities. This suggests 
that no such counterpart is given and thus does not dictate the langua-
ge which articulates them. Indeed, the very articulations determine the 
meaning of these objectivities. For phenomenology, these claims are, in 
principle, circular. To state that there is a structural difference between a 
designating mode of speaking, and the designated object, is to recognize, 
equally, an awareness of the object irrespective of its designation. Thus, 
the culturally specific linguistic interpretation, with its diverse modalities 
of meanings, constitutes variants, granting the intentional presence OF 
the given objectivities. This is to say that the arguments among the empi-
ricists concerning the status of an empirical datum such as color, leading 
some to contend that it is purely subject bound impression, and compel-
ling others to argue that it is part of an objective explanation in terms of 
light waves, assumes the primacy of the giveness of the color irrespective 
of its location or explanatory discourse. We grant the awareness of color 
despite its variant meanings and explanations.
The various issues enunciated so far suggest that the last interpreter is 
a constant conjunction of objective intentionality and a universe of tradi-
tionally transmitted cultural mediations. They are the “inner-social” field 
of temporal development, and neither can assume a privileged position. 
In turn, neither of the selected intentional activities and their selected sta-
tements is in a position to encompass the entire field of intentional acts 
and cultural processes. To be able to perform such a feat, one would have 
to assume a non-temporal posture; yet the latter must be rejected as me-
taphysical. The latter too is one intentional activity selective of cultural 
expressions that may be meaningful, but in the final analysis restricted 
to this metaphysical sense. This suggests that the meaningful language is 
metaphysical, but such language does not correlate to sense making in-
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tentional activities and sensible expressions of all cultures, although the 
intentional signification is accessible cross-culturally.
The deliberations on intentionality and cultural life worlds are in-
dicative of the exclusion of various traditional blocks, not the least of 
metaphysics, a priori assumptions such as thoughts, concepts, forms, and 
ideas, and their attendant relegation of language as an external clothing 
of something that is pregiven. In turn, it is unnecessary to hold that  in-
tentions are some pure presence that can be expressed univocally by any 
cultural terms. As noted above, every intention not only correlates to so-
mething, to some object, in one act, but is a polycentric system of activ-
ities engaged in explicating the object and completely involved in cultural 
expressions. In this sense cultural world is not an a priori set of rules but 
a concrete and practical activity of sense making. In brief, it is praxis in 
process without the mythology of progress, and includes both, the verti-
cal, systematic, active intentionalities and the sense making cultural ex-
pressions. The latter are neither subjective nor objective, but comprise a 
medium of explication of what can be designated as subjective and objec-
tive contents on the grounds of transcendental polycentric sense-making 
process. The latter is the domain of phenomenological investigations.
Although the charge that the cultural domain is more than any re-
searcher can encompass and therefore cannot be an object of any inves-
tigating intersubjectivity, is serious and includes the claims of numerous 
theses of the primacy of culture, historical tradition, and even society 
over the researcher, phenomenology can defend its stance on various 
grounds. First, the researchers, engaged in their own cultural studies 
engage in a tacit epoche by showing that they have an objective access 
to their own and other cultures and society. In brief, they assume a tran-
scendental position that enables them to show the various structural lim-
its of their own cultures, and the differences from other cultures. If this 
were not the case, then their research would be equally culture bound 
and would exhibit their own inability to offer objective analyses even of 
their own culture. The same regard is true of historicizing and sociolo-
gizing theses. The position that the members of a culture, society or a 
historical tradition are irrevocably enmeshed in the various structures, 
cannot be a universal claim since it excludes the polycentric researcher 
who makes this claim. Second, the performance of phenomenological 
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epoche, allows one to attend to specific aspects and their precise com-
positions of a given culture, history, and tradition, without the requi-
site claim that such attention must be all-encompassing. It is possible 
to focus on a specific noema and to decipher its essential and complex 
composition, and if need be its relationships to other noemata. One can 
show the composition of a specific economy, specific legal designs, show 
where the latter may be economically interest laden, mythologically re-
levant, and politically adequate or inadequate. One can also show va-
rious transformations of the sense of the phenomena from one domain 
to another. The condition for the possibility of such researches is the 
epoche of sciences and human disciplines and the a-positional consci-
ousness of tolerance. Third, phenomenological reflexivity includes the 
position of the polycentric researcher. The latter exhibits the limits of 
intentional analyses vis-à-vis a specific domain of objectivity and resul-
tantly can either show the ways in which such a position is appropriate 
or appropriate to a given subject matter. Moreover, in cases of signitive 
sense making processes, where the intended objectivity does not arise 
apart from the constitutive activities, as is the case of non-Euclidean sys-
tems, it is possible to show how certain intentionalities “shape” the very 
objectivity in question. Yet phenomenology is most careful to point out 
that while some intentionalities are required for this signitive domain, 
once the domain is established and becomes a part of tradition, they 
are accessible for anyone’s reiteration and learning. Finally, fourth, the 
advantage of the inclusion of the intentional position of the polycentric 
subject, the theoretician, allows one to read how certain phenomena are 
reconstituted. The various economic theses of the Nineteenth century 
resignifed the socio-political systems in a way that transformed the very 
fabric of awareness and elicited practical movements to transfigure both 
socio-economic and political systems. Indeed, without inclusion of such 
intentional awareness, and the ways it has resignified multiple relations-
hips among noematic essential compositions, we would not compre-
hend the economic and socio-political changes.
The phenomenological thesis, articulated so far, suggests that inten-
tionalities are not reducible to specific individual, traditionally called the 
subject, but are analyzable in numerous modifications. One may have a 
theoretical intentionality that claims to be universal explanatory system. 
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Obviously, such intentionality can be checked for its own consistency. If 
the theorizing subject claims that all contents are culturally determined, 
then such a subject excludes its own determination and precludes the 
universality of the thesis. If cultural world is granted to be the pregiven, 
tacit background which constitutes the structures of all intentionalities, 
then it cannot claim an ability to grasp this background. Yet, the pro-
ponents of this stance assume a transcendental argumentation and posit 
their own thesis as an objective and universal content, accessible to all. 
In this sense, they assume an intentional position without the requi-
red explication of such an intentional position. Barring the explication 
of this unthematized intentionality, such a thesis becomes incomplete; 
it leaves the sense making activities that are in the background of the 
intentional constitution of this very thesis. Intentionalities may be idio-
syncratically singular, claiming that all intentionalities are constituted 
autonomously and creatively, and thus all correlative objectivities are 
tied to an arbitrary will of the individual. Despite this popular subjecti-
vism, the claim is eidetically universal and can be both transcendentally 
accepted or contested by anyone.
This is very much in accord with the phenomenological awareness 
that any and all intentionalities and their either pregiven objectivities or 
the objectivities arising in the process of constitution, are reiterable and 
accessible to anyone. This can extend to include the deconstructionist 
stance that it is demonstratable that there was never a text and never a 
subject, that it can be demonstrated that they have never had a presence. 
This is akin to mathematical demonstration that something cannot be 
demonstrated. Such a claim is transcendental, all the while assuming 
that its intentionality is accessible to all. Obviously, this position leaves 
its own transcendental claims unattended. The latter may constitute a 
vertical intentionality of a constant flux, exhibited horizonally by the 
texts without parameters. If such intentionality is left out of considera-
tion, then the purely cultural position of the deconstructivists remains 
metaphysical. Despite the cultural variety and distinctions among textu-
al contents, this position assumes as a given the invalidity of culturally 
differentiated phenomena, and claims that such textual differentiations 
cannot be maintained in reality. Only intentional analyses could show 
at what level of awareness and objective generality these cultural con-
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tents lose their textual differentiations. Thus, as suggested above, there 
may be intentional generalities that may constitute various contents as 
permanent, and others as flowing, correlating to the modifications of 
the vertical and horizontal awareness. Yet without phenomenological 
articulation of such constitutive processes, correlated to their various 
objectivities, be they cultural or naturalistic, the theses of their decons-
truction remains a metaphysical, and hence arbitrary prejudgment. In 
this sense, it seems that an escape from metaphysics continues to be the 
prerogative of phenomenology.
Given this fundamental understanding of intentionality and its di-
verse and clearly distinguishable enactments in correlation to their varie-
ty of levels of objectivities, it is impossible to charge phenomenology 
with the maintenance of any traditional conceptions of mentalistic or 
psychological subjectivism or any form of objectivism. Presumptions of 
such maintenance stem from the reading only of the cultural, traditio-
nally bound modes of horizontal and variable expressions that assume 
the vertical modifications of awareness. The horizontal too is a taken 
for granted phenomenon that can appear across diverse cultural and/or 
specific traditional modifications. After all, the intentional claim that all 
phenomena are traditionally-linguistically laden is a vertical intentiona-
lity that uses most diverse modalities to demonstrate this claim. In this 
sense the introduction of mental intentions as being purely subjective, 
is one linguistic and culture specific expression of the assumption of 
intentionality. The reason for this restriction of intentionality to cultural 
modification is that a successful cultural media efface themselves in the 
process of making intentional sense of any object, leading to the con-
clusion that cultural world is all there is. Cultural means, nonetheless, 
assume sense as a specific and limited explication of the speaker’s and 
the listener’s intentionalities that articulate noematic sense correlated to 
proper objectivities. This unavoidable conjunction of intentionality and 
cultural means must discard the theory of speech acts which constitute 
meaning. Speech acts theory is one more version of saving the tradi-
tional metaphysics of mind; its exclusion, specifically in its reductio-
nist bio-psychological and causal form, does not detract from the sense 
making praxis. Such metaphysics has not yet grasped the radicality of 
transcendental phenomenology. Although it is difficult to avoid ontolo-
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gization and metaphysical pre-judgments, phenomenology, in principle 
if not always in practice, is in a position to extricate and distinguish the 
phenomena from such prejudgments, and indeed to explicate the inten-
tional grounding of ontologization and metaphysics.
Postscript
Our analyses of intentionality show that the latter is not a subjec-
tive state but a requisite activity, engaged with all sorts of objects – from 
physical, to formal, and cultural – and comprises a domain accessible to 
anyone. Obviously this domain is not identical to, nor derivable from 
the objects with which it is concerned. The activity of exploring a phy-
sical object is not identical with the object; the activities of making jud-
gments, correlating statements in terms of a valid rule of deduction is 
not identical with the rule. In turn, such activities are neither identical 
to, nor derivable from subjective-psychological states, or social-cultural 
and causally conceived conditions. They are completely intertwined in 
the cultural field of specific modes of speaking that are equally premised 
on activity of articulating and making sense of a given object. The “last 
interpreter” is an interface of polycentric awareness and cultural means, 
comprising a medium of both genetic activities and linguistic fields. No 
metaphysical tandems, such as intending minds or “things in themsel-
ves” are required. Indeed, no subjective acts such as generalizations are 
needed. Exploratory engagements and judgmental practices have their 
generalities that subtend the controversies of universal and particular.
The brief exposition does not deny additional analyses of inten-
tionality with the attendant issues concerning meaning and the meant 
in cross cultural communication. No claim is made that the generality 
of language is adequate for all purposes; indeed, one can engage in nu-
merous metaphysical and ontological speculations and add such tan-
dems as universal forms, concepts, rules, etc. Yet the assumed basis of 
such tandems will remain the interface between polycentric intentio-
nality and cultural lifeworld. Neither intentional generality nor cultural 
specificity is antithetical modes of awareness. They are inextricably joi-
ned and essentially correlated. Phenomenology simply points out that 
the awareness of the specificity of cultural media is correlative to the 
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awareness of the generality of intentionality. In the absence of the latter, 
the varieties of cultural conceptions fail to do justice to their own posi-
tions.
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A cursory survey of works in a variety of disciplines shows a trend 
that tends to use the term LIFE-WORLD or LIVED WORLD as a BASIS 
from which to critique the positive sciences. The usual appeal to Husserl’s 
KRISIS interprets the problematic of such a world in terms of its being the 
every day world, taken for granted prior to any scientific engagements. 
What is notable is that the LIFE-WORLD does not seem to differ from 
a daily natural attitude. No doubt, one can find prima facie passages in 
KRISIS to support such a reading. The issue, here, is not one of missing 
the point or bad faith by various interpreters, but of the notion that LIFE-
WORLD is distinct from various human activities, such as sciences, and 
that the latter are founded upon life-world. Thus, the forgetting of the ba-
sis in the life-world lends sciences an overly unwarranted preeminence. 
In order both to critique and limit these sciences, it is essential to show 
their basis in such a life-world. Yet the very showing is not a self-evident 
venture but depends on a specific phenomenological orientation. Such 
concepts as ground of sense, origin of sense, sense overlay, and sense 
transformation, do not have a mundane meaning. They appear as traces 
of constitutive subjectivity; as a transcendental activity, the latter has a 
task of explicating both the life-world and the transcendental genesis of 
sense of such components as sciences within the life-world.
The very notion of life-world as a ground of science is not without its 
own problems. The rise of science to preeminence was a catalyst that ini-
tiated the problematic of history. If the life-world is to be regarded as the 
ground of sciences, and if the latter ought to be explicated in light of tran-
scendental genesis, then the researches into such sciences must take place 
within the epoche, which is in the context of exclusion of any naturalistic 
or metaphysical prejudgments. The difficulties emerge when the constitu-
tion of sciences functions on the basis of an equally bracketed life-world. 
Thus the life-world and the sciences turn out to be traces of transcen-
dental genesis. Is the difference between them of founded-founding, or a 
difference of noematic content, given “next” to each other, or, finally, an 
inextricable intertwining? In the latter case, the modern life-world itself 
may be basically constituted by the sense of sciences.
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Is this a dilemma? Sciences must be interrogated in terms of their 
genesis in the life-world, and in turn such sciences, as traces of transcen-
dental genesis, are equally constituents of the life-world; the recognition 
of such sciences requires the tracing of their sense in the life-world. The 
awareness of life-world as the genetic ground of sciences requires equ-
ally the awareness of life-world as constituted by scientific sense besto-
wing. Indeed, the validity of science for the life-world not only cannot 
be denied but must be extended. The numerous practical incursions of 
sciences into the daily world make the life-world completely bound up 
with scientific sense. This is to say, what constitutes the human environ-
ment is, to a great extent, a result of modern sciences. The life-world 
bears within itself the constituted sense of such sciences. Even if one 
were to use the terminology of “basis,” the life-world, in its concretion, is 
both a ground of sciences and a bearer of scientific imprint. It might be 
that the metaphor of ground is not only inappropriate but also mislea-
ding in a way that prevents a resolution of this impasse, specifically if the 
two sides of the dilemma belong to the constitutive activities of trans-
cendental subjectivity. What appears to be a task for phenomenological 
investigations at this level is the tracing from the sense of the life-world, 
and from the sense of the sciences as traces, to their constitutive genesis 
in the transcendental subjectivity. Yet the tracing itself that stablishes 
different functionings for each, the life-world and the sciences, consti-
tutes, correlatively, another genesis not identical with the genesis of the 
systems of activities of either side. And yet this genesis seems to be the 
condition for the possibility of articulating both in their differentiation 
and correlation. In this sense, both would constitute the traces of their 
presupposed, although unthematized genesis. In brief, what shows up is 
a non-positional awareness. We shall focus on this genesis subsequently 
under the guise of transcendental history.
On the other hand, since life-world and science may be intertwined, 
for phenomenology this ought not to constitute a difficulty; the analysis of 
intentional-historical structures would reveal a genetic sense constitution 
of both. Thus, the mathematical, theoretical, and logical constructs have 
their experimental objectivity in the life-world where they maintain such 
objectivity imbedded in technical-experimental processes. At times there 
appears a misleading language when Husserl speaks of the “world of scien-
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ce,” as if science were one thing covering over the other layer, called the life-
world, implying that the latter is a ground for the former. Even if this regard 
would be historicized, one could point out that all scientific procedures 
are both theoretical and practical within the life-world. The theoretical 
side comprises the projects of scientific hypotheses, as well as their critical 
testing and empirical controls. Yet something novel occurs with the latter 
in its instrumentality: it becomes increasingly a part of sense intuition in 
the lived world and in turn it begins to alter the theoretical possibilities. 
At base, this technologization of science is what allows Husserl to speak 
of sense displacement and sense overlay of the life-world by sciences, and 
of scientific constitution of the life-world. One could even argue that the 
transformation of the environment into useful artifacts allows the latter to 
become the ground of modern life-world in such a way that the very trans-
formation of all aspects of the environment and the human extends this 
ground toward an all encompassing scientific life-world without residua. 
We shall see the constitution of this modern world in the next chapter.
Given this context, the tracing of the sense of the modern life-world 
through the layers of scientific sense toward their transcendental consti-
tution suggests that no prescientifc and distinct life-world can be discov-
ered as the ground of the world of sciences. The assumption of a change-
less ground of life-world seems to be untraceable. This would mean that 
once the modern sciences have appeared on the scene, they have set in 
motion a historical process and thus have become, genetically speaking, 
a transcendental-historical phenomenon. In turn, the appearance of such 
sciences restructures the life-world and eo ipso precludes the presumption 
of a pre-scientific life world. If there is such a world, its sense constitution 
does not belong to our world and thus it is not pre-scientific life-world, 
but a very differently constituted life-world. If the sense of the latter is 
accessible, its genesis must be traced in its own right. What appears in 
this procedure of tracing is no longer a pure manifestation of the trans-
cendental functioning of genetic constitution, but above all a comparative 
analysis of two life-worlds. Thomas Seebohm’s writings reveal a clear pro-
cedure of comparison as the ground of delimitation of a specific structure 
of awareness, yet in such a way that the procedure itself, as the condition 
of objective analysis, is not an aspect of any of the analyzed structures. 
This is not to claim that this background cannot be thematized.
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What can be said of the problematic so far? First, there seems to be 
a closure that precludes the tracing of the presumed originary life-world 
as the basis of other sense functions. Second, it may be the case that one 
can speak of a variety of life-worlds, and thus allow sociology or cultural 
anthropology to have a final say concerning the structures of such worlds. 
This possibility was discussed in its profundity by Landgrebe’s confron-
tation both with systems theory of Luhmann and the Critical School. 
Third, a problematic is opened with respect to the impossibility to see 
other life-worlds without subjecting them to the understanding of our 
own life-world. Fourth, the very questions raised point to a NON-POSI-
TIONAL awareness that constitutes the access to the various life-worlds, 
their differences, and comparisons. It would then mean that the various 
life-worlds comprise traces of the transcendental functions and conditions 
of their constitution and claims to being. To reach such activities at this 
level would require an epoche of all life-worlds. Yet the very enactment of 
the epoche will have to shift to the extent that the epoche of the life-world 
of modern tradition may not be adequate to exclude the onto-logical or 
specific naturalistic prejudgments of other life-worlds.
This task is not without its difficulties. Even if we trace the genesis 
of modern sciences, we must relive the constitutive genesis of sense of 
specific sense configurations of sciences in order to trace them through 
various sedimentations all the way to the reconstitution of the originary 
scientific sense. This might be seen, initially, to be the historical task of the 
specific constitution of specific scientific structures during a given histo-
rical period. This historically transcendental approach may offer an access 
to the transformation of a life-world toward a scientifically reconstituted 
world. Of course, this does not yet demonstrate that there is the life-world 
apart from the one now being extended by the sciences and the one that 
the sciences left behind as, for example, the Medieval life-world. This is to 
say, the extension of sense by the scientific constructions and their overlay 
of the prior life-world does not imply that the previous life-world was and 
is the originary, while the scientific is an overlay over the originary. If this 
were the case, then one would have to show why the Medieval life-world is 
the ground, and the modern activities are an overlay over such a ground. 
If this position fails to reveal the life-world, then we are left again with a 
multiplicity of such worlds. The problem can be phrased in other terms: is 
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there a pure life-world that is not intertwined with layers of cultural sense? 
The Medieval peasant as well as the Taoist perform minimal rituals that 
are totally coextensive with the formation of the sense intuition. Hence 
neither science nor other cultural constitutions of sense would comprise 
an overlay of an originary life-world. Given this possibility, one is barred 
from finding an access to some originary life-world. Thus if the modern 
life-world is scientifically and technologically laden, then the constitution 
of modern life world is the very sense embodiments that constitute scien-
tific-technological praxis. The functioning of transcendental subjectivity, 
as the genesis of sense is increasingly a complex and incompossable pro-
cess of those very sense constitutions that have assumed an embodied life 
of their own. In a manner of speaking, to trace the functioning of these 
embodied sense constitutions is to discover the ways they were intended 
initially. This is important in light of the possible claim that the embedded 
sense not only covers over the presumed originary life-world, but that it 
has assumed a life of its own. What would be such initial intentionali-
ty? One way of tracing this intentionality could be by showing how it is 
“working itself out” in myriads of ways, although such an intentionality 
remains invariant. This is to say, there is a traceable noema through mo-
dernity.8 Such a noema need not be constituted actively; rather, it is more 
lived than conceived. It seems that the phenomenological explication of 
such intentionality would be a worthy venture. The only suggestion that 
appears to be plausible is this: both Fink and Schabert would regard this 
intentionality to be empty in the sense that it has no vertical hold on any 
aesthetic tandem; any filling of this vertical intentionality must be first 
produced “horizontally” or in a sequence of steps. While the intentionali-
ty is empty, it is equally backed by a methodical and dogmatic metaphysi-
cs whose task is to legitimate the concrete construction of the horizontal 
filling. The dogmatic metaphysics is the assumed giveness of quantitative 
structures, procedures, and their “application.” Husserl has demonstrated 
that there can be empty, partially filled, and completely covered intentio-
nalities; yet such filling depends on the immediately given “this there.” 
What appears to be specific about modernity is that the dominant inten-
tionality is fillable in arbitrary ways. The filling depends on second level 
intentionalities, such as wants, projects, and designs. These horizontal in-
tentionalities consist of technically produced life world in a way that this 
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life-world comprises a filling for the vertical, empty intentionality, whose 
invariant logic of filling is the logic of conditions-conditioned, or “if-then” 
structure. If we establish certain conditions, then we shall get the desired 
results we projected. Here the phenomenological analyses of the processes 
of APPLICATION OF QUANTITATIVE STRUCTURES ON THE SEN-
SE FIELD OF AWARENESS ARE YET TO BE ACCOMPLISHED. How 
do the timeless and spaceless, unextended homogeneous quanta FIT the 
heterogeneous phenomena. APPLICATION AND FILLING ARE, to say 
the least, founded on the logic of corporeal systems of praxis and cannot 
be derived from the structure of the empty intentionality and its horizon-
tal articulation of wants, projects, and possibilities. A specific structure of 
the “I can,” with its own intentionalities, pervades the horizontal network 
of modern life-world, with an assumed purposive and teleological struc-
ture. We shall see subsequently the way that modern science is in princi-
ple technical.
The very shift from the non-scientific to scientific life-world may 
be regarded as historical, and hence the question of ground may very 
well be transcendentally-historical concept. Thus the function, ascribed 
to life-world as a sense foundation of sciences, is historically unfolded 
function. This ought not to mean that historicity is the sole issue; there 
is no doubt that whatever the life-world may be, it too comprises clu-
es to its genesis. The relationship between the life-world as a clue and 
its historicity is seen by Husserl as the most universal problem. Yet the 
tracing of this relationship raises the question whether it is sufficient to 
be the basis for the connection between life-world and science. What 
is opened here is the problematic of using the life-world as if it were a 
trace similar to the traces constituted by scientific sense. This is to say 
the transcendental founding of both cannot give priority of one over the 
other, if such a distinction is still maintainable. If it is maintainable in 
the traditionally stated sense, then life-world is the universal and unt-
hematized horizon of our prereflective life, and cannot be treated as one 
clue next to other clues of transcendental constitution. An implicit issue 
here is suggested by the difference between layers of thing constitution, 
theory-rationality-logic constitution, and life-world constitution. The 
latter cannot be read from the two former objectivities. This is suggested 
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by Husserl’s reference not to the forgetfulness of Being but of World. The 
epoche that brackets Being may not be adequate to bracket the world.
The relationship between life-world and history requires complex 
researches and unpeeling of intertwined and overlaid phenomena. At 
the same time, the two non-regional ontologies, the life-world and his-
tory would constitute traces – although most radical and difficult to 
decipher – of the genetic constitution of their identifiable and equally 
differentiated compositions. This is to say, the tracing of the transcen-
dental, the absolutely functioning subjectivity, could begin with the two, 
vaguely and yet constantly pregiven, dimensions. Such subjectivity se-
ems to hover irrevocably in the background of all comparative analyses 
and tracings. The task is to trace how such comparisons collapse into the 
discovered sedimentations both of life-world and mundane history.
The inception of such tracings cannot begin elsewhere than the LIV-
ING PRESENT. The latter has been investigated in its depth and com-
plexity by Jose Huertas-Jourda.29 Cross-cultural research of life-worlds 
suggest a reading of the living present in terms of the vertical and hori-
zontal intentionalities which not only resist univocal interpretation, but 
rather exhibit a variety of typological modifications. First modificati-
on shows that both intentionalities can become either permanent or in 
flux. Thus, the vertical may assume a modification of being a permanent 
and repeatable act, object, world, in contrast to a myriad of changes and 
transformations, exhibited horizontally. In turn the flux can be main-
tained vertically as permanent and continuous change, while the ho-
rizontal may appear as diverse objects, acts, etc., that are in constant 
transformation. Given a specific life-world and its available means of 
expression, either the permanent or the changing may be designated as 
historical. This suggests that not all life-worlds will contain such expres-
sions and resultantly they will not be designated as historical. Historical, 
thus, is one modification of either change or permanence, and, in turn, 
the modification of the vertical and the horizontal.
Diverse traditional and contemporary life-worlds manifest other 
modifications of both intentionalities of the living present. Some chan-
ges and activities may be seen as maintenance and enhancement of a 
given permanence. For example, given a life-world in which expressions 
of continuous and even lawful history are present, radical revolutions 
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may regard most dynamic activities as maintenance of the permanence 
of the laws of history. Other life-worlds, wherein the members see the 
world as an embodiment of eternally preordained laws of some divinity, 
may not have a history, and will regard their activities also as perma-
nently preordained to carry out, to maintain, some eternal edicts. Other 
examples of such typological modifications can be adduced from texts 
and practices of members of diverse life-worlds and cultures.
Some changes may be regarded as disruptive of permanence. In 
such cases an availability of expressions such as history that is always 
changing would be regarded as disruptive of, for example, eternal, di-
vine edicts, or scientific laws. The proponents of the latter will be com-
pelled to separate “natural sciences” from the “human sciences,” while 
the former will regard historical events as a fallen state, in the power of 
some evil forces, inclusive of secular tolerance of historical diversities.
Life-worlds exhibit other typological modifications. In some life-worlds 
permanence may suppress change, spontaneity, random variations, and 
thus constitute an iron cage without escape. Such modification is present in 
theological gnosticisms, with their variants in predestination and teleology, 
in sundry philosophical determinisms, and utopian ideologies. This type 
could be regarded as disruptive of change. This modification requires no 
historical variation, since to know the determining factors, is to know that 
everything has already been written. Any spontaneity would have to escape 
completely such an iron cage, and thus to constitute a radical opposition.
Permanence may also be an enhancement for change. There are per-
manent institutions, such as democratic, where changes are not only 
permitted, but supported. Indeed, the very institutions of this type of 
life-world may be designated to be historical, basically in two variati-
ons. History may be continuous in the sense that one may deem it to 
be always searching for democracy. It may also be discontinuous, to the 
extent that there may be and novel and diverse inceptions of democratic 
institutions, leading to the awareness of diverse types of histories.
While it is possible to perform an epoche to decipher “pure” mo-
difications of life-worlds as traces of the vertical-horizontal intentiona-
lities and their permanence-change modifications, it is equally of note 
that the requisite researches are more complex. A particular culture is 
usually a complex of various types. One may have a permanent, secular 
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democracy, permitting all changes, and also tolerating theologies and 
sciences with their permanence of the iron cage type. In this sense, the 
meaning of life-world becomes coextensive with a culture, possessing 
both historical and nonhistorical modes of awareness. Such a cultural 
life-world is in a constant tension, where each mode of awareness strives 
to establish its own supremacy over others.30 The transcendental soluti-
on that such cultures adopt is a tolerant consciousness.
In the final analysis, tolerant consciousness requires the epoche 
of all human sciences and cultural designs. Yet it is the transcendental 
APOSITIONALITY that allows the tracing of such sciences and designs 
to their transcendental constitutive genesis and their accessibility to any 
awareness. This would comprise an eidetic science of the relationship 
among life-worlds and either their possession or lack of histories.
This kind of understanding of correlation excludes presumed dis-
tinctions between mentalism, such as a conscious activity in contrast to 
motor and even unconscious activities, and received materialism. In-
tentionalities understood in this way can be seen metaphorically as VER-
TICAL: they are directed, in complex shifts, toward the objects. Verti-
cality has neither temporal nor spatial topoi; we can look toward future 
events, predicted by science, expected in daily engagements, or attend 
to galaxies “above” us. Whether such intentionalities were enacted by an-
cient Chinese astronomers, or contemporary scientists, the enactments 
can be reiterated by anyone and anytime. Thus vertical intentionalities 
are not correlations to something from a position of above toward the 
below, from left to right, and from forward to backward, but toward a 
given objectivity. Vertical intentionalities are, in principle, APOSITIO-
NAL and thus given to anyone.
There are, of course, powerful arguments, pointing out that intentio-
nalities are both INTERSUBJECTIVE and belong to a CULTURAL LIFE-
WORLD. Indeed, too many have pointed out that Husserl’s turn to the 
analyses of LIFEWORLD may be an admission of the inadequacy of the 
transcendental delimitation of awareness that I have sketched. I am well 
aware of this issue. As a matter of fact, I have argued in a paper entitled 
LIFEWORLD AND HISTORY that despite Husserl’s contention that mo-
dern sciences have constituted an artificial layer over the doxa of the life 
world, all the efforts to perform an epoche on what the sciences have cons-
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tituted, revealed, simply another cultural life world, perhaps the medieval 
before the scientific, and prior to both, perhaps a mixture of Greco-Ro-
man and Mid-Eastern. In brief, what was discovered were a variety of life 
worlds each having its own cultural modes of living, speaking, dancing, 
worshiping, socializing and dying. To speak bluntly and, perhaps, within 
some cultural life world, life worlds are relative. This is a common thesis of 
social and cultural anthropologists, with an added notion that each of us 
is subject to our own culture which far surpasses our own intentionalities. 
In a way this thesis lends priority to the WE over the I. As we are aware, 
the hermeneutical turn is also premised on this conception of the excess 
of the historically effective consciousness over the singular consciousness. 
One could even go so far as to argue that this singular consciousness re-
cognizes itself only in face of, and in contrast to the other.
Having said this much, it is also important to note another aspect, 
usually buried in the foreground, in the rush to reveal the primacy of 
cultural life worlds: that in the process of delimiting such cultural life-
worlds, we are not constituting our inherence in them, but our awareness 
of them. This is Husserl’s point concerning both the inadequacy of the 
Ego, and the notion that the UREGO is a requisite awareness that con-
stitutes itself in the correlation to cultural life worlds. This suggests that 
the consciousness we are tracing is not cultural – even if we use terms as 
consciousness that are borrowed from a specific culture. If we say that a 
cultural life world is premised on the priority of the WE over the singu-
lar, we are also saying that there is an awareness of the way both options 
may engage in articulating a given life world. But the awareness of either 
must be traced from the given life worlds in order to note the HOW 
of this awareness, its self-constituting intentionality. The point is quite 
simple: it may be the case that some cultural life worlds have expressive 
means to claim the transcendental region as egological – I see, I think, I 
perceive, while other such worlds may regard the WE to be the consti-
tutive background. Yet in each case, there is the given awareness of the 
world that is accessible to either cultural life world, despite the cultural 
limitations of expression. We shall return to this issue subsequently.
The rule of such intentionality is PEMANENCE AND CHANGE, 
the LIVING PRESENT. While the object remains permanent, the func-
tions correlated to it may change. In turn, we can repeat the same acts, 
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holding them as permanent (not necessarily viewed as timeless), while of-
fering a variation of objects. The vertical intentionalities are prelinguistic 
in the sense that no question of meaning is raised. If one were to say that 
a meaning of an object depends on the meaning of linguistic concepts, 
one would still assume the sense making process. This seems to be the 
point of Husserl’s later works concerned with passive syntheses as pre-
linguistic sense-making. The argument, based on linguistic signification, 
at times takes a turn toward cultural relativism. Hence the object “cow” 
might mean “holy” in some of the Hindu cultural traditions, or it might 
mean “product” in capitalist market economy. Regardless of these mean-
ings, it makes sense for anyone, Hindu or otherwise, to see this object as 
identical, given from various perspectives and exhibiting different sides, 
requiring our movements around the object. One cannot transgress this 
sense making process by a mere linguistic definition and walk through 
this object, i.e. one may not be arbitrary. The given structure of the object 
dictates the requisite access to it if the performance of this access is to 
make sense. Indeed, one can change linguistic expressions, use distinct 
cultural semantics to exemplify this object, yet such linguistic usages will 
have to correlate to the requirements of a given object.
Cultural Expressions
Cultural expressions can be regarded as means of articulating the 
vertically maintained objectivities. As is well known in phenomenology, 
the term “objectivity” includes anything to which we orient ourselves, 
inclusive of cultural objectivities such as works of arts, mythical figures, 
scientific theories, and spring rituals. These expressivities are to a great 
extent linguistic, and articulate the sense of the vertical intentionality. In 
order to accommodate the vertical intentionalities, language must be re-
garded as signifcative and dialogical, i.e. to speak is to speak to someone 
about something. Language, taken concretely, makes sense as dialogical, 
and despite the variety of its cultural types and rules, it follows the triadic 
structure of dialogue. No doubt, dialogical structure can be expanded to 
include more than two persons and more than one linguistic level.
Husserl calls such an extension of dialogue POLICENTRIC. We 
perceive with the intentional orientations of others as they do with 
ours. One can address a crowd about some issue; one can even argue 
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with members of one’s own or of other traditions who lived in a remote 
past. Thus one can say “I disagree with Plato’s argument about justice” 
without being regarded as somehow making no sense due to the empi-
rical absence of Plato. We know what Plato said in his works about the 
given subject-matter. Even if we claim that Plato was mistaken, we still 
claim that he was mistaken about the subject-matter such as justice. In 
turn, we are able to recognize not only the subject-matter of discourse, 
but also the various levels of speaking and can make appropriate jud-
gments concerning the fitness of a given terminology.
This suggests that discourses can be addressed in their own right 
and investigated in their own structures and rules. This is to say that 
our intentional activity is shifting to expressive compositions compri-
sing the horizontal articulation of a given objectivity or a subject matter. 
This, for me, is an argument concerning the priority of intentionality 
over culturally available means of expression. Only the granting of this 
priority opens the possibility of articulating these means. Without the 
intentional correlation to a specific structure of objectivity, there would 
be no criterion by which to judge the appropriateness of a given structu-
re of neither expression, nor a particular communication with persons 
of other cultures. Questions, such as “what do you mean by this gesture 
or this word” would not even arise.
All language is ABOUT something, and it is equally capable of ar-
ticulating that something in various ways and at different levels of human 
engagement with the objects of the environment and culture. This articu-
lation is HORIZONTAL, in the sense of serial succession of signs, terms, 
conventional marks or sounds. Such an articulation does not embody any 
meaning, but is designed to extend and to complicate the sense maintained 
in the vertical intentionalities. At one level language could be structured 
as a predicative judgment, at another it might be an explication of some 
pragmatic function of the object, at yet another, it would place the object 
in a system of exchange values, or aesthetic and cultural appreciation. Ob-
viously, all such articulations would have to make sense with respect to a 
given object and context. The linguistic combination of marks or sounds, 
even if patterned by “rules” of the verbal games or by the linguistic forms, 
do not reveal any sense. This is to say, the “solution” to the problem of 
sense-making cannot be had at the level of the presumed linguistic rules. 
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The latter are metaphysical postulates without any warrant or demonstra-
tion. No doubt, various philosophical directions of “lingualism” attempt 
to answer the question of sense-making by showing the difference betwe-
en marks, sounds, gestures, and the rules of their composition. Yet in the 
final analysis such ventures fail precisely at the juncture at which the rules 
are postulated as another set of objects for analysis to which some sense 
must be added. Such ventures lead to a fruitless regress.
The point is that the question of sense, even at the linguistic level, 
has always been a redundancy whose exclusion avoids the spilling of in-
nocent ink. In brief, such questions make no sense. What makes sense 
are questions concerned with the possible modes of cultural or horizon-
tal articulation of the vertical intentionalities. In order to come to terms 
with the composition of horizontal expressivities, some of the salient 
western traditional metaphysical assumptions must be surrendered. 
One of those assumptions culminated with Kant and his question as to 
the nature of conceptual understanding. Since a concept does not seem 
to be an aspect of the empirical, then it must be a structure of some non-
empirical type that can provide a form, a unity for the “blind” pheno-
mena. It seems then that such concepts are either “in us” or in language. 
Resultantly, one engages in conceptual analyses under the presumption 
that there are “concepts” offering some “universal” calling card. It could 
be that the so-called concepts are residu of Platonic metaphysics im-
ported through the back door of unsuspecting philosophical discourse. 
This takes place even under the guise of generalization or universaliza-
tion, leading to the claim of obtaining a universal proposition. Yet if one 
observes the so called universal proposition empirically (and how else 
could one observe such propositions in the context of intensionalism 
that rejects intentionality as some type of mental state in the interiority 
of an empirical subject, without, at the same time, introducing some 
metaphysical epiphenomenon), then one will discover a set of marks 
or noises, each in its own right a singular, empirical datum. A singular 
datum, or a succession of singular data, will not lead to anything more 
than the singular data. As Husserl has shown in his LOGICAL INVES-
TIGATIONS, given empirical prejudgments, neither universality nor 
generality are exhibited among such data. Indeed, even the assumed 
meaning is not available among these data without intentionality.
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From what has been said so far, it follows that the dialogical and 
polycentric intending and theorizing process, as a last interpreter, who 
selects linguistic usages and thus designates facts and evaluates such 
designations, cannot be investigated by such selected and theoretically 
interpreted terms. Were this the case, then the very subject of inten-
tion, selectivity and valuation would be selected as a factual datum of 
another subject of selectivity and intended as a fact. Such a move is not 
a solution, but simply a shift to another last interpreter that escapes, 
meanwhile, any interpretation. As noted above, the answer would be 
that since the subject of intention and selectivity cannot be an object of 
this selectivity, then it can be disregarded as irrelevant. The claim, then, 
can be made that cultural world with all its linguistic structures ought to 
be regarded as the process of selectivity and designation of what would 
be deemed as factual. Yet in this case a cultural world can never become 
an object of any discipline, since it surpasses any selected restriction to 
one discipline. This is to say, if such a world is assumed to be the process 
of selectivity, then it cannot be explicated by any, not even the philo-
sophical discipline. After all, if culture is the most primal intentional 
process of selectivity, correlation of theories to facts and interpretations, 
then all such theories and interpretations are parts of culture, but no 
one theory can make the entire process into its own object, since such a 
theory would be but one facet of cultural structures and rules. In other 
words, if the cultural process is the very social and historical process 
and if all theories of awareness are internal to this process, then none 
of them can rise above and be an external surveyor of this process. If 
the latter assumption would be, nonetheless, affirmed, then one would 
revert back to the last uninterrupted interpreter, the cultural process as 
the unmediated medium. But precisely the positing by the proponents 
of the primacy of this process over poli-centric intentionality assumes 
cultural worlds to be objects of their own intentional concerns. Here 
culture becomes a correlate, or an object, of intentionality. The latter, 
then, becomes the immediate, or the unmediated nexus. The latter, no-
netheless, can become equally problematic due to the available cultu-
ral modes of articulation. For example, the modern designation of su-
bject, even when it is regarded as transcendental subjectivity, may be 
restricted to the limitations of the senses of the term and hence result in 
121
CHAPTER VI. LIFEWORLD AND CULTURE
controversies and misunderstandings. After all, the very articulation of 
phenomenology is constantly pitted against, and is compelled to use, the 
various available senses of the term “subject.” This is precisely the point 
of argumentative access to various hermeneutics and their claims that 
the meaning of terms, such as subject, belong within the horizons of a 
given tradition, a given cultural world. Such claims posit the tradition 
as the unmediated mediation, the all encompassing nexus that is always 
more than any subject could encompass. Essentially speaking, all forms 
of culturalism would have to maintain this type of claim.
The discussed issues suggest a constant fluctuation between two no-
ematic contents: first is the intentional, transcendental and polycentric 
event as the last interpreter, the unmediated mediation that can never 
be designated either as a subject in any traditional sense or an object; 
and second, the cultural process, leading to the notion that all means of 
communication comprise an in-between domain as a mediation of both 
the intending and interpreting subject and the objects. In phenomeno-
logi-cal terms, we have a tension between the phenomena of vertical 
intentionality and its articulation in horizontal process of cultural life 
world. In cultural terms, phenomena, including vertical intentionalities, 
have a meaning within the context of horizontal articulations.
Yet we have suggested that the vertical intentionality is correlated 
to its own specific object as a systematic core for exploration requiring 
specific activities on the side of the polycentric subject who engages in 
various explorations; such a subject equally selects from the fund of cul-
tural process the domain that would be appropriate for a systematic des-
ignation of the system of exploration. This way of understanding avoids 
historicizing of culture and the assumption that all knowledge is purely 
a cultural interpretation. We would suggest added ways in which in-
tentionality may assume precedence over culture. As noted above, the 
essential claim of the latter is that no subject is capable of encompassing 
the horizons of a cultural tradition. The subject is always in the medium 
of the MORE of the cultural world over the intentional.
The various issues enunciated so far suggest that the last interpreter is 
a constant conjunction of objective intentionality and a universe of tradi-
tionally transmitted cultural mediations. They are the “inner-social” field 
of temporal development, and neither can assume a privileged position. 
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In turn, neither of the selected intentional activities and their selected sta-
tements is in a position to encompass the entire field of intentional acts 
and cultural processes. To be able to perform such a feat, one would have 
to assume a non-temporal posture; yet the latter must be rejected as me-
taphysical. The latter too is one intentional activity selective of cultural 
expressions that may be meaningful, but in the final analysis restricted 
to this metaphysical sense. This suggests that the meaningful language is 
metaphysical, but such language does not correlate to sense-making in-
tentional activities and sensible expressions of all cultures, although the 
intentional signification is accessible cross culturally.
The deliberations on intentionality and cultural life worlds are in-
dicative of the exclusion of various traditional blocks, not the least of 
metaphysics, a priori assumptions such as thoughts, concepts, forms, and 
ideas, and their attendant relegation of language as an external clothing 
of something that is pregiven. In turn, it is unnecessary to hold that in-
tentions are some pure presence that can be expressed univocally by any 
cultural terms. As noted above, every intention not only correlates to so-
mething, to some object, in one act, but is a polycentric system of activi-
ties engaged in explicating the object and completely involved in cultural 
expressions. In this sense cultural world is not an a priori set of rules but 
a concrete and practical activity of sense-making. In brief, it is praxis in 
process without the mythology of progress, and includes both, the verti-
cal, systematic, active intentionalities and the sense-making cultural ex-
pressions. The latter are neither subjective nor objective, but comprise a 
medium of explication of what can be designated as subjective and objec-
tive contents on the grounds of transcendental polycentric sense making 
process. The latter is the domain of phenomenological investigations.
Although the charge that the cultural domain is more than any re-
searcher can encompass and therefore cannot be an object of any inves-
tigating intersubjectivity, is serious and includes the claims of numerous 
theses of the primacy of culture, historical tradition, and even society 
over the researcher, phenomenology can defend its stance on various 
grounds. First, the researchers, engaged in their own cultural studies 
engage in a tacit epoche by showing that they have an objective access to 
their own and other cultures and society. In brief, they assume a trans-
cendental position that enables them to show the various structural 
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limits of their own cultures, and the differences from other cultures. 
If this were not the case, then their research would be equally culture 
bound and would exhibit their own inability to offer objective analyses 
even of their own culture. The same regard is true of historicizing and 
sociologizing theses. The position that the members of a culture, so-
ciety or a historical tradition are irrevocably enmeshed in the various 
structures, cannot be a universal claim since it excludes the polycentric 
researcher who makes this claim. Second, the performance of pheno-
menological epoche, allows one to attend to specific aspects and their 
precise compositions of a given culture, history, and tradition, without 
the requisite claim that such attention must be all-encompassing. It is 
possible to focus on a specific noema and to decipher its essential and 
complex composition, and if need be its relationships to other noemata. 
One can show the composition of a specific economy, specific legal de-
signs, show where the latter may be economically interest laden, mytho-
logically relevant, and politically adequate or inadequate. One can also 
show various transformations of the sense of the phenomena from one 
domain to another. The condition for the possibility of such researches 
is the epoche of sciences and human disciplines and the apositional 
consciousness of tolerance. Third, phenomenological reflexivity that in-
cludes the position of the polycentric researcher. The latter exhibits the 
limits of intentional analyses vis-à-vis a specific domain of objectivity 
and resultantly can either show the ways in which such a position is ap-
propriate or inappropriate to a given subject matter. Moreover, in cases 
of signitive sense making processes, where the intended objectivity does 
not arise apart from the constitutive activities, as is the case of non-Euc-
lidean systems, it is possible to show how certain intentionalities “shape” 
the very objectivity in question. Yet phenomenology is most careful to 
point out that while some intentionalities are required for this signitive 
domain, once the domain is established and becomes a part of tradition, 
they are accessible for anyone’s reiteration and learning. Finally, fourth, 
the advantages of the inclusion of the intentional position of the poly-
centric subject, the theoretician, allows one to read how certain pheno-
mena are reconstituted. The various economic theses of the nineteenth 
century resignifed the socio-political systems in a way that transformed 
the very fabric of awareness and elicited practical movements to transfi-
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gure both socio-economic and political systems. Indeed, without inclu-
sion of such intentional awareness, and the ways it has resignifed multi-
ple relationships among noematic essential compositions, we would not 
comprehend the economic and socio-political changes.
The phenomenological thesis, articulated so far, suggests that inten-
tionalities are not reducible to specific individual, traditionally called the 
subject, but are analyzable in numerous modifications. One may have a 
theoretical intentionality that claims to be universal explanatory system. 
Obviously, such intentionality can be checked for its own consistency. If 
the theorizing subject claims that all contents are culturally determined, 
then such a subject excludes its own determination and precludes the 
universality of the thesis. If cultural world is granted to be the pregiven, 
tacit background which constitutes the structures of all intentionalities, 
then it cannot claim an ability to grasp this background. Yet, the pro-
ponents of this stance assume a transcendental argumentation and posit 
their own thesis as an objective and universal content, accessible to all. In 
this sense, they assume an intentional position without the required ex-
plication of such an intentional position. Barring the explication of this 
unthematized intentionality, such a thesis becomes incomplete; it leaves 
the sense making activities that are in the background of the intentional 
constitution of this very thesis. Intentionalities may be idiosyncratically 
singular, claiming that all intentionalities are constituted autonomously 
and creatively, and thus all correlative objectivities are tied to an arbi-
trary will of the individual. Despite this popular subjectivism, the claim 
is eidetically universal and can be both transcendentally accepted or con-
tested by anyone. This is very much in accord with the phenomenologi-
cal awareness that any and all intentionalities and their either pregiven 
objectivities or the objectivities arising in the process of constitution, 
are reiterable and accessible to anyone. This can extend to include the 
deconstructionist stance that it is demonstratable that there was never 
a text and never a subject, that it can be demonstrated that they have 
never had a presence. This is akin to mathematical demonstration that 
something cannot be demonstrated. Such a claim is transcendental, all 
the while assuming that its intentionality is accessible to all. Obviously, 
this position excludes its own transcendental position unattended. The 
latter may constitute a vertical intentionality of a constant flux, exhibi-
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ted horizonally by the texts without parameters. If such intentionality 
is left out of consideration, then the purely cultural position of the de-
constructivists remains metaphysical. Despite the cultural variety and 
distinctions among textual contents, this position assumes as a given the 
invalidity of culturally differentiated phenomena, and claims that such 
textual differentiations cannot be maintained in reality. Only intentional 
analyses could show at what level of awareness and objective generality 
these cultural contents lose their textual differentiations. Thus, as sug-
gested above, there may be intentional generalities that may constitute 
various contents as permanent, and others as flowing, correlating to the 
modifications of the vertical and horizontal awareness. Yet without phe-
nomenological articulation of such constitutive processes, correlated to 
their various objectivities, be they cultural or naturalistic, the theses of 
their deconstruction remains a metaphysical and hence arbitrary pre-
judgment. In this sense, it seems that an escape from metaphysics con-
tinues to be the prerogative of phenomenology.
Given this fundamental understanding of intentionality and its 
diverse and clearly distinguishable enactments in correlation to their 
variety of levels of objectivities, it is impossible to charge phenomenolo-
gy with the maintenance of any traditional conceptions of mentalist or 
psychological subjectivism or any form of objectivism. Presumptions of 
such maintenance stem from the reading only of the cultural, tradition-
ally bound modes of horizontal and variable expressions that assume 
the vertical modifications of awareness. The horizontal too is a taken 
for granted phenomenon that can appear across diverse cultural and/or 
specific traditional modifications. After all, the intentional claim that all 
phenomena are traditionally-linguistically laden is a vertical intentiona-
lity that uses most diverse modalities to demonstrate this claim. In this 
sense the introduction of mental intentions as being purely subjective, 
is one linguistic and culture-specific expression of the assumption of 
intentionality. The reason for this restriction of intentionality to cultural 
modification is that a successful cultural media efface themselves in the 
process of making intentional sense of any object, leading to the con-
clusion that cultural world is all there is. Cultural means, nonetheless, 
assume sense as a specific and limited explication of the speaker’s and 
the listener’s intentonalities that articulate noematic sense correlated to 
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proper objectivities. This unavoidable conjunction of intentionality and 
cultural means must discard the theory of speech acts which constitute 
meaning. Speech acts theory is one more version of saving the tradi-
tional metaphysics of mind; its exclusion, specifically in its reductio-
nist bio-psychological and causal form, does not detract from the sense 
making praxis. Such metaphysics has not yet grasped the radicality of 
transcendental phenomenology. Although it is difficult to avoid ontolo-
gization and metaphysical prejudgments, phenomenology, in principle 
if not always in practice, is in a position to extricate and distinguish the 
phenomena from such prejudgments, and indeed to explicate the inten-
tional grounding of ontologization.
Formal Region
As already noted, the theoretical-methodological, or termed other-
wise, the quantitative-formal, are not within the domains of the contingent 
world, posited as transcendent. It is not found even in the directly intuited 
morphological composition of the lived world. It is regarded as different 
from these domains. Not having any other locus for the formal, the thin-
kers of the modern age invented a container called “mind” in which these 
quantitative and formal components reside. They belong to the immanen-
ce of the subject. The immanence assumes an ambiguous status: it is the 
container of the theoretical-methodological formal necessities, and yet it is 
factually contingent substance. This contingency is expressed in Cartesia-
nism in two ways: first, the formal composition, with respect to a posited 
absolute being, cannot be regarded as necessary. This is to say, the absolute 
being can will different formal systems; this is an analogical expression of 
a conception which offers an initial indication as to the arbitrariness of the 
formal. Second, the formal is seen as capable of continuous analyses; any 
break in the analyses is a matter of decision. In this sense, the formal do-
main swings in the ambiguity between necessity and will, rules and choi-
ce. The importance of this “indecision” consists precisely in the option to 
either regard the formal as a priori given or as a construct of the subject. 
Various expressions are offered at the dawn of the modern age to indicate 
the shift toward the latter option. The notions of nature as created in ac-
cordance with mathematical laws comprise one expression. Coupled with 
the notion that even the mathematical-formal is decidable by an absolute 
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will, the result is obvious: the stress is on the primacy of construction of 
the formal systems. They too are chosen, although they cannot be regarded 
as contingent in the sense of the contingency of the transcendent world. 
Their emergence requires unique intentions that have to be regarded as 
capable of formal construction and of arbitrary signification. Moreover, 
such intentionalities must include the possibility of extending and prolife-
rating formal compositions and divisions at will, and of disregarding the 
perceptual, intuitive content. The signitive symbolism of quantitative and 
formal compositions do not offer any intuitive counterpart in the percep-
tual world apart from the sounds or marks, selected arbitrarily. But these 
marks, while part of the morphological world, in no wise resemble the the-
oretical-methodological composition; they simply provide the arbitrary 
means for perceptual expression. While there are many complexities in the 
constitution of the quantitative-formal modes of theoretical-methodolo-
gical “thought,” in principle this thought does not offer any possibility of 
correspondence between theoretical- methodological compositions and 
the perceptual world of shapes and structures.
The intentionality emerging here between the theoretical and the 
“real” swings between two possibilizing structures: the formal possibilities, 
operating purely with arbitrarily selected signs, reach a point of realization 
that the formal processes are also arbitrarily constructed and hence can be 
reconstructed at will, purely empty significations without any immediate 
fulfillments in the perceptual intuition. These formally designed possibili-
ties are also in a position to align the transcendent reality toward intuitive 
fulfillment by human intervention into the processes of the lived world 
and, by disregarding the given perceptual morphologies of that world, to 
shape the presumed underlying homogeneous matter in accord with the 
formal designs. Both, the formally designed systems and the transcendent 
material nature, comprise a detachment from the lived world and allow 
an arbitrary correlation between them. One can treat everything from a 
vantage point of detached formalism and regard qualitative and essential 
distinctions with indifference. As already suggested, the formal indifferent 
and disconnected constitution lends itself to a horizontal process of in-
creased formalization of all propositions in such a way that there emerge 
increased formal differentiations of formal systems. While leading to more 
complex formal connections, it also includes increased differentiations. In 
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this sense, the material reality can be increasingly differentiated and cons-
tructed along more complex and yet more distinct technical masteries and 
controls of the material. The increase of formal complexities and differen-
ces is coextensive with an increase in the contingency of the material pro-
cesses, leading to more possible rearrangements of the indifferent material 
nature. Each domain is released from the concrete lived world implicati-
ons, each an “expert” in its own sphere, need not relate to any other sphere; 
each can claim that there is no such thing as conclusive evidence precisely 
because the formal systems and their fulfilled material arrangements are 
arbitrary designs and carry no necessity; they are, insofar as they make, 
and with the making they assume “reality” and hence increment power 
and “prove” their momentary success.
It would be redundant to speak of “needs” since the latter are part 
and parcel of the possibilizing procedures and become at the same time 
needs and fulfillments. We can make it, therefore we want it, and we 
want it therefore we can make it. What this suggests is that the process 
of increased contingency and arbitrariness as sources of power compri-
ses a self-referential domain. This means that there are no restrictions 
for the “search for truth.” After all, such a search has lost any boun-
dary and any distinction between knowledge and object. Even in so-
cial understanding, the relationship between the formal and material 
processes is determined by “science,” i.e. the very self articulation and 
production. One, thus, cannot find any trans-scientific criteria to check 
this process. And each domain has no built in reason to stop the proli-
feration of its own form of knowledge and praxis. There are no physical 
reasons to cease making more physical experiments and refinements, no 
economic reasons to stop the economic “growth,” no biological reasons 
to stop remolding of the living processes along new combinations, etc. 
Any limitation would be regarded as an infringement on the autonomy 
of research. Any science, which would proclaim that it has become com-
plete, would cease to be a science in the context depicted above.
Progress
Given the key intentionality which swings without any essential ne-
cessitation between the theoretical-methodological and the transcendent 
homogeneous domains, there emerges the attendant factor which is per-
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manent: PROGRESS. It must be without regression, without death, and 
all formal systems and all transformations of the lived world into a calcu-
lative remade world are enhancements, maintenances of this permanent 
structure. What is peculiar about progress is that it has no “subject” that 
would progress. Its aim and its subject is itself and thus it is self-referen-
tial. Progress is its own destiny. It constitutes its own increasing formal 
refinements, efficiencies and “perfect abilities” without of course attain-
ing perfection. No attained construction is left without possibilizing and 
hence improvement. In this sense one could say semiotically and yet on 
Husserlian basis, that the signifier and the signified are one.
Permanence and Flux the Living Present
The phenomenological analyses of most diverse activities of aware-
ness and their correlate contents led to the cognizance that the living 
present contains two encompassing, mutually exclusive although com-
pletely interrelated facets: the standing, the fixed or permanent, and the 
streaming, the flux, the dynamic becoming (stehend-stroemend), usu-
ally exemplified by the constitution of time awareness. It is to be noted 
that this exemplification is one among many modalities of a more basic 
awareness of permanence and flux. This intimates that our discoveries 
of these facets in other cultures need not be tied to the questions of 
time. Other cultural modes of expression of permanence and flux will 
have to be respected. Such exemplifications or expressions are cultural 
modes of symbolizing the more basic presence of permanence and flux 
comprising morphologies of civilization awareness. It ought to be poin-
ted out that the latter are neither completely a priori nor a posteriori; 
rather, they are pervasive generalities of concrete awareness that can be 
accessed by way of specific cultural life worlds. Thus the generalities are 
completely intertwined in cultural life worlds before a priori impositi-
ons and a posteriori generalizations.
While we already came to the conclusion that there are a variety of 
such worlds, we should ask whether they exhibit more general modes 
of awareness that pervade more than one life world. Care must be taken 
not to impose these generalities, but to show their phenomenal presence 
in a specific life world. Using cultural life worlds as expressive of per-
manence and flux, we hope to articulate what is common to the lived 
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worlds and what is divergent, and at what levels. It should be reiterated 
that phenomenology does not construct but articulates the compositi-
ons of awareness not by generalization but by variation of diverse levels 
of what is given in order to extricate the most concrete, even if unnoti-
ced, lived phenomena. The discoveries of differences among life worlds 
already suggest that they are neither empirically nor deductively deri-
ved, but are basically expressions of direct awareness. Such expressions 
will be followed in these researches as traces of such awareness.
Given this context, it ought to be clear that even the most respect-
ed theoretical constructs cannot be given any preeminence, since they 
too belong to a specific life world and must be regarded as a culture of 
such a world. Phenomenological researches cannot give preeminence to 
a claim of representing ultimate reality by any culture of any life world. 
Such realities will be seen as specific expressions of possible cross cul-
tural generalities exemplifying the correlations of permanence and flux. 
They will be regarded as variants of such correlations. Thus myths, signs, 
facts, languages, aims, metaphysical and ontological claims, are variants 
that express these basic phenomena of awareness.
This opens the possibility of various correlations of permanence 
and flux, suggesting that these phenomena or their compositions are not 
precisely identical with disciplinary and cultural components of a given 
life world. This is to say, while the social research attempts to decip-
her the social structures and their causes, and the cultural scholarship 
yields a variety of cultural discourses, our phenomenological approach 
will cut across these broad areas in the hopes of deciphering civilization 
modes of awareness that transgress various cultural and cross-cultural 
domains. Cultural discourses that compose lived worlds are not iron 
clad rules; to the contrary, deviations and “distortions” are also notable 
and can be read in correlation to or within a given life world and in 
comparison to either different or similar cultural discourses in other 
life worlds. It is possible to investigate such distortions and deviations 
by noting the efforts to adapt a specific discourse to a specific practical 
context and historical exigencies, and to articulate the way such efforts 
comprise an introduction of some aspects of other cultural discourses. It 
is also relevant to note how in some cases one would not find deviations 
or distortions, but only partial expressions of a cultural discourse from 
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another life world. Although interesting and important, these issues will 
not be addressed in the present discussion.
Eidetically speaking, lived worlds exhibit apodictically evident, yet 
culturally multiple readings of the living present, the standing, perma-
nent, and the flowing, changing aspects. The study of life worlds and their 
cultures, indeed the disciplines within them, reveals a constant and irrev-
ocable presence of this living present. Although these two aspects might 
seem to be mutually exclusive and mutually referent – and due to their 
exclusivity and mutuality various metaphysics were, and continue to be 
built, some ascribing reality to permanence while others to change – each 
requires the presence of the other either for its background or foreground. 
Neither apart from the other can comprise a complete lived world. No so-
cio-cultural discourses and intersubjective practices are completely struc-
tural, revealing only stasis, or totally in flux. Philosophical variations are 
available. Some ontologies and/or epistemologies make claims that struc-
tures are not found in the phenomena but are “imposed” by some system 
of categories, or by subjective interests. Such claims reveal one among 
many options to permanence, without abolishing its necessity. The same 
can be said of change. Obviously, at this transcendental level of awareness 
the traditional differences between subjective and objective become re-
dundant. They become cultural aspects of a specific lived world, assigned 
to express either permanence or flux.
At any rate, the studies of the lived worlds manifest, at the least, that 
in principle, the permanent compositions are describable in their essen-
ce while flux, also in its essence, cannot be delimited without residua. A 
full description of flux would reduce it to a structure. Hence, it lends itself 
only to an approximation, and the latter depends on culturally available 
means of discourse and intersubjective understanding. Given this un-
derstanding, lived worlds reveal two pervasive modes of discourse, one 
suited for permanent factors, the other more appropriate for dynamics. 
The former, in the West, exhibits something Platonic-scientific, somet-
hing “puritan” about it; it is bounded and circumscribed, delimiting a 
presumed order which can be expressed either theoretically or practi-
cally. Changes, in turn, may be understood in a sense of wild immersion 
in some spontaneous movement of forces whose sense requires one to 
“live through” the very process. This living through appears in life phi-
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losophies. This does not imply a superiority of one over the other mode 
of expression. In some lived worlds the permanent is deemed to be the 
ruling factor, while in others the dynamic is more important. Thus, for 
example, in Bali the most significant decisions are gleaned from cryptic 
sayings of persons caught in a trance 2, or rebirth is elicited by a cathar-
sis of a revivalist, or national pride and destiny is invented in a flux of 
political rhetoric encantated by an actors on television. This allows us to 
introduce one of the pervasive distinctions between the exoteric discour-
se, appropriate to the permanent aspect of awareness, and the esoteric, 
appropriate to becoming. One must be cognizant that a specific mode of 
discourse, regardless of its presumption of being objective, logical, and 
explanatory, may be inappropriate to a given cultural experience. Inde-
ed, even within a context of a culture in a lived world the assumption of 
a sole mode of speaking may not be taken for granted. When an exoteric 
discourse is employed to describe flux (e.g. scientific psychology), then 
the result will be a reification of psychic dynamics, leading to an ironic 
treatment and regard of various scientific discourses. There will not be 
any conscious connection between experience and discourse. The same 
can be said of the structural; a use of poetry to speak of mathematics 
does not add to the understanding of mathematics.
Approaching the relationship and differentiation between perma-
nence and becoming, and their major cultural articulations, we can deci-
pher rough outlines. Becoming and permanence can be correlated in 
a harmonious way (e.g. Chinese Confucianism), or arranged in a suc-
cession of temporary domination of one over the other (e.g. a tendency 
in Hinduism), or immersed in a hierarchy of powers and controls (e.g. 
Medieval and early modern Europe), or even understood as a battle un-
til one of them is completely annihilated (e.g. Marxian revolutionary 
theory, and some prophetic and eschatological religions). Some beco-
mings can be regarded as totally dominated by the permanent, wherein 
the only solution is a complete escape (e.g. gnosticism), or, finally, the 
permanent could be conceived as a mere appearance, a Maya, veiling a 
total flux, (e.g. Buddhism).
Great many of the characteristics relating permanence and becoming 
can be read from the discursive systems of particular traditions. In Chi-
nese tradition, the permanence term LI is related to the immanent or the 
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inner, while becoming term CH’I designates the external. Thus becoming 
is not contained by the permanent, as would be the tendency in Western 
romanticism 3, but rather the permanent emanates change. In addition, 
such terms as “spontaneity” and “life” are associated with the permanen-
ce term LI, the immanent, while, surprisingly such terms as “order” and 
“law” are tied to CH’I, flux, the outer. It seems, then, that in the Confucian 
tradition structure, as a specific modification of permanence, is natural, 
and one must adhere to it spontaneously, and spontaneity consists of this 
adherence. In turn, flux, in its purity, is compelled less naturally; in this 
sense, fits of passion, that are outside the normal psyche, or even illness, as 
being either abnormal or artificial, would lend credence to the awareness 
of spontaneity that must adhere to permanence. Taoists even claim that 
evil becoming arises solely from artificial human self-assertion.
While subsequently we shall decipher the “formal rules” of the re-
lationship between permanence and becoming, we are in a position to 
point out that such a relationship is deemed crucial in delimiting va-
luative components. The notion of good order, or even good disorder, 
is regarded as an appropriate relationship between permanence and be-
coming, while something malign, regarded as bad order or a bad dis-
order would be considered as some form of “misrelationship” between 
permanence and becoming. This is not to suggest a necessary connec-
tion between some a priori morality and immorality, but to indicate an 
association between valuation terms in the composition of permanence 
with becoming. These terms are equally variable, and must be regarded 
either in a context of a particular symbolic design of a life world, or as 
some more general set of symbolic invariants that transgress both cultu-
ral and disciplinary limitations.
Modifications of Permanence and Becoming
It can be granted at the outset that the complexities of interpretive-
ly accessible delimitations of flux among cultures of life worlds call for 
exhaustive analyses and detailed descriptions. Such analyses have been 
done by cultural scholars if not under the rubric of change, at least in the 
contexts of languages, images, and practices, which make the unders-
tanding of change accessible. Our task is not to review such analyses, 
but to extricate more pervasive phenomena which comprise the traces 
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of civilizational awareness. Although it is impossible to exhaust all cul-
tures, they manifest that becoming can be regarded within the following 
broad modifications:
A. Various dynamisms are regarded as life sustaining, even if they 
do not possess positive value in all cases. Vital drives, eros and desires 
which, in the case of Hinduism and Buddhism, are deemed to be the 
sources of suffering, while in Greek culture, specifically Eros, is seen 
as life infusing and elevating. The vital drives and even eros have been 
regarded as components of natural spontaneity, or at times as influxes 
from some transcendent source. Moreover, they can be wild, both in na-
tural and super-natural senses, or cultivated in accordance with custom 
and socio-cultural functions.
B. Dark, disruptive, chaotic, indeed deadly, being related to Tha-
natos and the latter, associated with the libidinal death instinct, is at 
times re garded as demonic, irresistible and yet self-defeating, manifes-
ting itself, in Durkheim’s understanding, of Faustian impulses. While 
there may be an appearance of traces of nobility and honor, these dyna-
misms are as sociated in the main with the lower region. If they reach 
the higher plane,  they tend to infuse it with pollution and degradation. 
These impulses tend to subvert the elevating eroticism.
C. The Ur-becoming, signified as a hurricane’s, vast upheaval of 
unknown cosmic forces, appearing in revolutions, uncontrollable and 
spon taneous mass movements, and even in charismatic figures. Urbe-
coming may appear as ambivalent and can be destructive or revitalizing, 
or both. This appears in Hegel’s as well as Sun Tzu’s conceptions of war, 
and in Nietzsche’s depiction of life that is both destructive and creative, 
“the dark mysterious force desiring and denying itself.” Basically, this 
primal becoming does not signal any warning concerning the rules of 
its appearance; if it posts signs, they are designed to constantly deviate 
toward dissolution of any fixity.
D. Constructive events, regarded as impulses striving to establish 
meaningful designs, both for symbolic purposes and for direct human 
interrelationships. Such events tend to “ignore” or bypass specifc cultural 
discourses in any given life world and propose universals such as human 
nature. They also disregard their impact on life or relationships to any 
ultimate purpose. These impulses are exemplified in the constant effort 
135
CHAPTER VI. LIFEWORLD AND CULTURE
to establish and refine legalistic and moralistic systems, precisely coded 
modes of behavior – Jesuit discipline, and Confucian designs for ritual-
ized ethics – all considered as cultivations of the human. The impulses 
assume a variety of designations, ranging from vital, through sensuous 
and emotional, all the way to spiritualities. There is also an allowance for 
mutual intersections among these impulses.
E. Mechanistic designs that are constructed to signify an indifer- 
ent, lifeless, and simultaneously a deterministic cosmos. Such symbolic 
designs range from a meaningless and purposeless clash of forces, op- 
erating by attraction or repulsion, whether in Greek atomism, and/or 
their conception of a battle among psychic cosmic forces, through mod 
ern physics, empiricist associational and behavioral psychology, market 
forces, and logico-mathematical systems, to such notions as the stern 
face of predestination and destiny, and their impositions on nature.
F. Tenuous and ethereal dynamisms, consisting of spontaneous et-
hical and aesthetic sensibilities, appearing as if from nowhere and vanish 
ing without a trace, apart from remaining shadings of memory that spre-
ad across numerous and even typologically diverse experiences. Such ex-
periences and memories have no chronological topos, although they pro-
vide regions of intensification, diffused attunement, and even nostalgic 
self-identification. In one sense, it is the Merleau-Pontean dimensional 
this, as an expressivity that transgresses localized objectivities, and yet 
does not turn out to be a region of transcendence. Such dimensionality 
may also assume substantive modifications, expressed in various terms, 
such as destiny-fate, having no localizable origin, but affecting human 
sensibilities,  and manners. They remind us of our duty to serve the spirit, 
the times, and the calling, although without any clear sense of their speci-
fic origin. These ethereal dynamics seem to be ever-present and atopic.
G. While mainly masculine, and partially monastic, certain energies 
or dynamisms can become all pervasive preoccupations to transcend the 
immediate solicitations of the world, to return to the extra-worldly pater-
nal home, so prevalent in chiliastic and eschatological movements and, in 
another sense, in the detachment of sciences. Such transcendentalizing is 
expressed usually by attitudes of non-involvement or non-participation in 
the states of affairs of one’s world. It may be regarded as an external look 
with an attendant longing for something else, for the source of this tran-
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scendence and detachment, regardless whether such source is known or 
unknown. This transcendentalizing at times assumes specific fusion either 
with something extra worldly, or something that is deemed to be pure 
and ultimate, such as pacifc surrender to the impeccable laws of nature 
or a will of divinities. Dynamics of this type may appear in active rituals 
of purification that result in the shedding of terrestrial pollutions. Matri-
archal, although very seldom feminist symbolic designs tend to exclude 
such purifying rituals, unless the matriarchal internalizes the transcen-
dentalizing designs signified in masculine terms.
H.  Vitalistic flux, usually expressed in animistic forms, shows va-
rious unattached, freely floating contractions of force, capable of en-
tering various objects and phenomena, vivifying them and departing. 
This would be coextensive with magical realm and practices, articulated 
by Gebser at the level of vital awareness. The latter exhibits some distinct 
modifications. It dominates the ritualistic incantations, where the act 
becomes the power of the event, the word brings about storms, healing 
and destruction, and the mask becomes the very enacted entity. This 
awareness is as well prevalent in transubstantiations, where the bread 
becomes flesh, and the wine blood, where a chant gives rebirth such 
that the human becomes the enchanted word. Thus through prayers and 
appropriate deeds, one not only associates but becomes identical with 
the very powers of a demon, a divinity, a totemic animal; it is notable 
that this identification stretches all the way to an assumption of names 
of animals or figures of power. Sports teams have their vital names and 
parade their mascots, and populations identify themselves with the vic-
torious teams by proclaiming “we won.” This awareness is also at the 
basis of theatre, where the actor becomes the enacted role, is absorbed 
and disappears into the portrayed character. 5
Each modification of flux can subsume and/or pervade a range of 
cultural variations, and can overlap with, transform, and find resonan-
ces in others. For example, both the vital as well as the erotic can be an 
impetus toward detachment and transcendence, or an attraction to mer-
ge into them as expressions of cosmic life and love. These modifications 
are also implicit criteria by which it will be decided what kind of specific 
flux may be regarded as dangerous, even if it is good, simply because 
it needs strict controls without which it might transgress symbolically 
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assigned limits and become decadent both by overuse and a lack of use. 
It might even be deemed indestructible and beyond human control.
One relevant hierarchization of flow and stasis is offered by Par-
sons, is the location of flow at the lower level of the cybernetic control 
hierarchy. Such a view leads one to understand the devitalized character 
of becoming in sociology. This restriction could have been circumven-
ted by introducing a flow stressed control hierarchy, independent of the 
first and flowing in an opposite direction with spontaneous passions in 
a ruling position. Such two hierarchies would not have to be understo-
od as facets of an established unity, but as bargaining with each other 
“politically” for “shares” in deciding results, where several hierarchies of 
each type would participate in the process, with equal rights for each to 
have its day.11 The Parsonian sociology is more akin to the composition 
of the Soviet Union, rather than the Western societies. More appropriate 
social theory for the West, encompassing the above bargaining, would 
be Luhmann’s multi-layered permanence-flow, with each one having a 
right to have its time and to carry out its political programs. This would 
be, to speak with Husserl, a poly-centric sociology, and indeed poli-cen-
tric culture, and would permit the coexistence of modernism and post-
modernism with an ability to cross the lines and thus to create novel 
permanence-becoming confgurations. The latter would most likely be 
comprised of flux enhancing flux with only minor restrictions.
Postscript
Given the above characterizations of the major kinds of perma-
nence-change and their interrelationships, it is possible to note some of 
the pervading rules of such interrelationships. What is quite obvious is 
that permanence-change, of whatever type and at whatever level, are al-
ways correlated. Their correlation follows all pervasive rules irrespective 
of culture, history, and privileged “explanations,” whether metaphysical, 
scientific, or mythological.
The first rule decipherable from the above cultural designs shows 
that becoming can function to enhance, promote, progress, and maintain 
permanence. Whether I work very tediously and hard to maintain the 
permanence of my job, whether the king fields and army of knights to 
maintain the permanence of his throne, whether Lucifer before the fall 
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scurries around to insure the supremacy of paternal edicts or whether the 
working class is pressed for labor power to maintain the ruling position of 
the owner class, all are engaged in permanence maintaining flux.
The second rule shows that flow can be disruptive of stasis. The 
barbarians are breaking down the edifices of the civilized world, Luci-
fer rebels and establishes a process of corruption of paternal edicts, 
over production, and resultantly, workers strikes and revolts disrupt 
capitalist fabric. In their stead, dissidents are disrupting the progress 
of the people’s parties and their efforts to establish communism, while 
the secular devils in the West are an incipient disruption of the Islamic 
republics. In modern literature the primordial chaos is slowly seeping 
through the bourgeoisie waxed furniture and order, and the woman’s 
revolution is disrupting the history of patriarchal supremacy.
The third rule shows that permanence can suppress becoming and 
disrupt its dynamics. The despotic-imperial edicts prohibit any deviati-
ons, the erotic spontaneities are defected along the paternal edicts, the 
passions become mortified by the salvifc codes of fundamentalists, and 
the Confucian hierarchy suppresses the Taoist spontaneity, the “garden 
of freedom.”
The fourth rule emerges with permanence as enhancing flow. Demo-
cratic institutions, articulated in the Promethean mythology of rebellion, 
but impossible in the Judeo-Christian and Islamic rebellion, are flow 
enhancing. The dialectics, prior to Diamat, demands an incessant trans-
cendence of what is, and solicits a constant revolution, leading to the pos-
sibility of post modern surrender of hierarchical, stratified, sublimated, 
ideologies, and alienated thought. Such surrender is made possible by a 
fundamental recognition that the rules of permanence-flow, and their nu-
merous modifications, have no natural necessity and are institutionalized 
constructs, modifiable with the transformations of discursive practices.
There is, of course, another rule which can be deciphered even 
across the rules of permanence-flow, but the extrication of this rule is 
much more involved and has been explicated in other writings.14 Suf-
fice it to say that such a rule must be capable of including the four rules 
of permanence and flow, and even the logic of negativity, so prevalent 
from the second part of the nineteenth to the middle of the twentieth 
centuries, and in some major Eastern systems of thought.
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CHAPTER VII
CULTURE: LAW AND VALUE: A 
Phenomenology of Desire:  
the Practical Domain
The concern of this paper is about the emergence of customs from 
valuation and of laws from custom, to the extent that these become “se-
dimented” in a tradition of human action and perception. The phenome-
nological understanding of values, customs and laws lies in the concre-
te domain of perception and experience. This has great significance for 
cross-cultural communication. In learning the values of the others, we do 
not learn primarily a system of values but of the way human perception 
is structured “selectively.” We learn how to discriminate among the things 
and events of the world: between what is important, worthy, how and in 
what way to act toward something, how to treat it; and what access and 
prohibitions there are in relationship to something. This process is not 
reducible to learning definitions. It is rather a process of perceptual dis-
crimination, of what one concretely can and cannot do.
Conflict is a special problem: one participant in an interaction refuses 
to accept the choices or selections of another, and communicates this refu-
sal. What is crucial is the employment of “negation potential” for refusing 
choices; the acceptance of what had been previously accepted. As a reacti-
on, with the existence of class structure notes the functional differentiation 
of society is already conflicts. But they are circumstances “pregnant with 
conflict” – if this becomes appropriate to investigate under what additional 
circumstances or conditions is an outbreak of con-fact likely to occur.
Luhmannesque Principles of Conflict
The following communication Principle of Conflict is derived from 
the European social theory of Niklas Luhmann. According to Luhmann: 
1.  At the face-to-face level, a system is based on personal presence 
operating under a premise that a consensus exists about what sub-
ject is being discussed. At any given time, only one central topic 
can be handled. As soon as conflict through the very act of refusal 
becomes the focal theme, the whole system is restructured. The 
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participant reacts to this new topic to continuously limit what is 
possible within the system. Interaction systems cannot easily co-
sign open conflicts to a marginal status within their border. They 
are faced with a choice: either avoid conflicts or be conflicts.
2.  Advances in social evolution in modern societies presuppose a 
two-faceted increase in the potential for society-wide and cul-
tural conflicts: an increase both in social potential for producing 
conflicts by communicating refusal and in the social potential 
for tolerating conflicts as continuing events that only need to be 
resolved in critical cases. As complexity increases, so does the 
differentiation of interests and perspectives as do occasions and 
structured opportunities for negation. Social order must assume 
that legal norms than will be changed as well as established truth 
will be doubted, i.e. someone may stay away from religious cer-
emonies without crowding the feelings of region or even with-
drawing from the religious community.
3.  The chance to consistently follow special interest also depends 
upon an increase in readily employable “negation potential”. 
The same can be said for social development: the possibility of 
transforming and varying the given. The structural principle of 
organizations presupposes social mobility and the ever-present 
option of breaking of entering a new social relation. In sum, dif-
ferentiation, innovation and organization can be said to depend 
upon a normalization or routinization of conflict behavior.
4.  A political systems potential for resolving conflicts must be seen 
as the result of several variables: (a) it depends on the extent to 
which oppositions and conflicts in society at large are politicized, 
or thought to require binding decisions, (b) it depends on whet-
her the political system has been sufficiently differentiated from 
the rest of society so that, in taking over a conflict as its own 
behavior, it can activate new motives. Furthermore, the degree 
of abstraction and the scope that the structure of the political sys-
tem has for defining the limits which conflicts may be permissi-
ble are equally important. Finally, and most important of all, the 
systems potential for conflict depends on how selective processes 
can be coordinated with one another.
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5.  The original impulse toward a thorough understanding and des-
cription of society cease in connection with the transaction from 
archaic settlements and tribal communities to collectivities of 
greater magnitude. Such larger collectivities were constructed 
and held together politically and were thus essentially character-
ized by a capacity for making binding decisions. This transition 
to a politically achieved social order did not merely extend soci-
ety’s capacity for integrating group activates -- which, “primitive” 
communities already possessed. More significantly, it introduced 
(by concentrating power and authority) the possibility of resolv-
ing conflicts through binding decisions. Therefore, it made it ex-
perientially obvious that the social whole does not result from 
spontaneous or “natural” living together, but rather, in certain 
respects, presupposes contingency and refuses the deliberate 
overcoming of contingency. In order for us to come to unders-
tand Luhmann’s system theory of conflict we must approach this 
special problem from the concrete experience of valuation in or-
der for conflict at the social and cultural level to be managed.
Valuation: Selectivity of Environment
Perception is the fundamental domain of experience. For phenom-
enology this domain is constituted on the basis of our direct corporeal en-
gagement with the world. The perceptual level contains two basic factors: 
the field background and the specific objects and events which emerge 
from this field. The emerging objects and events are founded upon our ori-
entation, our interest and attendance to something specific. If we shift our 
interest to something else, the previous specific object “sinks” back into 
the field background. Valuation presupposes this perceptual experience 
as the process which lends preeminence to some things and neglects oth-
ers. Therefore, our environment is a valuation milieu, which consists of a 
field of things, events and objects which assume preeminence stand out 
and are counted as important and relevant to us. The sum of such objects 
comprises the humanly relevant surroundings. They belong in a system of 
meaningful interrelationships. All objects are selected in terms of explicit 
interest from a broader background environment. These objects of inter-
est constitute an interrelated “immediate environment” wherein objects, 
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events and things are treated as “tools.” The immediate environment is no 
longer a “natural” environment. Various objects are selected along practi-
cal and instrumental valuations and enter an ends-means interrelations-
hip such that the various objects have value for the sake of some purpose 
and the achieved purpose may become means for other purposes. For 
instance, wood is evaluated as “material” means for the purpose of a hou-
se, and a house is for the purpose of shelter. The field is for the sake of 
growing crops, and the crops are for the sake of food. This means that the 
wood and the field are not judged merely on the basis of their perceptual 
qualities, but evaluated and selected for their KU value. In this sense hu-
man perception is completely intertwined with valuation. According to 
phenomenology, humans do not approach the objects given to perception 
with a “value” system existing intact within some mental region. In such 
a case we would simply apply our values to “indifferent” objects, whose 
qualities express for us no inherent attraction. Values emerge in selectivity 
of environmental factors. For instance, scientists do not simply respond to 
the objects of the environment. Rather the scientist selects the materials 
on the basis of their value for his/her experiment. We can extend the se-
lectivity concept to every human interaction in the world, from religious 
practice to building a home. In religion certain objects are selected as va-
luable for a ritual, for sacrifice, for evoking the favors of divinities and 
for directing appropriate human behavior. The term “direction” does not 
mean a spatial orientation but rather the ways in which things and other 
humans should be treated. “Others” belong to the environment, of course 
not as objects of use, but more fundamentally as partners in the process 
of constituting an environment. This form of “value judgment” is more 
concrete and may be considered to be a “pre-linguistic” value judgment. 
Handling, surveying, testing the materials being selected is a direct per-
ceptual and corporeal process. The hardness, the elasticity of the wood is 
directly judged by the hand and the eye, the appropriateness of the soil for 
crops is judged by the texture of the earth between our fingers. This kind 
of valuation is “pre-predicative,” and it comprises the basis of linguistic 
predication: “This tree looks good; we can use it.” Yet the pre-predicative 
level is what comprises valuation and selectivity.1
1 Husserl, E. Experience and Judgment. Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1973, p. 88. 
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The objects, events and domains which emerge as an interrelated 
immediate environment, become “valuable.” Therefore, our essential 
and relevant environment is a valued environment. The valued envi-
ronment isn’t a closed one. It extends toward the “background” and 
points to things in the background whenever they become relevant and 
are selected by us. For example, a city dweller who views oneself as a 
“sportsman” will buy a hunting rife, practice in a closed city room -- 
all these belonging to his immediate environment. Yet in the diffused 
background there are the forests, the mountains where he/she is going 
someday to hunt. But he/she will go hunting on the advice of friends, or 
on the suggestions of “experts” who will select for him/her the “good” 
places to go hunting. This selective valuation is extended from one’s im-
mediate environment to the factors within the background environment 
which become relevant and interconnect with the immediate surroun-
dings. The extension of valuation is not arbitrary. It interconnects with 
the immediate environment and continues it “without breaks.”2
The initial valuation and selectivity can become “sedimented” or 
habituated and the” valuable” objects of the environment can become a 
matter of course. Our engagement with them turns to a set of unnoticed 
or anonymous” activities.3 For example, a carpenter performs his activi-
ties without paying attention to them and without engaging him or her-
self in the process of evaluative selectivity. In this manner the carpenter’s 
milieu assumes a factual status, as his or her “reality.”
Phenomenology does not claim that all of us engage in the process 
of evaluative selectivity of the environment. We are born into an environ-
ment which has been established by others. Hence education partially 
consists in learning the ways to deal with the objects and others already 
there for us. But in this our learning accepts established valuations taci-
tly as accomplished and objective facts. The objective facts nonetheless 
embody the evaluative selectivity which has become institutionalized in 
the objective facts-the implements, the buildings, the materials and our 
ways of dealing with them.
2 Husserl, E. supra note 1, p. 88.
3 Merleau-Ponty, M. Phenomenology of Perception. Smith, C. trans. New York: Humani-
ties press, 1962, p. 91.
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Custom
The valuative selectivity of objects and events which comprise our im-
mediate environment at the same time constitutes our modes of activities 
in relationship to objects and events and to other persons. These activities 
become sedimented through repetition, leading to the understanding of 
customary behavior. “One” uses this kind of material, this kind of imple-
ment to build something or to plant something. The child is taught the 
“right way” to perform something with the use of the appropriately select-
ed means and materials, with appropriate valuations. It is the accustomed 
“right way” that turns into a custom. In this sense customs of action with 
accustomed objects and events, as well as and accustomed relationships 
with others embody evaluative selectivity and are deemed to be of value.4 
Customs, at this level, are sedimented valuations and can constitute a “val-
ue system” of people. The value system, extended into linguistic articula-
tion, is a direct description of customary relationships and activities. In the 
simplest linguistic form such values can be expressed as “This is the way we 
do things around here,” or “this is the way the Chinese do things,” etc.
On the basis of the previous discussion of the perceptual founda-
tion of selectivity, we can see how customs, or “ways of doing,” are cor-
related with ways of perceiving. Perception is not a secondary mode of 
activity consisting of sensibilities, but is completely intertwined with the 
activities and customary “doings.” Hence at this level to say “this is the 
way we do things” is equivalent to saying “this is the way we see things.” 
If we say that “this (x) is good for that (y),” what is it we have already 
done? We have presupposed the activities of Y and have at the same time 
indicated how we-see the functions or qualities of X in relation to Y’s 
activities. We also assume the correctness of our assertion (X is good for 
Y). For the “others” who share the relevant environment in which X and 
Y are customarily valued. Chicken soup, ginseng tea, mustard plaster, 
and Vicks Vapor Rub all are good for the common cold because conges-
tion is reduced by the hot, pungent qualities of these substances.
Since the immediate environment is built by us through the origi-
nal (originating) acts of evaluative selectivity, it is also a source of desi-
4 Luhmann, N. Zweckbegrif und Systemrationalitaet. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Ver-
lag, 1977, p. 24.
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gnation in terms “mine” and “yours” or “ours” and “theirs.” Building an 
environment is a way of appropriating it and assigning to it a personal 
imprint. What and how one “builds” constitutes one’s sphere of influen-
ce delineated against the “building” of others. In this sense the environ-
ments of others are diffused backgrounds and cannot be intruded upon. 
The sedi-mented result is that one does not intrude into the other’s en-
vironment to appropriate objects without the other’s permission. Cus-
toms such as prohibitions against stealing have their source at this level. 
This same principle operates regardless of the complexity of customary 
practices. When a person circulates his money on a stock market, the 
money constitutes his inviolable domain. When a government, such as 
socialism, claims that the means of production belong to the society, it 
also proclaims tacitly that this social domain is not to be interfered with 
by private individuals without governmental permission. In post-revo-
lutionary states old customs maintain their force, even if terminological 
changes are made to accommodate the “revolutionary ideology.”
Customs, based upon evaluative selectivity, constitute unwritten 
codes (see Luhmann) of human activity toward things and with one 
another. They carry the practical “wisdom of the ages” and their initial 
codification is usually symbolic or ideological. Symbolically, the cus-
toms are represented through mythological figures: goddesses and gods 
and their servants are the “primordial” makers and teachers of the “pro-
per ways.”5 Since they are the builders of the environment, humans, in 
their limited wisdom, must do their level best to imitate the ways of the 
mythical figures. In this sense the customs are sanctioned by gods, and 
their transgress ion is tantamount to the transgression of some ultimate 
being. In reading mythologies we are reading human customs in a sym-
bolic form. Ideologically the customs are represented by more mundane 
expressions. The customs are regarded as reflections of “inherent” hu-
man nature, of human reaction to material needs, of an initial covenant 
establishing rules of behavior by “rational self-interest” or of sublimated 
human drives.” Symbols and ideologies are a way of codifying the custo-
mary. Thus the customary evaluative selectivity of the environment and 
human interaction need not be observed directly. It can be deciphered 
from symbolic and ideological expressions.
5 Greimas, A. Apie Dievus ir Žmones. Chicago: AM & M Publications, 1979, p. 10.
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Cross-cultural communication about customs intertwines these 
three domains: direct understanding of the selectivity process, symbolic 
expressions and ideological “explanations.” There is a general consensus 
among the scholars of culture students that mythological and ideolo-
gical “languages” comprise a codified refection of social relationships. 
What phenomenology adds is that these relationships have a source in 
the selective valuation of the environment which correlatively includes 
human activities and interrelationships.
Selective valuation also constitutes a “significant environment” 
where one thing or event interrelates with and points to other events. 
Trees selected as “good” for building point to the activities of building, 
the production of boards, logs and their relationship to buildings and 
their purposes. (Inner horizons or fields of implication.) The significant 
environment lends to events and things a priority of importance and es 
tablishes a context of what is near and what is distant. Phenomenology 
suggests that prior to presupposed spatial distance there is a distance and 
nearness of meaningful factors in the environment.6
The individual’s relationships are structured by the meaningful 
factors. For a business-person, driving down the road among majestic 
mountain peaks, the majestic is distant, what is near is the coal which 
he interrelates with his business environment. For the religious person 
the tavern next door is remote, while the church six blocks away is very 
close. The tavern is an irrelevant factor for selectivity. The significant 
factors correlate with typological activities, customary processes.7 In the 
meaningful interconnection of factors the business-person would deal 
with the required activities and investments to extract the coal from the 
mountains. These factors and activities would be near, despite the fact 
that the business-person is hundreds of miles away from his office. The 
meaningful interconnection of factors provides a system within which 
our actions make sense: they too interconnect meaningfully and thus 
comprise a “silent language.” This language reveals the typological in-
terconnections and also the “customary” activities sedimented into cus-
toms: that is the way we do things around here. Hence the hermeneutic 
6 Bardt, H. Umwelterfahrung. Darmstadt: W.B.G. 1979, p. 60. 
7 Ibid, p. 68.
147
CHAPTER VII. CULTURE: LAW AND VALUE: A
of customs can be accomplished by “reading” human activities in the 
context of the meaningful interconnections of the environment. Phe-
nomenologically, this relieves us from the task of deciphering what is in 
the “mind” of peoples having different customs from our own.
Mythological, ideological and linguistic expressions comprise only 
a partial codification of customs. The reason for this limitation is the im-
agery of mythology and the indefiniteness of audial speech. To insure the 
continuation and success of the custom, mythologies “over determine” 
the customs by making the daily activities into super-human, world crea-
tive deeds. The details of human daily concerns are pale in comparison. 
Myths codify the “founding” acts of “making” the world and of building 
an interrelated system of meanings. In turn, language which codifies the 
daily activities and sedimented practices carries with it psychological 
attunement and disruptions which would accrue to customary codes. Cus-
toms are usually transmitted through direct spoken language. But direct 
spoken language is that its meaning is not univocal. Spoken language has 
an overlay of psychological meanings rendering it ambiguous. Moreover, 
unwritten codes, codes transmitted audially, do not allow a precise verbal 
repeatability. They assume a “system” of various expressions each one de-
viating from the others. One cannot return to the same precise statement. 
One gives a variant from it and the variant may become the “standard” 
which also is deviated from by subsequent expressions. This is the reason 
why there seem to be such a variety of linguistic expressions of customs 
and such a differentiation among the sayings of “folk-wisdom.” Each one 
is “correct” but each one is “more” than an interpretation of the earlier 
ones. Each one is rather another saying with a different meaning, and the 
difference may not be acceptable even by a people of the same region, or 
of the same tradition. The linguistic codification and hence extension of 
what is understood by “heard to be” the custom, begins to deviate from 
direct involvement in daily activities and to assume a life of its own.
Pure custom, as expressed in myths, is an enactment, a direct en-
gagement in activities. Once activities are sediment and extended into 
linguistic edicts, sayings and commands, the customs assume a partial 
codification. Linguistic codification “expands” the customs through vari-
ation of stories and sayings, through instruction by exemplars. The ex-
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pansion of customs is no longer followed by such statements “this is the 
way we do things around here” but “As the story goes” and “As the saying 
goes.” The complexity of codifed customs, and specifically the complex-
ity of linguistic expressions which become customary, require a more 
encompassing and yet more uniform codification. Thus “covenants” are 
made in order to unify some of the linguistically articulated customs.
Codifed Constitutional Law
While customs and linguistically codified activities have no juridical 
force, they have a force of habit, of a sedimented tradition. Yet the codi-
fied law is regarded as having a legitimacy which can be enforced. The 
specific character of constitutional law is that it has two sides: emerges or 
evolves from customs and at the same time transcends them by becoming 
“applied” to them. Codified law simplifies the customs into more general 
rules becoming more encompassing than the specific customs. Although 
embodying practical and customary values, the customs are seen as facts 
which have to be submitted to norms.8 While there are well-known theo-
rists who claim that the only sense of law is the constitutional law which is 
posited by an agreement and enforced by social sanctions.9 Hans Kelsen, 
for example, argues that the difference between a custom and a legal norm 
is the difference between moral order and order of rules. Moral order has 
no coercive power, is customary, but not explicitly legitimated by positing 
a set of rules. The order of rules is normative and has a socially organized 
coercive power.10 This positive theory of law claims norms emerge from 
the act of positing of norms which then become a justification for a le-
gal system. Thus the constitutionally posited norms comprise a positive 
value judgment. Therefore, law does not have its origin or source in any 
custom.11 To the contrary, scholars of law influenced by phenomenology 
argue that laws do originate in and emerge from, customs in order to ma-
nage social complexity at a higher, more encompassing level.12
8 Waldenfels, B. Der Speilraum des Verhaltens. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 
1980, p. 288.
9 Kelsen, H. Pure Theory of Law. Knight, M. trans. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1970, p. 173.
10 Luhmann, N. supra note 4, p. 155.
11 Kelsen, H. op. cit., p. 62.
12 Ibid., p. 199.
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The claim that law does not have custom as its source must be rejected 
on the following grounds. Customs are not simply actions. They are em-
bedded in language, myths and sayings. Sayings and language embody the 
initial “selective valuation” and hence must enter into the establishment 
of explicit norms. The evaluative norms do not appear with a positing of 
a value judgment as the basis of a norm, but are pregiven in customary 
action and language. Moreover, if such evaluative norms were to emerge 
on the basis of the “pure” establishment of norms, they would have to 
be completely distinct, disconnected from the incomprehensible for the 
persons who would be establishing them and on whom they would be im-
posed. For instance, in the domain of cross-cultural communication, no 
intelligent explanation could be offered how two distinct peoples, having 
posited their distinct norms, could communicate them to each other. The-
re would be no basis in experience, no world context in which one could 
recognize one’s possible activities. As suggested by Bernard Waldenfels, 
a leading scholar of Merleau-Ponty and Marx, human activity does not 
simply follow normative edicts. The human activity takes place in a con-
text.13 Phenomenology contends that any cross-cultural communication 
of norms, of coded rules is primarily comprehensible on the basis of direct 
activity: what one can and cannot do. The “I can,” the domain of practical 
action is presupposed. Even if one were to extricate oneself from the acti-
ve process of valuation and from a sedimented tradition of activities, one’s 
positing of the “rules” would have to be translated directly into action in 
order to be understood.
Not only do norms emerge from the customary language which 
has within it no distinction between “fact” and “value,” they also point 
toward the experiential context in two ways. First, norms are “interpre-
ted” to suit a customary situation and, second, norms are selective of the 
environment which is already pregiven on the basis of customary activi-
ties.14 Additionally, the rules that are established to manage complexity, 
must enter into contexts in which they must be applied. In this sense, 
they cannot be “pure.” As Gadamer says, quoting Aristotle, “one and the 
same measure always proves smaller when we buy wine than when we 
13 Waldenfels, B. supra note 8, p. 286. 
14 Waldenfels, B. supra note 8, p. 299.
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sell it.”15 This means normative rules do not cover the specifics of every 
case, nor do they cover all possible cases to which they will be applied.16 
Phenomenology does not deny that norms comprise a framework, but 
rather shows that the “pure” framework is enacted by engaged humans 
with situated interests, conflicts and customs. The norms are enacted by 
situated and corporeal beings who do not simply confront the norms by 
cognitive assent. Rather, the norms are “fleshed out” and submitted to 
interpretation that is always context-bound. Even those who apply the 
rules are not “situated” and must, therefore, interpret rules in a manner 
which makes sense to the particular case. The ordering of behavior regu-
lated by legal norms is itself a behavior which is acted upon by others 
and interconnected with a specific tradition. The tradition contains the 
customs which are developed prior to rule codifications and the latter 
are constantly interpreted in light of the customs.
Norms and laws are not derived from any presupposed human or 
social nature. Rather they appear on the basis of a decision; which le-
gitimates the norms selected. The experiential condition for establishing 
norms is that the decisions are made not only about regulation, but also 
reflectively about decisions. The reflective condition functions on two 
levels. First, it is a refection upon the customary practices, valuations 
and their linguistic and ideological expressions. Second, the reflecti-
ons focus upon the rules which are being formalized and the decisions 
which posit these rules as legitimate for all members of a society. It could 
be said that the posited rules embody concretely the decisions and the 
reflective process which set up the rules. The rules then comprise refle-
xive means which not only illuminate the customs but also manage their 
complexity. The rules are a reflexive structure which in its generality is 
more encompassing and becomes a directive over the customs.
The reflexive process accomplishes the ability to constitute the pos-
sibilities for the application of a particular system upon itself. There are 
numerous examples in social life of this process. We not only have a tra-
dition of education, but also of education about education; we not only 
use currency as means for commodity exchange, but also have reflexive 
15 Gadamer, H. G., et. al. Truth and Method.  New York: Continuum Publishing Group, 
2004, p. 303. 
16 Luhmann, N. Positives Recht und Ideologie. Archiv für Rechts und Sozial-Philosophie, 
Nr. 53, 1967, p. 537.
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processes to “exchange the exchange means,” we not only have language 
developed through tradition, but we also extricate the rules of language 
and posit them as reflexive means to evaluate our customary uses and 
master them in terms of the “correct” grammatical rules. The same is 
also true for social rules: they are reflexive processes ranging over cus-
tomary practices and apply directly to these practices. At first glance the 
rules may appear to be “abstract,” in actuality they provide a reflective 
framework for activities. Customs direct our activities implicitly, and 
rules established by reflective decisions direct our activities explicitly. 
This is not to say that the reflectively established rules cover the customs 
identically, point for point. Rules are more general and provide a way of 
acting which may not be included in the customs or they may require 
the establishment of future customs in accordance with the rules. The 
reflexive process constitutes the condition for “positivization” of laws; 
the laws become “positive” in this process. (Luhmann) Laws, therefo-
re, are not derivable from “nature” or “myths” or “ideologies.” Due to 
positivation, “nature” or “myths” assume a specific role: they function 
as ideological legitimating of the rules. We shall discuss the question 
of ideology and value in the next section. It is sufficient to point out 
that the reflective process of positivation tends to abolish mythological 
expressions of “the ways” of acting and is translated into a systematic 
constitution of ideologies as “supports” mechanism for the norms.
In regard to cross-cultural understanding of law, it is inadequate to 
simply read the rules; these would be empty formalities unless we also 
read them as reflexive processes which contain the decisions to establish 
them and relate the rules to the customs. The decisions are not composed 
of factual, but of evaluative experiences, although we should not make a 
distinction between the two. In the process of selection among the cus-
tomary activities, decisions are made on the basis of various understand-
ings such as “better, worse, more suitable, appropriate” ‘more encompass-
ing, closer to the needs of the community, providing a more uniform and 
equitable treatment of the membership,” etc. The interpretations are fol-
lowed by immediate ideological rhetoric of “this is the human thing to 
do” or “this is in accordance with how we all ought to act (naturally).” The 
reflective process of decision making constitutes a secondary evaluative 
selectivity within the already established environment. Hence when we 
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enter the environment of customs of another peoples, we must also learn 
the way that the secondary selectivity functions. We must enter the refle-
xive process embedded in the rules which comprise indexes for the ways 
that one ought to function within the customary environment. One learns 
a process of selectivity among actions and environmental components, 
i.e., components which have significance. This means that entering into 
another culture and its value “system” is not an entrance into a completely 
alien world; we can understand the actions as meaningful interconnecti-
ons of an environment and the ways in which reflective processes cons-
titute norms on the basis of selective valuation within the environment 
which we can readily understand.
Although it is a demonstrable fact that cultures differ in terms of cus-
toms and modes of activities, the relativity does not preclude our under-
standing of them and our ability to communicate with them. At times it is 
almost amusing to read accounts of the customs of other peoples and the 
claims that such customs are different from ours and hence inaccessible 
to us. Bound as we are to our own customs and rules, we cannot liberate 
ourselves from them to be able to grasp those of the other peoples. Yet 
the persons writing such accounts tell us precisely that not only they, but 
we who read the accounts are in a position to understand such peoples. 
This means, we are already in the process of communication with them. 
The basis of this process is the phenomenologically understood “I can” 
structure. The “I can” structure means I can act and perform in the same 
ways that they can, even if in my own culture I don’t. I can follow the 
meaningful interconnections of a cultural world because these intercon-
nections comprise the structuration of activities and perceptions, which 
constitutes the field of my concrete involvement.17 In this sense I do not 
have to learn an abstract “value” system extricated from the world and 
placed inside the “subjects of another culture. The valuations are embed-
ded in the environment which is coextensive with this activity and per-
ceptions. Therefore my understanding of their values is a direct process of 
perceptual engagement and corporeal activity. The complete intertwining 
of perception and activity with the signifcatively deployed environment is 
prior to the distinction of value, fact and meaning.
17 Merleau-Ponty, M. supra note 3, p. 67, 152.
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Ideology and the Legitimation of Value.
Ideology functions to codify the customs; yet in contrast to myths 
that parallel customs, ideology enters the domain of codified rules as a 
factor of legitimation and stabilization. We have previously noted, the es-
tablishment of rules is a reflective process of decision. Yet the decision 
alone is insufficient to guarantee the acceptance of the rules, specifically 
when the rules must in some cases, either limit or transgress ingrained 
customs. As Paul Ricoeur points out, the use of violence to enforce the 
rules could not be maintained if any kind of cohesive society is to be ob-
tained; hence ideology functions to legitimate, to justify the rules.18 Such 
notions as “the laws correspond to human nature,” or “they are expres-
sions of the will of the autonomous members of society,” or “they enhance 
progress” or “the rules provide for human equality” etc., are used to sta-
bilize the selected rules.
The peculiarity about ideologies are they not only support and 
legitimate the rules, but also that they embody the values of the rules. 
What is at work is a process which structures itself across various levels. 
The valuative selectivity of the environment, comprising the customs, is 
evaluated by a reflective process of decisions about the rules which are 
capable of managing a greater complexity of customary activities. This 
reflective process is one of valuation and selectivity among the customa-
ry values. Hence the positivised rules are embodiments of this seconda-
ry valuation. The ideological expressions which legitimate the rules have 
no meaning apart from the meaning of the values embedded in the ru-
les. For example, to say ideologically that laws flow from human nature, 
means that the human being is of value if he/she acts in accordance with 
the rules or laws. The laws are expressions of human nature, and to act 
in accordance with the laws is to act in accordance with human nature. 
Or we can take, for example, the ideology of “progress.” If the reflective 
decision-making selects from the customary valuations and positivizes 
those valuation as rules as enhancing change, then to conform to such 
rules means to conform to progress. Therefore, the ideology of progress 
legitimates and embodies the reflective valuations which posit the rules 
establishing them as “positive law.”
18 Borchert, D., Steward, D. Technological Age. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1979, p. 117.
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Niklas Luhmann expresses this point well. He indicates that any pref-
erence of one activity over another is valuation. These valuations are ref-
lected upon and posited as rules. Ideologies have no other meaning apart 
from being the embodiment of the values of the rules. Ideologies are val-
ues which are employed to evaluate other values.19 Luhmann’s point is that 
ideologies are symbolic expressions which provide the means to evaluate 
various norms as valuable for positivisation into laws. Hence an ideology 
of progress is a symbolic expression of values which provides a reflective ac-
cess for decision-making concerning the valuations which ought to become 
positivised into “standard” rules. It is important to note that ideologies are 
not the sources of values and rules. Rather rules emerge from valuation and 
the reflective decision-making which selects specific valuations for positivi-
sation. Therefore, ideology emerges as a symbolic expression which allows 
the evaluation of values and the selection of those which are preferred for 
the establishment of rules. This ideologies are reflexive mechanisms which 
enhance one set of activities over another, since the desired activities com-
prise initial evaluation and environmental constitution.
Relevance-for Cross-Cultural Communication
This has grave import for cross-cultural communication of law in 
that we must recognize how ideologies function as legitimating expres-
sions embodying the reflective valuations for the selectivity of norms. By 
understanding ideologies, i.e., the linguistic descriptions which purport 
to explain human events in terms of some permanent assumptions, we 
are in a position to grasp the way in which reflexive decisions positivize 
some customs and valuations into laws. For example, if one is told that 
human beings are subject to the rational progress of material conditions 
through history, inclusive of revolutionary activity, one can also under-
stand that such an ideology embodies valuations which select specific 
values for positivisation into law.
The positivized laws would sanction activities which promote mate-
rial production, revolutionary activity and submission to established 
laws as the sole rational mode of behavior during the present histori-
cal stage of development. Or if one were presented with an ideology of 
19 Luhmann, N. supra note 16, p. 551, 154.
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the hierarchy of human levels of perfections, acquired through cycles 
of rebirth, one would also find that this ideology is an expression of 
and a reflective stance for the selection of valuations which as positive 
laws sanction caste differentiations. These differentiations might go so 
far as to forbid legally some activities of one group, while allowing the 
same activities in another group. The same can be said for racist ideolo-
gies, although such ideologies may assume the rhetoric of biology/na-
tural, evolutionary or even theological expressions. What is important 
for cross-cultural communication either of laws or of ideology is they 
function correlatively. Laws and ideologies are correlative expressions 
of the preference for activities established reflectively.20 They embody 
reflective decisions comprising a process of selective valuations among 
customs. (It is beyond the task of this paper to include the motivating 
factors such as interest in the making of decisions.)
As soon as the values embedded in an ideology become visible, it 
becomes a standard of “value valuation.” Thus in this process absolute 
values discredit themselves. It is not possible to evaluate values in terms 
of “higher values,” since such values will have to be positivised reflexive-
ly as one set among other sets to be compared, selected, accepted or dis-
carded. And ideology is a summation of particular values, a summation 
allowing the variation among values. At the same time, ideology allows 
for a relative stability among values. This means that a complex society 
is no longer founded on a fixed set of customs and their valuations, but 
requires various reflective decision making processes establishing rela-
tive norms and their attendant ideologies. At first this may seem as if 
such a society or societies would be completely unstable. But precisely 
the opposite is the case. Societies which include diverse norms with di-
verse ideological legitimations require a variety of political groups each 
permitting the other to have a temporary function of reflective decision-
making in order to positivize some rules resulting in establishing speci-
fic programs. Temporary functioning requires a partial sacrifice of the 
valuations of the other groups; yet many groups are willing to concede 
to the temporary supremacy of one ideology in light of the possibility 
that their day is also coming.
20 Luhmann, N. supra note 16, p. 553.
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Societies with one ideology and correlatively with a fixed selectivity 
of positivized rules, endure a complete disruption of the social fabric by 
the valuations and activities of a group which is continuously suppres-
sed. After all, the opportunity to institute its valuations and programs 
expressed ideologically is completely forbidden. While a suppressed 
group recognizes its activities as valuable and constitutive of possible 
environment, their re-flective decisions remain without fulfllment; hen-
ce their alternative is perhaps revolutionary overthrow of the political 
organ which in its decisions maintains only one ideology for the se-
lectivity of values. This means that a “suppressed” group is permitted 
neither intra-cultural communication of its ideology and values nor a 
cross cultural communication with members of other cultures holding 
similar ideologies. The group’s reflectively selected valuation can neither 
be positivized into social norms nor enacted into programs for the esta-
blishment of an environment. In a society with a monistic ideology, ot-
her possible ideologies may acquire a symbolic function; such a function 
does not signify real possibilities. It communicates only revolutionary 
activity in which the ideology as a symbol functions as a possibility to 
be concretized in the post-revolutionary period. In this case, if there is 
any cross-cultural communication concerning law by the “suppressed” 
group, the communication is structured along two dimensions: (i) the 
ideological, in which the suppressed group expresses its dissatisfaction 
with the socio-political system as one which violates “human nature,” 
“human rights,” limits “progress” etc., and (ii) the practical, in which 
requests are made for support of revolutionary activity, i.e., aid for con-
crete establishment of valuations embedded in the alternative ideology. 
The communication of such requests leads to international tensions, ac-
cusations and indeed an establishment of ideologically laden organizati-
ons functioning reflectively to monitor intra-cultural and cross-cultural 
“violations of human rights.” Such organizations employ mass media 
to communicate about laws on the basis of an ideology which does not 
embody “higher values” but alternative values which are not permitted 
an opportunity for programmatic realization in a particular culture. It 
could be surmised that such organizations opt for a culture with nume-
rous ideologies and evaluative structurations of the environment. In this 
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sense they demand that each culture possess multiple reflective proces-
ses each capable of positivisation of rules for concrete realization.
While the cross-cultural communication about laws is possible both 
at the level of ideologies and the process of reflective positivisation of 
norms, we must be cognizant of a possibility which might lead to miss-
communication. In societies with multi-ideological options, the process 
of reflective decision making may be perverted. When we communicate 
about the establishment of norms, we do so on the tenuous assumption 
that the political activity is to attain specific programmatic aims stem-
ming from the positivisation of rules for activity. Yet in many cases po-
litical parties pervert such an aim: the proposed ideological valuations 
are in turn evaluated with respect to their potential for the maintenance 
of political power of a given party. The programs become subordinate 
to the ends of power which should not be an end but a means. Even 
in the intra-cultural communication about laws one must ask whether 
the norms are being positivised for the establishment of programmatic 
ends and their enactment through selective activity or whether they are 
means for the propagation of political hegemony. This also applies to 
cross-cultural communication concerning laws. This communication 
becomes quite complex, since the perversion of evaluative process from 
reflective positivisation of norms for their enactment introduces anot-
her reflective process: political power.
In this sense all values become extremely variable and the valua-
tion itself extremely reflective. Here the process of “power reflectivity” 
subsumes under itself all customary values, all positivised norms and 
their correlative ideologies, and submits them to variation as means in a 
chess-game of political power. Within this context, the communication 
about laws must also become highly reflective and constantly revert to 
such questions as: “How will this law and its resulting programs bene-
fit the political party?” “Is this law a rhetorical device without concre-
te programmatic value?” “To what extent is the new rule designed to 
subvert the aspirations of other political parties with their ideologies?” 
The task for communicative understanding, in this regard, lies in the 
extrication of ideologies and their correlative laws not as reflective me-
ans to establish programs but as instrumentalities to be employed either 
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as rhetorical devices or as weapons against other ideologies. When we 
enter into a cultural milieu possessing political processes whose main 
devices of reflective decision making is removed from the public sphere; 
they become interests of private political groups. In this milieu we reach 
a “legitimation crisis.”21 22
Legitimation crisis means that the reflective processes of positivi-
sation of values into rules and their correlative ideologies cease to func-
tion as a concrete selectivity of activities for the meaningful structu-
ration of the environment and become means for private interests of 
political maintenance of power. Basically, communication about law 
and legitimation becomes a communication about the use of laws and 
legitimating ideologies as means for political power and communicati-
on reverts to a discourse about the “effectivity” of laws and ideologies to 
enhance the private political aims of the political groups. Therefore, in 
modern mass-media communication the responsibility of the journalist 
is to be a critical evaluator of this process. The mass media has to func-
tion as a reflective process capable of discerning the difference betwe-
en the reflective processes in the political sphere which positivise rules 
for the sake of propagation of private political ambitions. In an intra-
cultural sense and in a cross-cultural sense, the communication about 
laws and ideologies has to be a critical communication. In this sense, 
the institutionalized mass media comprises a reflective process with the 
duty not only to report “facts” but more importantly to reflect on the 
evaluative processes which select and positivise the laws. The mass me-
dia is the major reflective process of valuation which is in a position to 
critically evaluate the “valuation of values” by political processes.
Summary
This essay discussed the primary emergence of valuation which is 
not distinct from factual activity of a meaningful construction of an en-
vironment. At this level evaluative selectivity of environmental factors 
and “natural” causality are not two distinct phenomena. The evaluative 
21 McCarthy, T. The Critical Theory of Juergen Habermas. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1979, 
p. 358-386.
22 Mickunas, A., Pilotta, J. Technology vs. Democracy. Cresskill: Hampton Press, 1998, p. 
141-154.
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activity is sedimented into customary performances within the establis-
hed environment as a meaningful interconnection of things and events. 
Yet the pressure of complexity, i.e., the emergence of various customs and 
their interaction requires rules which would be capable of managing such 
an interaction. Hence a process of reflectivity arises which functions to 
evaluate selectively customary values and posit some of them as rules.
The communication about customs is a direct call for the under-
standing of “the way we do things here;” requiring a description of the 
selective valuations of things and events and our interaction with them. 
The customary processes are legitimated by mythologies. The mythical 
figures perform similar evaluative activities and in turn sanction human 
activities. Hence mythologies communicate the customs of particular 
peoples. Yet the reflective processes which positivise selectively some 
of the values for a broader management of complex customs require 
reflective communication. Therefore, one must ask why some facets of 
a culture remain customs unaffected by legal prescripts, while others 
are submitted to regulations. The legitimation of reflectively established 
rules are expressed ideologically. Ideologies contain selected valuations 
which in turn justify the reflective selection of some values as positive 
norms for the management of complex customs. These norms are pro-
grammatic prescripts for concrete activity and structuration of the en-
vironment, justified by ideologies such as “human nature” or “historical 
progress” or even “free expression of individual wills.” One main charac-
teristic of positivized rules are that their application requires interpreta-
tion within concrete situations which involves the customary activities 
and environment, application cannot avoid the customary.
Complex societies have two possibilities for reflective positivisati-
on of norms: monistic and pluralistic. Monistic societies positivisation 
of norms is expressed by one ideology which allows the selectivity of 
norms at the expense and negation of other possible norms and ideolo-
gies. Such societies are in a constant danger of having unfulfillable va-
luations for activity and construction of environment and of revolution. 
The pluralistic societies are in a position of engendering support from 
groups with diverse norms and correlative ideologies, since all of them 
are in a position of “having their day.”
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The task of modern mass media is to function as a reflective pro-
cess. It must evaluate critically to what extent the reflective processes 
of various political groups positivise laws for the evaluative activities of 
environmental structuration, and to what extent such laws would ser-
ve as means for political maintenance of power by one group. In other 
words, to what extent the norms and attendant ideologies are exploi-
ted for private ends. In short, mass media communication is a reflective 
process whose major task is to reveal legitimation crises.
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TECHNICAL CENTERS AND  
CULTURAL MARGINS
Particularly in the last decade, scholarly debate about internatio-
nal technology transfer and national development has centered with 
growing regularity upon the disruption of social environments and the 
uneven transformation of national economies brought about by the 
introduction of modern Western technology into developing nations. 
Harsh criticisms of Western technology transfer policies and practices 
are often coupled with equally severe assessments of extra-national do-
mination of modern mass communication and information technolo-
gies. Galtung (1979), Hamelink (1983), Mattelart (1979), Smythe (1981), 
Schiller (1976; 1981), and White (1982) are readily identified with this 
trend in modern communication political economy.
Regardless whether one is sympathetic to the conspiratorial ring of 
many of their arguments, the core issue is clear enough. The commodi-
fication of Western culture in combination with its massively capitali-
zed distribution apparatus threatens to overwhelm many non-Western 
cultural systems. Too often in today’s world, the intellectual, symbolic, 
moral and instrumental resources of many nations are subject to extra-
territorial control and manipulation.
But this is not a recent situation. For better than 500 years, the rela-
tionship between Western and non-Western nations has been defined by 
one-sided economic exploitation effected through political domination 
and cultural marginalization. The “wretched” that Frantz Fanon (1968) so 
ably characterized owe their prostration to the destruction of their cultu-
ral anchorage. Nkrumah (1973: p. 207) stated the situation plainly when 
he said: “Europeans insist upon the denial that we are an historic people.” 
The colonialist arrogance that history begins only with the arrival of the 
first Europeans is surpassed only by the post-colonial conviction that his-
tory must come to a dead stop should the last European depart.
Of course, for the generation of the microchip and the superconduc-
tor it is not intellectually respectable to assert the moral superiority of 
the West. On the surface at least, the Western world has given up as 
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ideologically quaint and geo-politically impractical its self-legitimating 
formulation of land, bloodlines, and religion that so effectively worked 
hiatus upon the indigenous cultural and social evolution of societies 
around the globe. At least since the era of Oswald Spengler and the in-
troduction of automatic weapons, the bloom has fallen from the flower 
of Western moral imperialism.
But this by no means suggests that relationships have improved. Ac-
cording to Cees Hamelink, if anything, the condition of the marginals has 
deteriorated. Hamelink (1983) argues that “the survival of autonomous cul-
tural systems in many areas of the Third World is very much in question.” 
And, he continues, “cultural autonomy is essential for a process of inde-
pendent development.” The cultural marginalization of developing nations, 
the pernicious denial of history, geography and choice, has its post-War 
formulation. The modern superiority of the West, embraced with the same 
exaggerated sincerity in Nsukka and Manila as it is in New York or Paris, is 
fabricated out of the unhappy equivalences of information-technique-po-
wer. The hierophant of the technological enlightenment is the scientist; its 
holy places are the academy and the corporate research division; its cur-
rency is the intellectual and moral capital resources of global society. In its 
post-War, post-colonial formulation, modern domination is more elegant, 
more efficient, and more affluent; but its effects are no less tangible, and its 
consequences no more humane (Angus, 1984; Mickunas, 1987).
Viewed in this broad cultural perspective, control of and access to 
technology become the primary attributes distinguishing the perenni-
ally “haves” from the chronically “have not’s.” Similarly, technology trans-
fer and diffusion topics, namely, when, how, where and if, offer some of 
the most challenging and potentially valuable questions currently being 
tackled by communication scholarship. But still too often, human com-
munication is looked upon only as a means to promote the adoption of a 
desired practice (Academy for Educational Development, 1985). Today, 
we ‘export’ cigarettes; and tomorrow, we ‘transfer’ cancer research and 
“wellness” social technologies. In either instance, the privileged organiza-
tion of cultural-technological proprietorship remains in place.
Reflecting on the impact of technology on culture in the develo-
ping nations, Johan Galtung (1979) has asserted that Western attitu-
des toward technology and national development are intrinsically and 
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irremediably adversive for the social and cultural organization of life 
found in many non-Western societies. Galtung advocates profound re-
orientations within the so-called ‘alpha-structure’ that predominates 
the advanced Western technological outlook. Everett Rogers (1983) has 
acknowledged that individual blame and pro-innovation bias charac-
terize both diffusion research and diffusion practice carried on within 
the “traditional innovation diffusion paradigm.” Michael Todaro (1981) 
has observed that many societies in the developing world “suffer from 
serious cultural confusion when they come into contact with econo-
mically and technologically advanced societies.” Finally, Perlmutter 
and Sagaf-Nejad (1981) maintain that responsible technology transfer 
depends upon achieving genuine and effective dialogue among all the 
participants in a technology exchange relationship.
This discussion outlines some conceptual and methodological fea-
tures of research that promote intercultural sensitive technology trans-
fer. It argues that (1) no technology inherently makes sense for another 
cultural system, and therefore (2) an explicit determination of a tech-
nology’s socio-cultural “ft” needs to take place. This perspective emp-
hasizes the utility of achieving mutual accommodation in a technology 
exchange relationship. It attempts to delineate a polycentric model of 
technology transfer by underscoring the critical role of cultural auto-
nomy in planned technological solutions to development problems (Pi-
lotta & Widman, 1987). Finally, it offers a preliminary framework for 
indexing the socio-cultural appropriateness of a particular technology 
within a given setting in the interest of providing a methodological basis 
for genuinely collaborative knowledge transfer activities.
Communication Research and  
Knowledge Transfer
Development and technological development have come to be vie-
wed as virtually co-terminus. “Developed,” “advanced,” and “modern” 
now mean “technological.” With only the possible exception of raw dol-
lar transfusions into developing economies, every remedy for under-
development involves some sort of knowledge transfer. Even political 
reform rests finally upon sets of prescripts, techniques, and practices 
dedicated to making some preferred model of government work effecti-
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vely. It is possible to treat the ideological struggles being waged in many 
developing countries as contests between competing political techno-
logies. Be that as it may be, technological affluence has become the ac-
cepted yardstick for development in developing and developed nations 
alike. The adoption of technological accomplishment as the measure of 
development has created a virtually universal attitude toward technolo-
gical transformations as both inevitable and eagerly anticipated.
For our present purposes, technology can be defined broadly, fol-
lowing Dennis Goulet (1971), as the “systematic application of collective 
human rationality with the view to achieving greater control over nature 
and over human processes of all kinds.” International technology trans-
fer can be defined broadly as (1) the spatial translation across national 
boundaries of (2) any of the aggregate purposively designed or evolved 
ways and means for (3) benefiting enhanced human manipulation of 
production and/or the satisfaction of human needs and desires through 
(4) the rational organization of human instrumental control over the 
material and symbolic environment.
This definition of technology includes: capital inputs and imple-
ments of all types; human resource, and especially human knowledge 
inputs; as well as both technical and commercial information associated 
with the economically and socially efficient employment of technolo-
gical principles, processes, implements and products. The tremendous 
breadth of the technological domain reflects the high degree of social 
penetration, rational specialization and economic integration charac-
teristic of advanced technological societies (Luhmann 1970 & 1982). 
For example, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, “technology” comprises a vast array of items and prac-
tices which range from feasibility studies and planning, to marketing 
research that implements design and physical installations. It also in-
cludes training, management, administration, and financing devoted to 
resource exploitation and manufacture, as well as to a vast assortment of 
human service delivery structures. (Perlmutter, 1981).
It can be argued that technologies collectively represent simply va-
lue neutral means serviceable for the accomplishment of socially desira-
ble ends. When looked upon only as means, technologies constitute in-
puts into the organization of social and economic activity that respond 
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to the goals, values, and priorities established by the user. In this view, 
goals, values, and priorities are extrinsic to the particular attributes of 
the technology itself.
But even from the vantage point of this instrumental definition of 
technology as value-neutral means-ordering techniques, there is clear 
prima facie evidence of valued options. These preferred options inclu-
de presuppositions about the efficiency of technological solutions for 
development problems, thereby wedding technological innovation with 
economic and social progress (Slack, 1984; Servaes, 1986). Because this 
association appears eminently reasonable, it lends credence to genuine 
research biases that have colored both the research designs and conclu-
sions of diffusion researchers. Diffusion research has been prejudiced 
in favor of adopter categories and adopter characteristics, adoption ra-
tes (dominated by the well-known S-shaped diffusion curve), the so-
cial-psychology of change agency stratagems, the identification of an 
assortment of diffusion patterns according to spatial proximity, access 
to information, relative economic advantage, and so forth.
The operative bias is twofold: (1) the technological innovation 
inherently merits adoption, and (2) the proper objects of diffusion rese-
arch are the individuals targeted to receive the innovation, and not the 
innovation itself or the interaction of the innovation with its physical 
and human environments. As the result, a remarkable oversimplificati-
on of the knowledge transfer process has occurred. This oversimplifca-
tion of the knowledge transfer process combines with the penchant for 
taking the technology for granted in such a way that diffusion is reduced 
to a matter of demonstrating the eminent advantages of the technology 
to prospective users. In other words, diffusion is reduced to marketing. 
This practice inherently marginalizes indigenous technological traditi-
ons, and insists upon the functional irrelevance of local history. Local 
history is demoted automatically to a collection of anthropological cu-
riosities and assorted prehistory’s. In short, recipients are “fitted” to the 
technology (Halloran, 1986; Golding, 1974).
Many authors have voiced their resistance to this narrowing of the 
technology transfer, development conceptualization: Todaro (1981), Gal-
tung (1979), Schiller (1976), Golding (1974), Mattelart (1983), White 
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(1982), Servaes (1986) and Goblet (1971). In fact, the list seems endless. 
According to authors like these, both the antecedents and consequents of 
development efforts driven by knowledge transfers are affected by items 
like: international economic relationships, recipient institutional structures, 
labor force dislocation, and proprietorship over material and information 
resources, distribution of benefits, local appropriateness of technical desi-
gns and indigenous social and psychological characteristics.
Technology and the Cultural Environment
For present purposes, it is not important to review the many structur-
al constraints and special interests that shape the landscape upon which 
technology transfer runs its course: And most especially from the stand-
point of the developing nations themselves, neither does a technophobic 
exercise merit serious consideration. What is the important point is that 
the transfer of implements, procedures, ideas, and information cannot 
be compared to the simple spatial relocation of physical objects. Instead, 
technology transfer introduces an entire series of complex interactions 
that can eventuate in unanticipated sudden and telling social cultural 
transformations for the recipient societies. It is neither a matter of reshap-
ing peoples’ outlooks and values by modifying their environments, nor 
a matter of reshaping peoples’ outlooks as the condition for successful-
ly instituting permanent changes in their environments. Instead, it is a 
matter of finding ways to manage responsibly multidimensional chan-
ges occurring simultaneously across multiple materials, psycho-social, 
and environmental levels. Technology transfer, no less than the research 
apparatus that administers and informs diffusion practices, is a form of 
social action. As such, it is embedded in cultural values. In this light, it 
is easy enough to see how what is in fact suspect social science becomes 
equated with “Western” social practice. Galtung (1979: p. 15) has for-
mulated the situation in broad terms.
“Transfer of technology” can never be a socially or politically neu-
tral process, despite the use of such terms as traditional/modern or de-
veloping/developed, giving the impression of a generally accepted or 
historically inevitable process. The nature of the transfer of technology 
should be seen rather in terms of Western/non-Western, since this ma-
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kes the process clear . . . The transfer of technology being a very deep-
rooted and complex process, discussions of the terms of transfer cannot 
be limited to the terms of techniques.
It is a truism for cultural anthropology that technology, namely, 
socially or materially embodied means-ordering structures, is integra-
ted in the social and cultural environments of human groups. Every-
day taken for granted features like common sense, social hierarchies 
and individual values are interwoven with the local technological mi-
lieu. Tommy Carlstein’s (1982) “ecotechnological” analyses of the re-
lationships between “cultural action shapes” and natural habitat offers 
an application of this principle within the framework set by a broad 
conceptualization of human ecology. A technology is a socio-cultural 
mechanism. As the result, a technology is never simply located or con-
tained within a cultural domain. Instead, a technology represents a ve-
hicle for an intrinsically culturally-specific system of meanings (Pilotta 
and Widman, 1987). A technology is an expression of the framework of 
meaning within which a particular human society lives. A technology, 
in other words, represents an extension of a particular intersubjective 
human understanding (Mickunas,1987).
A technological system constitutes a configuration of means-order-
ing processes, of “how to’s” with respect to the environment. The formal 
abstractness of the technology with respect to nature endows it with an 
instrumental capacity for purposeful manipulation and transformation 
of nature by selectively recombining and disposing over naturally oc-
curring means-ordering processes (causality). But at the level of human 
culture, a technological system is thoroughly integrated with the cogni-
tive and social organization of a historically and geographically local 
cultural form. As the consequence, the simple spatial relocation of some 
item from among the technical productions of one cultural form has the 
potential for generating disruptions within another cultural form, all the 
way from the societal to the individual levels. The inability, in principle, 
for a particular culture to anticipate or to control a technology’s poten-
tial for disruptive impact upon another culture underscores the need for 
identifying collaboratively constructed domains for multilateral or poli-
centric technological mediation between the relevant cultural groups.
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No technology inherently “makes sense” within another cultural 
setting. That a given technology does make cultural sense represents a 
conclusion based upon explicit determination of its social and cultural 
“ft.” It is precisely this explicit determination of social and cultural ft that 
is almost entirely lacking in traditional innovation and diffusion mo-
dels. It is also methodologically not an object of concern for many cri-
tical political economy-based analyses of technology and development. 
The absence of a multilateral perspective is clearly symptomized by what 
Todaro (1981: p. 319) has characterized as “internal” brain drain in the 
developing countries.
Dominated by rich-country ideas as to what represents true inter-
national and professional excellence, these highly educated and highly 
skilled Third World professionals do not physically migrate to the devel-
oped nations, but nevertheless migrate “intellectually” to these coun-
tries in terms of the orientation of their activities. This “internal” brain 
drain is much more serious than the external one.
Internal brain drain is a manifestation of the condition of discursi-
ve domination of developing countries by the developed nations (Pilotta 
& Widman, 1987). In other words, the ways of thinking about needs, 
issues, remedies, and enterprises-including, most especially, what the 
words “development” and “modernity” mean-are formulated in terms 
of an exoge nously achieved conceptual vocabulary, the vocabulary of 
the advanced, technology-exporting nations.
Managing Technological Impacts
The traditional model of technology transfer has assumed that dif-
fusion consists of the transmission or “communication” of a practice 
or body of information from a sender to a receiver, where senders and 
receivers can be individuals, organizations, or entire social systems. In 
the field of communication, knowledge diffusion research has principal-
ly taken the form of either interpersonal or mass communication stu-
dies. Throughout, a technical perspective has dominated: it has stressed 
the instrumental conditions and processes associated with knowledge 
distribution and adoption, and has conceptualized its variables primari-
ly in terms of receptiveness to and the technical efficiency of knowledge 
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transfer transactions between the subjects and objects of innovation-
inducing messages.
In essence, whether at the individual or aggregate levels, the history 
of this research has gradually disclosed indirectly the demonstration ef-
fects created by change-oriented messages. The stimulus for change and 
the tendency for knowledge diffusion activities to induce effects that 
overspill the controlled asymmetry of the sender-receiver model arise 
from the condition that communicative action is attention-shaping, and 
therefore is capable of carrying consequences for domains of human 
behavior that are not provided for within the explicitly circumscribed 
scope of the information exchange. In other words, diffusion messages, 
despite being focused upon a specific problem or need, nonetheless in-
teract with a host of what are strictly speaking external factors to the 
technology transfer. However complex the change message, it is nevert-
heless simple by comparison with the much more extensive network of 
interactions comprised by the broader matrix of its combinations with 
the communication environment (e.g., the socio-cultural system of the 
recipient nation) in which the message must be understood and put to 
use. The essential quality of the demonstration effect is that the message 
is overdetermined or “has an excess of meaning” with respect to the 
larger communication milieu (Greimas, 1983).
Despite their important differences, this is the reason for the ap-
parent validity of both the purely technical and structural (critical) van-
tage points upon knowledge diffusion. The technical perspective righ-
tly makes central the state-of-affairs or problem-solving orientation of 
specific diffusion activities. From this standpoint, diffusion is a matter 
of efficient information transmission that must as far as is possible iso-
late the problem or activity at hand from the broader and uncontrolla-
ble domain surrounding it. It is not to be legitimately expected of the 
change agent that s/he be either responsible for or competent to manage 
and direct the sequences of interactions taking place within the social 
environment as part of the technology diffusion activity. These possible 
combinations are, with respect to the matter at hand, strictly irrelevant 
from the technical standpoint.
At the same time, the historical/critical/structural perspective sets 
these collateral interactions into relief and quite rightly demonstrates 
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not only the reality, but also the virtual inevitability of such impacts and 
constraints within the economic, social, historical, psychological and en-
vironmental dimensions of the recipient’s action frame. The net result is 
that the issue of technology transfer has been viewed as either a narrow, 
isolated activity or as a far-reaching historical event. In fact, it is both.
Technology transfer exchanges will reflect the higher order diffe-
rentiation of the developed source societies (Luhmann, 1970). Tech-
nology transfer exchanges purposively influence circumscribed ad hoc 
domains determined by the particular problem at hand. But these ex-
changes also simultaneously migrate into and effect repercussions sys-
temically within (technically) amorphous social domains. Thus, while 
deliberately and necessarily local, knowledge diffusion is never entirely 
‘localized’ or ‘localizable’ because the technology also carries with it the 
residue of the complexly diferentiated social environment from which 
it originated and whose articulation of that environment it necessarily 
presupposes.
Stated somewhat differently, the natural habitat of modern technolo-
gy is high social complexity; therefore, a transferred technology will gen-
erate interactions of a similar order of complexity in its new surround-
ings. Such complexity is required for the technology’s functioning. It is 
commonly acknowledged that novel technologies within developed na-
tions create multidimensional effects-psychological, social, political and 
environmental (Rice, 1984). These effects are tremendously magnified 
for less complex social forms. The great stresses and strains that a mo-
dern technology can bring about within a less differentiated developing 
environment are both manifest and well-documented by critical/struc-
tural appraisals of knowledge transfer practices.
With this much theoretical justification, we can return to the pro-
blem of managing cultural change. It has been suggested that what is 
required are efforts devoted to maximizing the ‘ft’ between the techno-
logy and its new habitat. It has been further suggested that this problem 
presupposes an understanding that (1) this environment is a fundamen-
tally exotic environment, and (2) the recipient intellectual/professio-
nal/scientific dimension of this environment has a significant bearing 
upon (in that it is part of) the possibilities contained within the reci-
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pient socio-cultural-technological system. The attention-shaping nature 
of communication practice can be used to highlight the construction of 
a multilateral or poly-centric domain of technological mediation, much 
in the same way it has been used to dress the difusion conceptualization 
in robes of neutrality and beneficent progress.
Socio-cultural Receptivity Index
From the standpoint of achieving the mediation of technology, the 
central issue is not the fact of technology’s diffusion to nations around 
the world, but the way in which the technology is interpreted and imple-
mented. Consequently, it is a problem of gauging and adjusting for the 
probable interactions between the innovation and the socio-cultural en-
vironment. This is principally a question of the communication practi-
ces associated with the technology and their way of influencing social 
patterns. In order to accomplish such gauging and adjusting, technical 
considerations and determinations need to be supplemented by a so-
cio-cultural problem-solving orientation that is adequately sensitive to 
cultural/environmental differences between the technology originator 
and the recipient nation. Such an orientation would serve to provide 
guidance (in the broadest sense) with respect to the probable interacti-
ons between the particular technology and existing cultural meanings 
and practices. That is to say, the deliverer’s sense of relevance must be 
coordinated and reconciled with the recipient’s frame of reference (e.g., 
the recipient’s cultural sensibilities). Only in this way will the two very 
different social realities achieve a measure of genuinely collaborative in-
teraction.
The immediacy of the natural environment is so much taken for 
granted that we never pay attention to it, although it sustains all of our 
biological necessities and physical functions. This unnoted “immedia-
cy” applies equally in the case of the cultural environment: we do not 
face it; rather we are embraced and engaged by it. The various elements 
comprising the natural environment become thematic only when they 
for some reason become an object of concern, especially when somet-
hing fails to perform properly or somehow obstructs normal functions. 
Similarly, the cultural environment becomes an object of concern when 
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the interconnections of its symbolic design do not apply in the accus-
tomed way. In such situations the cultural system, or rather the agents 
embraced by it, encounter ‘novelty,’ ‘nonsensicality’ or ‘confusion.’ It is 
therefore of particular signifcance that technology transfer entails the 
intentional and purposive introduction of novel configurations into a 
local cultural system.
The various symbolic designs make up a cultural eco-system which, 
while taken for granted in our daily activities, is never confronted di-
rectly; all activities, events and behaviors appear in its context. Even the 
natural environment is incorporated into this cultural framework. This 
framework becomes manifest and effectual through its various artifacts 
and institutions, ranging from the religious and mythological, to the pro-
fessional and scientific, and to social roles and the daily stylization of 
human encounters.
Socio-cultural receptivity has two principal roles: (1) it provides 
a taxonomic framework of meaning that incorporates the core dimen-
sions of cross-cultural encounters pertinent to technology and innova-
tion diffusion activities. Therefore, it furthers the identification of the 
important components of the frame of reference establishing the cul-
tural environment. (2) It serves heuristically to draw the attention of 
planners, designers and implementers to the possible domains of so-
cio-cultural environmental impact. Thus it contributes to the capacity 
for ‘sizing up’ and ‘reading’ the situation, calling attention to the likely 
combinations of socio-cultural interactions that might be encountered.
The general nature of the communication relationship between 
technology/information transfer activities and recipient cultural charac-
teristics can be formulated in the following way. On the one side, place 
characteristics are a consequence of the recipient’s stage of development. 
On the other side, delivery strategies and implementation practices and 
objectives are established by the policy and program goals of the deliv-
erer. This independence of the two parties becomes transformed into 
irreversible interdependence at the point of delivery. Regardless of the 
previous history of the recipient nation and the institutional history and 
orientation of the deliverer, the two become “locked” irrevocably into a 
reciprocal communication structure. It is this structural interdependen-
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ce of communicative action that determines the possibility, the effecti-
veness, the timeliness, and the sustainment/durability of the technology 
exchange undertaking.
Socio-cultural receptivity indexing places emphasis upon locating 
possibilities for mutual intersection between different complex sys-
tems of cultural designs (Pilotta & Widman,1987). The methodological 
assumption is that there exist no ‘one way’ influences. By its very nature, 
technology mediates and is mediated by the socio-cultural system into 
which it is being introduced, viz., it effects changes and is itself changed. 
Consequently, the objective is to raise the inevitable intercombination 
with a communication environment to an explicit domain of analysis 
in order to make possible the maximal anticipation of consequences. In 
this setting, the innovation and its interaction with the socio-cultural 
environment are the chief foci of research attention. Indeed, adopter 
characteristics and determinants, as well as the characteristics and de-
terminants affecting the deliverer and the deliverer’s sense of relevance 
are treated as elements of the interaction configuration produced “pro-
blematizing” of the innovation which establishes the basis for explicit 
cultural mediation of the technology.
The following roster itemizes dimensions along which the cultural 
mediation of the technology is to be pursued and, it should be empha-
sized, pursued across the symbolic designs framing both deliverer and 
recipient cultural sensibilities.
Social Cultural Receptivity Dimensions
Cultural Factors:
1.  social organization of space and place: central place, prominent 
natural features; the articulation of social roles and, status rela-
tive to locally significant landscape.
2.  social institutions: education or the organization of work; adapt-
ability of the local mind-set to the technology; local aspirations 
and expectations.
3.  value composition: prevailing beliefs and myths, cherished vir-
tues and practices; also constructs like common sense, proprie-
ty, justice and the like.
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4.  ritual organization of social life: punctuality, ceremony, hierar-
chy and psychological adjustment.
5.  cultural legitimation of social structure: the relationships between 
cultural outlook, heritage and values and role divisions, status, 
social place of different generations and genders; political forms.
6.  cultural aesthetics: concepts of beauty, decoration, and appropri-
ateness; aesthetics of the physical environment; also the percep-
tion of symbolic designs and artistic forms.
Social Factors:
1.  somatic expression: bodily expressiveness, physical regimen 
and rhythms, tact.
2.  psychological culture: emotions, manners, appropriateness, so-
ciability, trust.
3.  conceptual/credal constellations: differences between groups, 
unchallengeable beliefs, unmentionable topics, world-view.
4.  linguistic culture: cultural face and language; verbal expression 
of equality, sincerity, superiority, uncertainty, disagreement and 
the like.
5.  individual interpretive matrix: the other’s likely assumptions and 
interpretations of statements and actions; how one’s culture, his-
tory, and social position are read from the other’s point of view.
In short, both general cultural factors and more apparently commu-
nication-specifc factors affect the delivery and enactment of the know-
ledge transfer. Sometimes, it is a question of the mutual adjustment of 
expectations about the other that takes the form of negotiating cultural 
differences. For the deliverer, constant monitoring and careful evalua-
tion are crucial to the gradual development of trust and collaboration. 
It is important that the recipient has a way to see that it is the recipient’s 
own best interest that is served by the innovation, and consequently that 
the technology “makes sense” within the recipient’s own cultural un-
derstanding.
Accessing recipient cultural sensibilities and priorities lies at the 
heart of this research approach. Establishing this access requires partici-
patory research methods (White, 1984). By enacting a problem-solving, 
user-oriented approach, participatory research attempts to avoid the sit-
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uation in which researchers gather information from a population for 
purposes that are either undisclosed or unintelligible to the population. 
Participatory research begins from the premise that the recipient popula-
tion knows best its own situation and requires that the research activity 
be ratified as having value to the recipient’s own life-situation.
Technology transfer is a form of social action. Participatory rese-
arch acknowledges social action as a legitimate component in the rese-
arch design. It seeks to engage the research population in the research 
process and assist the research population to understand the relevance 
of the activity of concern in light of the recipient’s own social environ-
ment. Participatory research (1) helps to create a shared awareness of an 
existing social reality; (2) promotes indigenous recognition of possibi-
lities for change; (3) presupposes interaction between deliverer and re-
cipient roles; and (4) constitutes the recipient as an equal partner in the 
exchange process. In summary, assessment research conducted along 
SCRI dimensions can be integrated into a development program as a 
means for the gradual coordination of pertinent relevancies. In this way, 
the research procedure can guard against the temptation to focus irres-
ponsibly upon the decision to adopt as an end in itself.
We have argued for the utility of a culturally sensitive approach to 
technology transfer. We have provided a justification for doing some 
additional fine tuning of technology transfer and diffusion practices by 
identifying some conceptual shortfalls among existing research perspec-
tives, and by highlighting the reality of research issues that still need to 
be addressed. The theoretical relevance of these issues has been establis-
hed by way of a qualitative approach that looks at cultural environments 
(including technological structures) as elaborate sign-system articulati-
ons of social habitats. This perspective calls for a problem-solving and 
user oriented research procedure hinging upon the management of 
cultural differences.
Our aim has been to extend, rather than to restrict, the scope of con-
siderations meriting attention by knowledge diffusion and development 
communication scholars. At the same time, we have carefully avoided 
importing socio-philosophical predispositions into the definition of the 
problem. Having one’s conclusions in advance remarkably foreshortens 
insight into the complex variability of the relevant phenomena.
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